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ABSTRACT 
Expressive forms of collective and individual mobilization of the evangelical population 
in the United States have been understudied in both social movement theory and religion 
and politics literature. While these forms of mobilization are not the only form of 
mobilization, they are important to understanding what specific issues evangelicals are 
feeling aggrieved about. Current research such as Wong (2018a; 2018b) and  Sides, Tesler, 
and Vavreck (2018) have found that there is a growing sense of racial anxiety among the 
ranks of white evangelicals. Hence, it is likely that evangelicals, at least white evangelicals, 
are feeling a sense of marginalization.   
I theorize that a growing feeling of social marginalization is driving evangelicals to 
mobilize using forms of expressive mobilization such as political consumerism and Twitter 
venting. These forms of expression help to alleviate their social strain and promote their 
Biblical values publicly as a way of “identity claiming”. I interview clergy in three different 
states, perform case studies, and analyze Twitter data to test this theoretical assertion. I find 
that, while evangelicals are demonstrating signs of social marginalization, they are only 
mobilizing under a very specific set of circumstances. Their proclivity towards individual 
salvation and otherworldliness hinders a sense of “collective identity” which is essential to 
collective action.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"I believe what the Bible says [about marriage], so I came out here to support Chick-
fil-A and the movement," Chauncy Fields tells Fox News as he devours a hot tasty Chick-
fil-A chicken biscuit (Roberts 2012). Another Chick-fil-A consumer echoes a similar 
sentiment but with a touch of exasperation, "He [Dan Cathy, the COO of Chick-fi-A] said 
the exact same thing that President Obama said, and he gets negativity and Obama gets 
positivity!" (2012). These two individuals, along with millions of evangelicals, 
conservatives and others flocked to Chick-fil-A on August 1, 2012, to consume chicken 
and publicly express their political and social positions by showing support for a company 
who shared those positions. These two men participated in a growing form of political 
expression: political consumerism. This particular movement happened for a reason and 
represented an area of religion and politics research that, until this dissertation, has been 
left derelict. 
The Pew Research Group carried out the following thought experiment. If the United 
States only had one hundred people what would be the religious makeup of that group? 
There would be twenty-one Catholics, fifteen mainline Protestants, twenty-three 
unaffiliated, six Black Protestants and a handful of Mormons, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, 
Buddhists, other Christians, and other faiths. The group I am leaving out, of course, is 
evangelical Protestants. They hold the top position with twenty-five (Alper and Sandstrom 
2016). 
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While it is true that religiously unaffiliated “nones” are a growing number in America 
today, it would be fallacious to assume that evangelicalism is dead and of little 
consequence. Religion and politics scholars have studied the counterintuitive (Durkheim 
and Lukes 2014; Parsons 1949; Weber 1978;) vibrancy of the evangelical population in 
America (Hunter 1992; Smith et al.1998), and have attempted to understand who they are, 
what they believe and how they operate within politics (Emerson and Smith 2000; Guth 
1996; Jelen 1993b; Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Moen 1989; 1992; 1994; 1996; Oldfield 1996; 
Streensland et al. 2000; Wilcox 1986; 1989; 1990; 1996; 1991; Wilcox and Jelen 1990; 
Wilcox and Robinson 2010; Wuthnow 1988; 2014). Countless scholars show the 
influential importance of religion on various forms of political behavior along with the 
development of civic skills (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Calhoun-Brown 1998; 
Campbell 2004; Chaves 2004; Djupe and Gilbert 2006; Djupe, Neiheisal, and Sokhey 
2017; Gilbert 1993; Green 1999; Green, Guth, Smidt, Kellstedt 1996; Harris 1999; 
Huckfeldt, Plutzer, Sprague 1993; Jelen 1991; 2001; Jennings 2005; Kellstedt and Green 
1993; Kellstedt 1994; Kohut, Green, Keeter, Toth 2000; McKenzie 2004; Olson and 
Crawford 2001; Olson and Green 2006; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wald 2003; 
Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). Thus, there is little argument that religion is not important to 
people’s political beliefs and behaviors.  
Religion and politics scholars analyze religion’s influence on different forms of 
political mobilization such as voting, civic engagement, and racial empowerment 
(Calhoun-Brown 1996; 1998; Campbell 2004; Djupe and Gilbert 2006; Djupe and Grant 
2001; Wilcox 1990). Scholars initially looked at the one-dimensional relationship between 
religion and political participation and asked the question: does religious participation 
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stimulate political participation or does it suppress political participation? Calhoun-Brown 
(1998) contends that religion’s impact on political participation cannot be stripped down 
to the simplistic relationship of stimulating or suppressing; instead, different dimensions 
of religion should be considered. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) show how religious 
behavior in a religious institution develops civic skills and acts as a substitute for education. 
Other research shows how religious beliefs, clergy, church organizational structures, 
church community environment, available resources, and a well-developed group identity 
positively impact the political mobilization of religious groups. Sometimes these differing 
religious variables act as opiates to political action, while in other cases they positively 
influence individuals in ways that lead to political action (see Calhoun-Brown 1996). 
Others find that the environmental context also influences political engagement (Djupe and 
Gilbert 2006; Djupe and Grant 2001; Olson 2000).  
This research provides insight into the multi-dimensional and nuanced world of religion 
and political mobilization. However—though scholars such as Jasper (1997; 2008) in 
modern social movement theory have acknowledged it—only a few scholars in religion 
and political literature have realized that while rational behavior, resources, beliefs, group 
identity, organization and environmental context are all central to understanding the 
mobilization (or lack thereof) of the religious community, emotions cannot be ignored. 
Early social movement theorists argued that a feeling of marginalization and alienation was 
all that was needed to motivate a group into collective action (Arendt 1951; Buechler 1993; 
1995; Kornhauser 1959). This simplistic view of collective action was soon replaced by a 
more sophisticated understanding of the specific mechanisms needed to stimulate and 
organize collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977) but the importance of emotion to 
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collective action should never be lost in the array of new, sophisticated variables. Social 
movement scholars such as Jasper (1998; 2011) and Benford and Snow (2000) realized the 
importance of emotion and framing to collective action and therefore introduced a new 
theory, the theory of social constructionism. This theory maintains the rationality and 
practicality promoted by the resource mobilization model, but also accounts for the impact 
of emotion. Specifically, social constructionism contends that emotions are socially 
constructed by movement elites in order to stir up desired political behavior. Therefore, in 
this dissertation, I contend that emotion cannot be lost in the study of religion and political 
behavior.  
What emotions brewing in the evangelical community might we, as scholars, be 
missing? Specifically, are evangelicals feeling a sense of marginalization by a changing 
society? Evangelicals have held a dominant position in society, and yet recent research 
shows that they are showing signs of perceived marginalization. What does it take for a 
dominant group in society to feel as though they are oppressed rather than the oppressors? 
Given the importance of marginalization to mobilization, if evangelicals are indeed feeling 
marginalized, are they responding with mobilization? Further, what kinds of mobilization 
are they willing to engage in as a result of these feelings? 
Wong (2018a) finds that white evangelicals are struggling with demographic changes 
within their ranks. She shows that the proportion of Black, Latinx and Asian evangelicals 
have grown while the proportion of white evangelicals has decreased. She finds, however, 
that despite these demographic changes within the evangelical community, white 
evangelicals "appear to be supporting a political agenda that goes against the tide of 
demographic change in the United States" (88). These findings coincide with those of 
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Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek (2016; 2017; 2018) who show that white Americans are 
displaying signs of anxiety and even perceived marginalization because of demographic 
changes in society. Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek (2017) call this anxiety the “white identity” 
crisis and point out the uniqueness of a “white identity” crisis in a country that is primarily 
white. They attribute the recent surge of a “white identity” rhetoric in politics to the racial 
strain amongst whites in response to having an African American president coupled with 
Donald Trump’s use of “us” versus “them” rhetoric during his presidential campaign. 
The demographic changes occurring within the evangelical population are a microcosm 
of what is happening in America at large. Further, there is a unique difference between 
white evangelicals and evangelicals of a minority race/ethnicity (Wong 2018a). However, 
it is important to note that social strain in the white evangelical population is likely 
connected to this broader sense of anxiety present amongst white Americans as they 
struggle with their looming “status loss” in society and loss of power in the political realm 
as a result of shifting societal demographics (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017; 2018; Tesler 
and Sides 2016; Tesler 2016; Wong 2018a; 2018b). This literature finds that ethnic and 
racial identities played a tremendous role in the election of Donald Trump. Sides, Tesler, 
and Vavreck (2016; 2017; 2018) and Tesler (2016) found that divisions tied to race, 
immigration and religion were exacerbated due to the “us” versus “them” rhetoric used in 
the Trump campaign. Hence, Donald Trump’s election sheds light on an area of social and 
status anxiety simmering in the ranks of white America.  
Thus, current literature shows that in the general white population there is social strain 
brewing, a strain that Trump was able to use to his advantage (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 
2016; 2017; 2018; Wong 2018a). Wong (2018a) points out that this strain is not associated 
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with economics—as many assumed—but rather to issues of race. White evangelicals are 
experiencing an even more substantial demographic shift in their community than whites 
in general. Their support for President Trump was substantially higher (80%) than that of 
their non-evangelical white counterparts (31%), indicating an even stronger emotional 
impetus for political mobilization (Wong 2018b). Wong (2018a; 2018b) explains that 
evangelicals are feeling a sense of marginalization based on racial prejudice and societal 
strain as their "us" versus "them" mentality is constructed and reconstructed for the benefit 
of Republican elites. This does not mean that evangelical marginalization is based solely 
on a "white identity" crisis but that it is a crucial factor that cannot be ignored. 
Many other factors are likely also contributing to feelings of marginalization. I will 
touch on these other possible influential factors throughout this dissertation. However, the 
purpose of this dissertation is not to uncover and assess why evangelicals are feeling 
marginalized but rather to look at how they are expressing themselves through 
unconventional forms of political mobilization as a result of this emotional impetus.   
Both social movement theory and theories of political behavior acknowledge the 
importance of expression as a form of political mobilization (Jasper 1998; 2011; 
Theocharis 2015). Rojas and Puig-I-Abril (2009) explain that expression is the way that 
individuals can publicly express their political orientations; thus, it is an essential part of 
the mobilization process. Further, Charles Tilly (1978) calls this kind of expression 
"identity claiming." It is the simple act of expressing one's identity, one's collective "we" 
to the world. It is not an attempt to change the world as much as it is a form of expressing 
that one's perspectives, values, and identity still exist and "constitute a unified force to be 
reckoned with" (Tilly 1978, 184). 
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Evangelicals make up a sizable portion of the population and, as the Christian Right 
Movement taught political scientists, should not be underestimated or understudied (Moen 
1992). Elites construct a “marginalized” collective identity to stimulate evangelicals into 
political participation. Given the latent civic skills (Campbell 2004) in the evangelical 
community, evangelical churches are ripe with powerful and skilled individuals who, on a 
moment’s notice, have the organizational capacity, civic skills, and resources to mobilize—
they just need to emotional stimuli to push them over the edge.  
While emotion is an understudied causal variable in the “religion” and “political 
behavior” relationship, there are some understudied forms of political behavior as well. 
The Donald Trump presidential election showed that evangelicals are willing to mobilize 
conventionally; however, conventional mobilization is not the only form of mobilization 
available to groups who feel aggrieved. Throughout history, marginalized groups have 
turned to extra-institutional forms of mobilization such as protests, marches, rallies, and 
boycotting. Might we find evangelicals utilizing such forms of mobilization as they adopt 
the marginalized label for themselves? 
Expression is a form of mobilization. Are evangelicals motivated to express themselves 
using unconventional, extra-institutional forms of political mobilization? What other ways 
might evangelicals be expressing their feelings about society and politics? While voting 
behavior, lobbying, political donations, founding and funding pressure groups, writing 
members of Congress and any other form of conventional political participation are 
essential to understanding the mobilization of the evangelicals, there are other forms of 
expressive political mobilization that may be used to tell us more about the emotional 
context driving these individuals to engage in conventional political participation.  
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Evangelicals are still highly involved in forms of conventional political participation 
and continue to have an impact on the American political landscape (Wilcox and Robinson 
2010). The Donald Trump presidential election is perhaps one of the most recent examples 
of evangelical political participation and influence. In this dissertation, I do not argue that 
forms of conventional political participation are irrelevant, nor do I contend that 
evangelicals are disengaged from these forms of participation. In fact, I argue the opposite. 
Evangelicals are quite willing to engage in conventional forms of political participation 
when they feel the need (Fowler et al. 2013; Smith 1998). Religion and politics scholars 
are keenly aware of this and the importance of understanding the ways that religion 
influences and informs such participation. However, there is scant research that studies 
how and why evangelicals engage in unconventional expressive forms of political 
participation such as marches and protests, boycotting, or online media expression. While 
these unconventional forms of political participation are by no means the only forms of 
participation, nor are they even the most important, they are and have played an essential 
role in many social movements in American history. Further, these forms of political 
mobilization are highly expressive and usually indicate the specific issues of social strain 
present in the aggrieved group. 
Tilly (1978) discusses the “repertoire” of activities that aggrieved groups use to express 
themselves and their desires. The repertoire changes with the times. Forms of expressive 
mobilization are indicative of social strain and studying them provides a unique picture of 
evangelical social strain or lack thereof. We can better understand some of the issues and 
concerns present in the evangelical population by studying what kinds of issues they 
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express themselves for or against. Thus, studying unconventional political participation 
informs our understanding of conventional participation.  
I also believe the research in this dissertation can lead to more research and greater 
insight into the political polarization literature and the presumed culture war (Layman 
2001; Layman and Carsey 1998; Layman and Green 2005). Presumably, the more society 
embraces socially liberal norms, the more socially conservative norms will stand out. This 
is common sense, and would work in the opposite direction as well. The key here is the 
fact that these norms must be publicly expressed as still existent for them to "stand out." 
Evangelical expressive mobilization makes these views stand out. 
There are only a select few groups left in the US who still hold certain "black or white" 
positions on social issues. Abortion, homosexuality, and sexuality are all highly divisive 
and invoke strong feelings (Hunter 1992). However, most groups, including evangelicals 
have become more open and accepting of forms of sexuality or homosexuality present in 
society (Pew Research Group 2016; 2017). A subset of "traditional values still persists" 
(Inglehart and Baker 2000). Thus, the idea that evangelical/conservative views on issues 
of sexuality are outdated swells until some form of outdated social expression reminds 
people that this view still exists. Hence, "there's still more work to do." 
For example, the North Carolina school system recently removed the children’s book 
“Jacob Wears a Dress” because of parental opposition. The authors of the book, 
disappointed by the reaction, said “Our hope, when we wrote this book, was that someday 
it would be considered quaint. We imagined future generations saying, ‘What was the fuss 
about?’ Clearly, there’s more work to do.” (Mele 2017). “Clearly, there’s more work to 
do” implies that since socially conservative perspectives on human sexuality still exist, 
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these authors’ job is not complete. This means that statements and expressions in favor of 
socially conservative norms likely stimulate progressives to fight harder for their end goals. 
I believe that this dynamic feedback loop between social perspectives is overlooked in 
polarization literature. Therefore, my dissertation's analysis of evangelical expression 
provides a critical missing piece for this otherwise complex puzzle of polarization.   
Why should we care then about how evangelicals are expressively mobilizing in 
support of their values and identity? Numerous scholars already agree that religion's impact 
on political behavior cannot be overstated; thus, understanding the impact of emotions on 
the expressive mobilization of one of the most significant religious populations in the 
United States is essential to understanding political behavior in the United States. If we 
choose not to care, we may yet again be blindsided by future election results or befuddled 
when evangelicals engage politically in something we never saw coming. 
These expressive forms of mobilization act as proxies for what is going on in the hearts 
and minds of evangelicals and provide insight into their feelings of social marginalization. 
I theorize that the higher their feelings of social strain, the more they will engage in these 
forms of expressive mobilization. This allows them to, at the very least, express their 
thoughts and feelings on issues they about which they feel strongly. Studying why and how 
they maintain their religious vitality, or what kinds of evangelicals are out there, or even 
studying the Christian Right's political participation, will never allow us to fully understand 
the dynamics and nuance of the evangelical population and what levels, if any, of 
marginalization they may be feeling. Further, it misses how this marginalization is 
affecting their behavior now and may affect their behavior in future or current elections. 
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Summary 
This dissertation is about perceived social marginalization and subsequent expressive 
mobilization of evangelicals in America. Do evangelicals, regardless of ideology, race, age 
or political persuasion, feel marginalized by society and/or government? Given the Donald 
Trump presidential administration, is it possible for them to feel a sense of political efficacy 
while still possessing a sense of marginalization? Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2017) show 
that social strain was and is present among the ranks of white Americans surrounding issues 
of race, immigration, and religion. Thus, if evangelicals do feel marginalized how does this 
perceived marginalization cause them to express themselves through unconventional 
political participation? The Donald Trump election is evidence they are willing to engage 
in conventional political participation; but, in what ways have they attempted to relieve 
their perceived social strain through alternative forms of political mobilization? Does an 
increase in feelings of marginalization cause them to mobilize expressively? I argue that 
evangelicals when they do mobilize, are counter-mobilizing since mobilization is the 
attempt to change the societal status-quo and counter-mobilization is the attempt to stall or 
maintain the challenged status-quo.  
Evangelicals are just one of many groups in the United States fighting to make their 
voices heard. All groups are important to the political and social process of any democratic 
country, and every group uniquely influences society and politics. Evangelicals'  zero-sum 
understanding of morality is another reason I am interested in evangelicals in the USA. 
They are one of only a few groups left in the United States that adamantly claim that their 
way (belief system) is the only way, while the societal zeitgeist is that everybody’s way is 
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the right way. Given this current societal trend, I believe that it is important to understand 
how evangelicals are feeling in response to societal change and if they are mobilizing in 
kind.  
Evangelicals are not a homogeneous unit. This means there is likely not one universally 
shared feeling. African American evangelicals may be responding and/or mobilizing 
differently than white evangelicals. Younger evangelicals may have different feelings in 
than older evangelicals. These are differences that I intend to unravel and better understand 
while writing this dissertation. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I cannot unravel the 
answers to all these intricacies, but I can begin shedding light on them. 
I expect to find that evangelicals are becoming increasingly frustrated with the direction 
of the country and thus perceive themselves to be socially marginalized. Ergo, in this 
dissertation, I theorize that, based on social movement theory, one-way evangelicals will 
express their displeasure with the feeling of marginalization is by expressively mobilizing. 
Assuming evangelicals believe they have lost some of their political and social influence, 
I posit that they will use different forms of expression as their form of mobilization. I use 
political consumerism and social media venting as indicators of this expression. These are 
not the only two forms of unconventional political participation. Other forms of political 
participation include protests, marches, picketing, violence, and rioting. I focus primarily 
on political consumerism and social media venting for two reasons: political consumerism 
is now one of the most frequently used forms of political participation (Michelleti 2003); 
social media venting is a growing forum for political participation (Theocharis 2015).  
In Chapter 2, I review the relevant literature. I spend most of the chapter summarizing 
the literature on evangelicals, their history, their philosophy and beliefs, their place in 
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society, and their relationship with marginalized groups such as African Americans and 
those in the LGBTQ community. Much of the chapter is spent unraveling the many 
different interpretations and definitions of "evangelical." I also use a good portion of this 
chapter to review social movement theory and political efficacy. 
I set up my theory and establish the assumptions for my theory of social 
marginalization and subsequent mobilization in the third chapter. Broadly, my theory can 
be applied to all groups who feel a sense of marginalization. However, since I am looking 
specifically at evangelicals, I narrow my theory to fit some of their idiosyncrasies. I use 
the final portion of Chapter 3 to spell out my hypotheses and the implications of my theory 
that I intend to analyze in this dissertation.  
Chapter 4 is the first of my empirical chapters. It is an exploratory chapter and focuses 
primarily on the "marginalization" portion of my theory. I analyze findings from qualitative 
field research. I discuss findings from interviews with different evangelical pastors from 
three different states. These interviews provide much-needed insight into the individual 
thoughts and reactions that evangelical clergy are experiencing in response to changes in 
society. I can confirm my original assumption that evangelicals are indeed feeling 
marginalized, while also uncovering some of the differing reasons for this feeling of 
marginalization, across race, age, region, and denomination. The findings presented in this 
chapter are insightful, while also, at times, surprising. I find that evangelical pastors, for 
the most part, even though they displayed a high sense of societal marginalization, are not 
expressively mobilizing individually or collectively.   
In Chapter 5 I perform a case study analysis of collective evangelical mobilization 
through political consumerism. Though evangelical elites and some evangelical 
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organizations have been very loud in recent history, there are limited instances of collective 
evangelical political consumerism that do not stem from these organizations. I use this 
chapter to analyze one organized boycott and one organized buycott. I use the rest of the 
chapter to focus on what moving parts are sufficient to motivate evangelicals who are not 
part of these organizations into collective action.  
In Chapter 6, I analyze individual evangelical mobilization via Twitter. Twitter is a 
handy source of individual public expression. I analyze the differences in how evangelicals 
mobilize by looking at a little over 17,000 evangelical Twitter users and the proportion of 
tweets that are political versus mundane or spiritual. Further, I analyze the sentiment of the 
tweets and compare them to the sentiments expressed by a control dataset of randomly 
selected Twitter users. 
In Chapter 7, I conclude and establish this dissertation's place in the literature and 
discuss plans for future research. This dissertation is just the starting point of a wealth of 
further research that explores corporate politics, polarization and public opinion, and a 
more in-depth analysis of evangelical marginalization and mobilization. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: EVANGELICAL WHO? 
"If ideological leaders warn darkly of the dangers of the forces of liberalism, and stir 
up hatred towards gays and lesbians, feminists, secularists, and others with whom they do 
not agree, the movement will constitute a divisive force in America that threatens the 
lifestyles of many citizens" (Wilcox 1996, 150). Wilcox, a prominent religion and politics 
scholar, warns of the dangers of a healthy and unified Christian Right. Many religion and 
politics scholars have studied the motivations and movements of the Christian Right 
(Leinesch 1982). They delved into the psyche of its members and tried to understand the 
motivations and reasoning behind their beliefs and political actions. However, most 
religion and politics scholars who study evangelicalism focus almost exclusively on the 
Christian Right. 
While there is much to learn and understand about the Christian Right, there is also 
much missed by focusing exclusively on this extreme ideological portion of evangelicals. 
Evangelicals, in total, are much more nuanced and diverse than this ideological branch of 
the Christian Right. Evangelicalism, at its core, is not a race, it is not a political ideology, 
nor is it a political persuasion, it is a set of Biblical, theological beliefs. I am interested in 
the perceived marginalization and expressive mobilization of evangelicals whether they be 
conservative or liberal, black or white, young or old, southern or northern, rich or poor, 
educated or uneducated. However, it behooves my research to briefly overview the 
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previous research, debates, definitions and findings on the Christian Right, or in rare cases, 
all evangelicals.   
Firstly, I am interested in understanding the inter-workings of one specific group; the 
evangelical Christian base in America. They are an unconventional crowd, mainly because 
of the division and disagreement amongst their members. Evangelicals tend to be content 
not conforming to the social zeitgeist and many have been reticent to engage in overtly 
political behavior (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Campbell 2004; Djupe, Neiheisel, Sokhey 2017; 
Green 1999; Green, Guth, and Wilcox 1998; Green, Rozell, and Wilcox 2000; Olson 2000) 
even though they have chosen to engage in political behavior under specific circumstances 
(Green 1999; Green, Guth, and Hill 1993; Green, Rozell, and Wilcox 2000; 2003; Jelen 
1991; Leinesch 1982; Wald 1989; Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Evangelicals are steadfast 
and devout in their adherence to their doctrines and beliefs regardless of the way society 
may or may not be trending. Further, evangelicals baffle the minds of scientists who argue 
that modernization should and usually does result in the extinction of religion.  
There is quite an abundance of literature that says that religion and modernization 
cannot and do not coexist. This is the secularization/modernization hypothesis. Emile 
Durkheim and Steven Lukes (2014), Max Weber (1978) and Talcott Parsons (1949) 
formulated the theory of modernization. Modernization posits that advances in technology, 
education, communication and urban growth enlighten the human mind. These advances 
convert society from beliefs in the spiritual to beliefs in science. This conversion is the 
direct result of science answering previously unanswered life questions that were once 
answered by spirituality.   
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Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1964; 2011) introduced a similar theory with their 
class conflict model. They argued that members of society in power used religion to dumb 
down the minds of the oppressed. They postulated that religion appeased minds and 
provided an explanation for oppression and an escape from oppression. Thus, once 
communism/socialism and modernization brought about an equal and fair society, religion 
became unnecessary and irrelevant.  
The modernization of European countries has affirmed these theories; however, the 
United States, one of the leading industrialized and modernized societies, has not followed 
suit. As one political scientist states, “American religion, like Mark Twain, has obstinately 
refused to comply with reports of demise” (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2018, 8). Further 
literature has shown that not only is religion still present, it is highly influential on political 
behavior (Calhoun-Brown 1996; 1998; Djupe and Olson 2007; Djupe and Gilbert 2008; 
2006; Djupe and Grant 2001; Guth 2001; Guth, Kellstedt, Green, and Smidt 2002; 
McKenzie 2004; Smidt 2016).  
Against standing theory then, religion, and specifically American Christianity, is 
relevant, both socially and politically. Despite Christianity’s persistent relevance, scholars 
agree that the study of religion and its followers, in the context of politics, suffers from a 
lack of scholarly attention (Vitz 1985). While there is a small niche within political science 
that devotes attention to religion and politics, the niche is not a completed collection and 
still has room for exploration.  
Evangelical Vitality 
There is a subset of religion and politics research that focuses exclusively on religious 
vitality in America, specifically, evangelical vitality in America since evangelicalism has 
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maintained its vitality against the odds (Hunter 1981; 1992; Smith et al. 1998). There are 
two primary schools of thought that attempt to unpack this evangelical anomaly. James 
Davidson Hunter (1981; 1992) introduced the idea of a "culture war." He claimed that the 
resurgence of conservative religion during the 1960s through the 1980s was a defensive 
maneuver in response to the increasing forces of modernity. He states that religion has two 
choices when faced with modernity: resistance or accommodation. He finds that 
evangelicals have chosen to resist. They distance themselves from the “evil devices” of 
modernity by creating social boundaries for themselves. This intentional distancing 
preserves and strengthens their vitality (Hunter 1981; 1992). He concludes that evangelical 
vitality is due to their geographic and social distance from modernity (Hill 2004). 
However, years later, scholars began to reject the idea that modernity and secularism 
were the leading causes of evangelical vitality and resurgence. One scholar, Smith et al. 
(1998), posited the subcultural identity theory, which gives a different reason for religious 
vitality. He found that self-described evangelicals were more highly educated than all their 
religious and non-religious counterparts, save for mainline Protestants. Further, the 
evangelical's average yearly income was higher than most every other form of Christianity, 
and they were also less likely to live in rural America than other Christian persuasions. 
Hunter's assertion that evangelical vitality is due to their geographic and social distance 
from modernity is less plausible given Smith et al.'s (1998) findings about evangelicalism. 
Smith offers his answer for continued religious vitality. He says that modernity, instead of 
threatening to evangelicals, is stimulating to them. That is, secularism/modernity helps to 
re-establish an in-group, out-group mentality for evangelicals (see Jelen 1991). This 
mentality stimulates and re-invigorates them religiously. Thus, interaction with and 
 19  
proximity to out-groups renews the groups’ distinction from other groups.  He defines 
subcultural identity: “In a pluralistic society, those religious groups will be relatively 
stronger which better possess and employ the cultural tools needed to create both clear 
distinction from and significant engagement and tension with other relevant outgroups, 
short of becoming genuinely countercultural” (Smith et al. 1998, 118-119).  
These two analyses on evangelical vitality agree on very little. However, one aspect is 
similar between them; both studies use either the basic doctrinal definition of evangelical 
or self-identification to select their evangelical subgroups. This is unique since much 
research on evangelicals focuses on the Christian Right or the conservative aspect of 
evangelicals. However, these two scholars only analyze how and what stimulates religious 
vitality. That is secularism either drives evangelicals to create more boundaries to shut 
themselves off from the world, or pushes them to a greater in-group homogeneity and out-
group alienation. With this dissertation, I research the flip side of this. What stimulates 
doctrinal evangelicals to interact and express themselves and their perspectives to the 
world? Many scholars have answered this question, but few have addressed how emotion 
affects unconventional expressive mobilization (see Christian Smith 2014).  
The gap I intend to fill concerns all evangelicals and not just members of the Christian 
Right. I endeavor to uncover truths about evangelical feelings and how those feelings 
manifest in forms of expression. How do evangelicals feel about the trajectory of society? 
Have these feelings affected their political and social involvement? How do the recent 
trends in society towards secularization, especially in sexuality, cause evangelicals to feel? 
Are evangelicals feeling a sense of marginalization, and if so, is this causing members to 
engage in politics and society differently? Do they feel that they are experiencing a societal 
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attack on their convictions or are they more concerned with the possibility of a loss of 
social status and power position in government (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018)? Based 
on prominent research on mobilization and counter-mobilization, evangelicals, equipped 
with a unique set of civic skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Campbell 2004), if 
they are indeed feeling marginalized, are likely to respond both conventionally and 
unconventionally.  
Is there a shared feeling of marginalization between African American evangelicals 
and white evangelicals or is the marginalization felt by white evangelicals exclusive to 
white evangelicals? According to the literature on race and religion, African Americans 
and evangelicalism have a complicated past and present relationship (Day 2012; Harris 
1999; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990). The African American religious community has a 
unique set of experiences that set them apart politically from white evangelicals (Calhoun-
Brown 1996; 1998; Emerson and Smith 2000; Harris 1996; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990); 
however, Black and white evangelicals share the same perspectives on many social and 
doctrinal issues. Are there any feelings of marginalization that are tied explicitly to the 
perceived marginalization of religious values and if so, does this form of marginalization 
cross racial lines? If these feelings of marginalization do cross race lines, does it invoke 
similar forms of mobilization or varied forms of mobilization?  
Evangelical Who? 
According to the Pew Research Group, Evangelical Christians make up 25.4% of the 
Christian population in American while Mainline Protestants make up 14.7% of the 
Christian population in America (2015a). Evangelical denominations usually include the 
Southern Baptists, Independent Baptists, Assembly of God, Church of God, and some 
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Presbyterians (Brint and Abrutyn 2010; Goren and Chapp 2017).  
While the research of religion and politics is a small niche in political science, there 
has been a good deal of research done on Mainline Protestantism, Catholicism, the 
evangelical Christian Right and their respective relationships to politics. However, most 
scholars’ struggle defining and identifying evangelical. Hence, one of the most researched 
and debated topics in religion and politics research centers around what evangelical means. 
There is no easy answer to this question, and there is no scholarly consensus or agreement 
on precisely what evangelicalism is (Burge and Lewis 2018; Ethridge and Feagin 1979; 
Hackett and Lindsay 2008; Hunter 1981;  Streensland et al. 2000; Warner 1979). At their 
core, evangelicals are a subset of Protestants who believe in the need to proselytize or 
evangelize. The word evangelical is a derivative of the Greek word euangelion, which 
means "gospel." Evangelicals are keenly concerned with spreading the "good news" of the 
Christian gospel message. Further, it is reasonably safe to say that since evangelicalism is 
a Protestant phenomenon, Catholics and Jews are automatically excluded (Hunter 1981). 
Scholars agree that beliefs in the divinity of Christ and personal faith for salvation are also 
vital to evangelicalism (Ammerman 1982). Beyond that, however, evangelicalism is poorly 
defined (Hunter 1981).  
Another, perhaps less agreed upon indicator of evangelicalism is biblical inerrancy. 
While most scholars agree that biblical inerrancy is key to evangelicalism (Gorsuch and 
McFarland 1972; Maranell 1974), others (Ammerman 1982; Quebedeaux 1974) question 
its place within the operationalization of evangelicalism. Ammerman points out that the 
inerrancy of the Bible (at least in the early 1980s) became a topic of contention within 
evangelicals ranks. Biblical inerrancy, she explains, is where fundamentalism and 
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evangelicalism split. Fundamentalists have a unified belief in the inerrancy of the Bible 
while evangelicals do not.  
However, for this dissertation, I consider Biblical inerrancy central to my definition of 
evangelical for two reasons. First, evangelicals tend to use inerrancy as a descriptor for 
themselves when explaining why they are evangelical; second, the prevailing scholarly 
opinion is that Biblical inerrancy is a crucial part of what makes someone evangelical 
versus any other kind of Christian persuasion (Emerson and Smith 2000; Hunter 1981; 
Wilcox 1996; Wilcox and Robinson 2010).  
Scholars also disagree on the parameters used to define evangelicalism. Hackett and 
Lindsay (2008) identify three distinct ways of defining evangelicalism: denominational 
affiliation, identity, and beliefs. Using all three forms of evangelical measures, the total 
population of evangelicals is scaled down from over 40% of the US population to 2% of 
the population (2008). The benefit of using self-identification is that political scientists can 
capture political movement adherents as well as doctrinal or denominational evangelicals 
(2008). Some survey respondents may identify themselves with an "evangelical 
movement" even if they would not fit into the doctrinal or denominational standards of 
evangelicalism. However, I am not interested in individuals who identify with a movement 
but rather individuals who theologically fall in line with evangelicalism (Smith et al. 
1998).1 
                                                 
1 This leads to more questions; what is more important, whether a person self-identifies as evangelical or 
whether they subscribe to a specific set of beliefs that scholars have defined as evangelical? For my study, 
does it matter whether they fall into the defined category if they think of themselves as evangelical? 
Presumably, if someone considers themselves evangelical and they believe evangelicals are being 
marginalized, they would fit into my analysis. Further, can someone go to an evangelical church and not be 
evangelical themselves or, in contrast, can someone go to a church that is not evangelical but be evangelical 
themselves?  
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Denominational categorization, when utilized correctly, simplifies the categorization 
process. However, Ammerman cautions that in categorizing by denomination “we must be 
extremely careful not to repeat past mistakes by trying to assume individual behavior or 
attitudes from association with a larger structure” (1982, 171). Moen (1989) categorizes 
fundamentalists, Pentecostals and charismatics separately, highlighting their slight 
differences. Scholars provide no consensus whether to categorize fundamentalists, 
Pentecostals and charismatics as mere versions of evangelicalism or as separate entities. 
While Moen tends to conceptualize evangelicals, fundamentalists, Pentecostals and 
charismatics as distinct from one another, other scholars conceptualize fundamentalists, 
Pentecostals and charismatics as mere subsets of the “evangelical”  Christian Right 
(Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Hence, much of the difficulty inherent in defining 
evangelicals is the lack of coherency in the group itself.  
Burge and Lewis (2018), in a recent analysis of evangelicals and their support of 
Donald Trump, find that self-identification and denominational identification end up 
identifying approximately the same number of evangelicals. This means that these two 
measures may not be as distinct from one another as previously assumed.   
Wilcox (1991) addresses some of these conceptual issues inherent in defining 
evangelicals. He divides evangelicals into three different categories: doctrinal evangelicals; 
denominational evangelicals and denominational/doctrinal evangelicals. In his book God’s 
Warriors, he researches the detailed intricacies that differentiate the three types of 
evangelicals. Generally, he finds that doctrinal evangelicals are more religiously 
committed and more politically conservative than denominational evangelicals. However, 
denominational and doctrinal evangelicals are more nuanced. In some cases, these hybrid 
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evangelicals were more religiously committed and more conservative, while in other cases 
they were not. The concluding assumption, then, is that doctrinal evangelicals are more 
fervently committed than denominational evangelicals.  
Hunter uses the doctrinal approach when analyzing evangelicals. His qualifications 
turn up one of the lowest rates of evangelicalism available (Hackett and Lindsay 2008). 
Hunter encapsulates the concept of evangelicalism with three conceptual requirements.2 
First, an individual must believe in the inerrancy of the Bible.3 Second, the individual must 
believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ, and finally, he or she must believe that salvation is 
only through faith in Jesus Christ and not of works. Doctrinal evangelicals are highly 
focused on individual salvation and otherworldly concerns (Hunter 1981; 1992). 
When possible, I use these doctrinal qualifications for my research data. Doctrinal, not 
ideological, qualifications are essential to my research since I am not interested in studying 
the Christian Right but rather doctrinal evangelicals. By using only theological and 
doctrinal qualifications to define evangelicals, I can more clearly analyze the evangelical 
base with all its diversity or lack thereof. I do not use any political or ideological 
qualifications to select my evangelical base. Instead, I attempt to analyze how politically 
engaged the evangelical base is by avoiding any political identifiers in my qualification 
process.   
These doctrinal evangelical groups all share the fundamental belief of the inerrancy and 
supremacy of the Bible and profess a “born again experience”; yet, they still disagree about 
additional details. These disagreements have led to significant divisions among professing 
                                                 
2 Smidt and Kellstedt (1992, 332) define evangelicals by three similar criteria: Christianity plays an essential 
and defining role in an individual’s life; the individual has had a “born again experience”; he/she sees the 
Bible as God’s inerrant Word.  
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evangelicals. Fundamentalists and Pentecostals, specifically, have a unique relationship 
within evangelicalism, one that is riddled with disagreement (Smidt 1988; 1989; Wilcox 
and Robinson 2010). Beliefs in pre-millennialism and post-millennialism are at the at the 
root of the disagreement. Pre-millennialists (primarily fundamentalists; their belief in pre-
millennialism is essential to the formation of fundamentalism and has a notable impact on 
their identity) believe that the world is supposed to worsen socially and politically before 
Jesus comes back to take all the “born again” Christians home to heaven (Sandeen 1970). 
This is in stark contrast to post-millennialism. Those who believe in post-millennialism 
believe that Jesus will not come until a thousand years of peace on earth have passed.  
These diverging beliefs have significant political consequences. If Christ cannot come 
until after a thousand years of perfect peace, Christians have a meaningful and critical role 
in politics to bring about perfect peace. Therefore, post-millennials possess a considerable 
internal and spiritual motivation to involve themselves in politics to bring about peace on 
earth. Pre-millennials do not own this same urgency since they believe the world is 
supposed to perish and be in darkness before Jesus returns. In this case, the Christian's 
calling is only to save as many, spiritually, as they can. Human and political involvement 
is temporary and futile (Wilcox and Robinson 2010).  
In sum, who evangelicals are and how they have maintained their vitality are areas of 
research that are fraught with debate. I utilize different portions of Hunter's theory and 
Smith et al.'s theory to build my theory about doctrinal evangelicals and their expressive 
engagement. My concern is less how these evangelicals are still thriving; instead, what are 
they doing with themselves since they are thriving? 
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The Historical Context of Evangelicals and Conservatism 
Religious mobilization spans the centuries (Smith 2014) with every religion mobilizing 
at different times and for different reasons. Fowler et al. (2013, 1) say "It would be very 
difficult to understand American politics today without knowing something about 
American religion." Since the inception of the country, religion has played an influential 
role in American politics and society. Puritanism was central in shaping American civic 
institutions and gave the United States a "sense of national mission" (2010, 2). Initially, 
most colonies installed state churches that eventually devolved, but the tendency to include 
religion in government persisted. Although the United States is growing in religious 
diversity, with a growing percentage of Muslims and Jews, America remains decidedly 
Christian, with one in four Americans identifying as such (2010). 
There are four dominant forms of Christianity in the United States: Catholicism, 
evangelicalism, mainline and African American Protestantism (2010). Mainline Protestant 
clergy “have argued that Christians must address the world’s injustices not merely by 
individual charity but by collective efforts to change societal structures” (2010, 37). This 
“theological liberalism” has influenced Mainline Protestant clergy and parishioners 
towards liberal political activism. During the mid-1900s, Mainline Protestant churches 
were the dominant force in American religion and were “well entrenched” (2010). Mainline 
Protestant clergy participated in and promoted many of the social movements during the 
1960s and embraced issues such as poverty, racism, sexism, and oppression (2010). They 
lent their voices, their money, and their activism in support of righting these “unjust 
structures” (2010, 38).  
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In recent decades Mainline Protestantism has faced a steep decline in membership. 
Fowler et al. (2013) contend that despite this decline in numbers, "mainline churches still 
possess a wealth of inherited capital in the form of buildings, institutions and endowments, 
as well as the loyalty of lay members. Local churches continue to operate a host of food 
banks, meal programs, homeless shelters, clothing closets, and day care centers, and 
national organizations operate large hospitals, charitable agencies, and highly respected 
international development organizations" (39). In short, Mainline Protestants have been 
and still are publicly involved with "the world." They are willing to engage in conventional 
and unconventional political participation and tend to do so in support of "theologically 
liberal" issues. 
Catholicism is also closely connected to politics. Throughout world history, 
Catholicism has played a pivotal role in many governments, particularly in Europe where 
the church was “deeply enmeshed in statecraft”(Fowler et al. 2013, 41). However, some 
Americans tended to look at the Catholic church with suspicion. In time, the Catholic 
church evolved into a bridge of sorts between evangelical Protestantism and mainline 
Protestantism because of its uniquely liberal and conservative positions on critical political 
issues in the United States (Fowler et al. 2013). 
Evangelical Protestants' relationship with government and public activity is different 
from both mainline Protestants and Catholics, and, as I address in another section of the 
dissertation, African American Protestants. While Catholics and Mainline Protestants are 
happy to engage in political participation and public action, evangelicals' otherworldly 
orientation and concern for individual salvation have made subsets of evangelicals 
politically and socially reticent (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Djupe, Neiheisel, and Sokhey 2017, 
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Campbell 2004; Green 1999; Green, Guth, and Wilcox 1998; Green, Roxell, and Wilcox 
2000, 2003; Olson 2000; but see Jelen 1991; Chaves 2004). However, portions of the 
hitherto politically inactive coalition of evangelicals have mobilized (Burge and Guth 
1996; Green, Guth, Smidt, and Kellstedt 1996;  Green, Guth, and Wilcox 1998; Moen 
1989; Oldfield 1996; Steensland et al. 2000; Wilcox 1991; Wilcox and Robinson 2010; 
Wuthnow 1988).  
Evangelicals have entered the world of politics on some occasions. The "crusade 
against slavery" was one of the most notable religiously motivated movements in American 
history (Fowler et al. 2013). Religious revivals in the North awakened the Christian 
consciousness against slavery while white southern evangelicals came to the defense of 
slavery, their institutions, and their way of life (2010). Hence, the Bible becomes both a 
beacon of hope for slaves and a justification for slavery (Noll 2010). 
It was not until the prohibition era that evangelicals again mobilized on a national scale. 
Fowler et al. (2013) explain that the Temperance movement “provides some important 
practical lessons for religious partisans today” (14). The Anti-Saloon League, founded in 
1895 by Rev. Howard Hyde Russell, was a compilation of various protestant clergy from 
different denominations. The league was incredibly effective as it used education, 
lobbying, and electioneering to establish its message. The ability of the league to pull 
together religious groups across varying denominations and to appeal to a variety of people 
through messaging rather than pure political pressure sets the Temperance movement apart 
from other religiously motivated movements (2010). Those involved in the movement 
began their campaign in states and slowly moved their way through each state. Fowler et 
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al. (2013) say that “Prohibition represented the high water mark of the popularity and 
political clout of evangelical Protestantism” (15).  
The Temperance movement engineers were effective and strategic. They constructed 
and pulled on the emotions of Americans throughout the country. Too many times men had 
come home drunk or never came home at all. People lost their jobs, their money, their 
homes because of drunkenness. These experiences primed the public for the voice of 
change that the evangelical elites presented through the Anti-Saloon League. However, 
despite initial success, the Temperance movement failed as the country came to grips with 
the reality that law cannot mandate morality. Evangelicals withdrew from public politics 
for the better part of the 20th century until the late 1970s when new issues arose that seemed 
to call for their activation (Fowler et al. 2013).   
In the late 19th century, Mainstream Protestants began shifting their understanding of 
faith in relation to the "outside world" in response to the modern scientific and social ideas 
(Wilcox and Robinson 2010). With this change, Protestant churches started preaching a 
new "social gospel," one that put more focus on outward changes in behavior to alleviate 
social ills (2010). Fundamentalism was the direct reaction to the new "social gospel." Those 
who held more conservative religious beliefs felt the new "social gospel" threatened the 
Christian's fundamental focus of simply "saving souls" (2010). In the earlier 20th century, 
the fundamentalists were moderately active in politics as they engaged in anticommunist 
crusades. In the 1950s these crusades devolve and were followed by the charismatic 
movement, prevalent amongst Mainline Protestant churches and Catholic churches. It was 
not until the late 1970s that a new fundamentalist movement began.   
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The fundamentalists began showing signs of potential politicization during the 1970s 
since they mobilized in response to local political issues and in support of "born-again" 
presidential candidate Jimmy Carter (2010). It was because of this mobilization that 
evangelical and political elites realized that evangelicals could be mobilized. It was not 
until the late 1970s and the early 1980s that latent evangelicals began to fully engage in 
political mobilization through the emergence of the Christian Right (Fowler et al. 2013). 
Guth (1996) states that “Few political movements have enjoyed as much notoriety in recent 
years as the ‘New Christian Right’” (7). 
Wilcox and Robinson (2010) explain that portions of the Christian Right movement 
were aimed solely at returning America to "a sound moral footing" (46). Green (1999) finds 
that during the rise of the Christian Right, their moralism began to transition from concern 
about general societal moral decay to specific policy goals such as restrictions on abortions 
and gay rights. The Christian Right movement showed that religion could generate strong 
collective identities that can serve as a basis for political action (1999). These collective 
identities, as Smith's subcultural identity theory explains, are strengthened by outgroups. 
Jelen (1991) contends that antagonism toward cultural minorities—namely, atheists, 
Blacks, homosexuals, feminists, liberals, and religious minorities---fueled the Christian 
Right. Individual congregations were sources of religious and political cues used to mold 
the political and religious identity of the Religious Right (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Jelen 
1991). 
The Christian Right movement started for a variety of reasons. Moen (1992) attributes 
much of the fervor to moral outrage. He even condemns scholars for pigeonholing 
members of the Christian Right into a specific framework. He says, “The concerns of 
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Christian Right supporters were explained as the by-product of authoritarian personalities 
or symbolic crusades, rather than taken at face value. One unfortunate result of 
pigeonholing the Christian Right was that scholars circumscribed their research agendas” 
(349). Secular trends during the late 1970s, such as the removal of religion from schools, 
abortion, and the sexual revolution all contributed to a growing unease in the evangelical 
population (Moen 1992). Therefore, it is crucial, in any research of evangelicals to 
acknowledge the religious versus secular paradigm in the country and its effect on 
evangelicals. 
However, many others scholars have found that evangelical unease also stems from an 
embedded antagonism for outgroups (Jelen 1991; Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek 2016; 2017; 
2018; Wong 2018a; 2018b). As Smith et al. (1998) assert with their subcultural identity 
theory, these outgroups help to stimulate and cultivate a tighter, more exclusive "in-group" 
amongst the evangelicals. This is particularly prevalent amongst white evangelicals. While 
white evangelicals tend to share some socially conservative views with minority 
evangelicals, white evangelicals more are highly conservative in all other issues in 
comparison to minority evangelicals. This difference in political perspectives speaks to an 
underlying racial component influencing the politics of white evangelicals (Wong 2018a). 
Thus, the Christian Right movement was both a reaction to a secularizing society and a 
pushback against demographic changes in society. 
Motivated for a number of reasons, the newly activated evangelical political force in 
the late 1970s birthed several organized and politically influential groups starting with the 
Moral Majority.4 Jerry Falwell, the pastor of Thomas Road Baptist Church in Lynchburg, 
                                                 
4 “[T]he approximately 50 million evangelicals in the country and in particular the fundamentalist wing of 
this community. The aim from the beginning was to mobilize a group of people who had traditionally avoided 
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Virginia, started the Moral Majority in 1979 (Hunter 1992; Leonard 1987; Moen 1992; 
Post 1992; Wilcox and Robinson 2010; Wilcox 1986; 1989). Other evangelical 
conservative Christian groups such as the Religious Roundtable, The Christian Voice, and 
the Christian Coalition followed the Moral Majority. Some scholars posit that these groups 
greatly influenced politics and society at the time---some even called the political 
activation of the evangelical base waking a sleeping giant (Moen 1989; 1992).5 Others find 
that the Christian Right Movement’s influence was limited when compared to other major 
social movements such as the Civil Rights Movement or the Feminist Movement (Rozell 
1997; Wilcox and Robinson 2010; Wilcox and Wolpert 2000) 
The Christian Right of the 1970s was “shaped by the nature of its evangelical 
constituency” (Oldfield 1996, 28). While evangelicalism and its adherents 
(fundamentalists, neo-evangelists, and Pentecostals) grew, Liberal Protestant 
denominations stopped growing (Oldfield 1996, 28-29). At this time, evangelical 
Christians began to align with the GOP (Brint and Abrutyn 2010; Green and Guth 1988; 
Green, Guth, Smidt, and Kellstedt 1996;  Green, Guth,  and Wilcox 1998; Lambert 2010; 
Moen 1996). The alignment of evangelicals with the GOP produced the sustained 
alignment of evangelicals with conservatism and the GOP, while secular members of 
society began aligning with liberalism and with the Democratic Party (Brint and Abrutyn 
2010; Moen 1996; Lambert 2010).  
                                                 
politics because they saw it as dirty, corrupt business...by convincing these people that political involvement 
was a God-given responsibility” (Zwier 1982, 9-10).  
5 Not all scholars agree. Some scholars contend that in fact, the Christian Right had little impact on 
government or policy (Wilcox and Robinson 2010). In fact, some argue that the political mobilization of the 
Christian Right may have instigated and caused a change in the opposite direction of their desired change 
(Jelen 1993a; Fetner 2008).  
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Before these alignments, evangelicals were not automatically assumed to be 
conservative. However, in time, partisan politics adopted vital religious components, with 
the GOP becoming known as the party of the evangelicals and Democratic Party becoming 
the party of secular society.  Scholars predict that the more evangelicals use the GOP as 
their vehicle for access, the more the GOP will be identified with traditional values and 
religion and Democrats with secularism. It is from this that “sharper partisan conflict will 
ensue” (Green and Guth 1988, 162).    
Brint and Abrutyn (2010) show that adherence to traditional moral standards is the 
crucial link between religiosity and conservativism across a broad range of issues (345). 
Traditional moral standards are the pivotal link between religion and conservatives rather 
than traditionally conservative issues such as government assistance and/or environmental 
policies (1988). “In this respect, commentators have frequently overstated the support of 
religious people for the broader conservative movement. They have failed to see how 
narrowly focused this support has been on issues like abortion, gay rights, and end-of-life 
care” (Green and Guth 1988, 345). Further research shows that the Republican Party started 
appealing to the evangelical base by stressing the importance of traditional moral values 
and that this began to draw evangelicals to the Republican base.6 The GOP found a reliable 
voting base in evangelicals because of moral issues and took advantage of the base by 
intentionally exaggerating these issues (Wilcox 1990). Thus, intentional elite framing is 
highly responsible for the marriage of religion and republicanism. This elite framing is a 
form of social constructionism, a theory I explain later in this chapter. Based on social 
                                                 
6 Some scholars find that, at least where voter turnout is concerned, the attachment of the evangelicals to the 
Republican party was more a result of social and demographic changes within the evangelicals rather than a 
result of a change in political strategy by the Republican party (Claasson and Pavtak 2010). 
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constructionism, the GOP engaged in a sophisticated form of collective identity framing 
with the use of emotionalism to garner evangelical followers.  
The politically active evangelical conservatives became known as the Christian Right 
and were uniquely evangelical and distinct from mainline Catholics and Protestants (Moen 
1992; Wilcox 1991). In interviews with these Evangelical Christian Right activists, 
Oldfield found that members knew they were “objects of ridicule in the broader society,” 
but were more concerned about the values and culture being ridiculed (Oldfield 1996, 39; 
Moen 1992). Thus, evangelical "values" are critical to an evangelical's identity and key to 
my theory. 
Evangelicals adopted a group consciousness during the rise of the Moral Majority 
under this Republican collective identity umbrella (Jelen 1991; Wilcox 1990). This 
development is significant because individuals feel marginalized if they feel the group they 
identify with is marginalized; for this to happen, individuals must have a conscious 
awareness of the group in which they associate. Research shows that denominational 
affiliation has an independent effect on partisanship and political attitudes (Kellstedt and 
Green 1993; Olson 2000; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Wilcox 1990, 28) as does religious 
doctrine (Wilcox and Jelen 1990). Both affiliations create a group consciousness, one that 
significantly influences individuals’ political perceptions, values and beliefs (Conover 
1984; Conover and Feldman 1984; Goren and Chapp 2017; Wilcox 1990, 29).  
Wilcox says that scholars have developed a consensus that “group consciousness is an 
important part of group mobilization, and that group identification is an important 
prerequisite for group consciousness” (1990, 29). This group consciousness has developed 
over time for evangelicals. Televangelists, pastors and political elites attempted to mobilize 
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the evangelical voting base intentionally by stoking and constructing this group 
consciousness (Wilcox 1990). The idea of a "group consciousness" or an awareness of 
one's personal identity and the group of people they are then associated with, is called 
"collective identity" by social movement theory scholars. A "collective identity," we will 
find moving forward, is an important condition for evangelical collective action. 
Evangelicals and the Influence of the Christian Right 
Generally, scholars disagree on how influential the Christian Right was at its peak. 
Moen (1989) argues that the Christian Right was relatively successful at influencing policy, 
especially at the congressional level. However, Wilcox and Robinson (2010) argue that 
while the Christian Right had some influence, it was not unified enough or large enough to 
win most political battles. In fact, Wilcox and Robinson detail the many political and 
judicial losses that the Christian Right suffered over the recent decades. They agree that, at 
times, the Christian Right can influence elections but rarely does their candidate ever enact 
the desires of the Christian Right since their policy preferences are usually too radical for 
the candidate implement once in office (2010). 
This finding supports Prothero’s (2016a) theory that liberals win all culture wars. 
Prothero (2016a) details the different societal and political wins that liberals secured over 
American history He concludes that conservatives push an agenda for a period before it is 
eventually phased out by the liberal agenda which eventually becomes the American 
agenda. Given that the Christian Right is a subset of the right, Wilcox and Robinson’s 
conclusion about the Christian Right is reinforced. Evangelical influence can and has only 
gone so far and is not likely to go much further anytime soon.  
 Jelen (1993a) details why he believes the Christian Right movement of the 1980s failed. 
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After interviewing evangelical clergy, he finds three prominent reasons for the failure of 
the Christian Right to fully mobilize. The first reason he notes is that evangelicals are 
individualistic. He is not the only scholar to find that evangelicals are highly focused on 
individual salvation and otherworldly issues (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Campbell 2004; 
Djupe, Neiheisel, Sokhey 2017; Green 1999; Green, Guth and Wilcox 1998; Green, Rozell 
and Wilcox 2000; Olson 2000). Salvation (which was the most important thing to the 
evangelical clergy interviewed, not policy change) is an individual experience and 
relationship that exists only between the individual and God. Jelen (1993a) says: 
The evangelical pastors simply would not accept systematic explanations for 
adverse political developments, nor would they integrate macro level accounts into 
their own theological thinking. Such matters as homosexuality, abortion, and drug 
use were regarded as evidence of individual moral railings, which could be handled 
by individual conversions. Even communism (which had been prominently 
featured in the demonology of the Christian Right) is simply a bad idea, rather than 
a manifestation of evil on earth...The idea that either sin or salvation can be 
collective matters represents a cast of thought alien to Evangelical Clergy. A 
political response to matters of individual piety would involve an enormous 
perceptual shift for a majority of the evangelical clergy (132).  
He found that the mindset of the evangelical clergy is micro, not macro. Thus, the macro-
mobilization of the Christian Right to combat a problem that they consider to be an 
individual issue between God and man is not enough to stimulate sustained political action. 
Further, he says that the emphasis that evangelicals have on individual conversion limits 
the scope of their impact on political agenda. Policies, regarding religion, beyond the scope 
of individual morality, were considered irrelevant to the evangelical clergy.   
Second, since evangelicals are highly concerned with doctrine, unity amongst different 
sects of evangelicals becomes more difficult. This lack of unity is yet another inhibiting 
factor. Doctrinal differences tend to be highly divisive and are even prevalent within 
sharing theological families (Jelen 1993a). Without being cohesive and somewhat unified, 
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evangelicals were never able to create a legitimate force for long-term change.   
 Finally, he argues that political participation itself may play a role in undercutting the 
Christian Right’s movement. “It may be that the aggregating characteristics of a political 
party, which is not identified with a particular theological tradition, make the assertion of 
specific religious doctrines inappropriate” (134). He concludes by saying that a strong 
enough move of secular humanism and a strong enough feeling of threat could be enough 
to mobilize evangelicals, at least for a short time (Jelen 1993a).  
These findings do not mean, however, that evangelicals have not and do not have any 
influence. The Temperance movement alone is sufficient enough evidence that 
evangelicals have been active and can have significant influence. Evangelical influence has 
waxed and waned over the decades, with its arena of influence also shifting. Many times, 
the disagreements amongst evangelicals themselves that has been the biggest roadblock to 
continued evangelical success (Jelen 1993a). Recall that a growing sense of "collective 
identity," predicated upon an "us" versus "them" mentality, contributes to evangelical 
influence. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2017) assert that Donald Trump's "us" versus "them" 
rhetoric stimulated a "white identity" crises in America. Given that evangelicals supported 
Trump at a much higher rate than their non-evangelical white citizens, this rhetoric appears 
to be resonating with them and is likely stirring up a missing sense of "collective identity." 
Evangelicals and Race 
 Evangelicals are not a homogeneous unit doctrinally nor are they a homogeneous unit 
demographically. While a significant portion of doctrinal/denominational evangelicals are 
white, a sizable number are African American and Latino. However, scant research has 
been done on the experiences and concerns of white evangelicals in contrast to the 
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experiences and concerns of African American or Latino evangelicals. Most research, 
except for a few works (Calhoun-Brown 1996; 1998; Emerson and Smith 2000; Fowler et 
al. 2013; Harris 1999; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Wadsworth 2012) detailing religion and 
race have focused on "religion" and race rather than "evangelicals" and race.  
Statistics and research show that African American Protestants are generally socially 
conservative even though they overwhelming vote Democrat (Fowler et al. 2013; Harris 
1999; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Wadsworth 2012). Black Protestants and white 
evangelicals share similar theological belief systems. Jones and Francis (2012) show that 
measures of religious belief and practice, across five standard measures (salience of 
religion, biblical literalism, a certainty of God's existence, and frequency of prayer and 
church attendance), were almost entirely identical and markedly different from the rest of 
the public. However, while white evangelicals tend to vote Republican overwhelmingly, 
Black Protestants vote Democrat (Jones and Francis 2012). 
Wong (2018a) studies some of these racial differences in political perspectives and 
attributes the difference to racial anxiety among white evangelicals. She finds that white 
evangelicals are significantly more conservative on immigration than their black, Latinx 
and Asian counterparts. Latinx and Asian evangelicals are the only sources of growth 
occurring in the evangelical community in 2018 (2018b). Despite growing racial diversity, 
Wong finds that white evangelicals are growing more Republican (2018a). Thus, Wong 
believes that the growing demographic changes in the evangelical community have 
triggered racial and religious anxieties (2018b). She explains that “white evangelical 
conservatism strongly correlates with their perceptions of anti-white discrimination” 
(Wong 2018b).   
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Harris (1999) looks at the differences between white evangelical mobilization and 
black evangelical mobilization. He contends that there is a fundamental difference between 
how black churches approach their political engagement and how white evangelical 
churches approach their engagement with politics. Historically, black Protestants remained 
politically aloof, for both theological and social reasons (Fowler et al. 2013; Harris 1999). 
African Americans and have a unique relationship with evangelical Protestantism (Harris 
1994; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Noll 2010). Harris (1994; 1999) studies white and black 
religion and mobilization and finds that religion, though at times used as an opiate for the 
masses (particularly during slavery), now acts as a mobilizer for most African Americans 
(also see Calhoun-Brown 1996). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) and Harris (1994) 
show that religion can be a tremendous political resource. Harris (1994) shows that the 
three political resources that religion provides are motivation, organization, and social 
interaction. In some ways, religious motivation acts as an opiate because of theological 
passivism; however, moral issues are likely to stimulate action (1994). Harris posits, 
"Organizational participation as a political resource provides individuals not only with 
communication networks and opportunities to interact with others with shared goals but 
with organizational skills that can be nurtured through involvement, thus promoting 
political action” (1994, 53).  
Harris contends that these three political resources have different effects on political 
mobilization based on demographic and SES factors (1994). He finds that church 
attendance has a more significant impact on political participation than education for Black 
and white Protestants (also see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Church attendance 
has a more significant impact on white mobilization than black mobilization. He finds that 
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civic attitudes are important to white mobilization while group identity and consciousness 
are essential to black mobilization (1994). Church activism has a more significant influence 
on black voter participation than on white voter participation. Overall, as Lincoln and 
Mamiya (1990) also show, churches are essential communal, political institutions for all 
races but particularly for blacks. 
Thus, the literature that does exist on black and white evangelicals is still growing. 
There is very little research available on other evangelical racial minorities. Wong's (2018a; 
2018b) research has opened a door for a deeper understanding of black, Latinx and Asian 
evangelicals but is only the beginning of research on evangelicalism in the Latinx and 
Asian communities. The literature on race and evangelicalism presents a puzzle for 
religious scholars and this dissertation. Thus far, the literature has not profoundly engaged 
with the religious and doctrinal beliefs that blacks and whites share or do not share. Instead, 
the historical backdrop, assumptions, and findings all point to the conclusion that blacks 
and whites who share the same religious and doctrinal beliefs are politically divergent. This 
disparity is attributable to racial resentment within the ranks of white evangelicalism, but 
there is still room for more exploration on this topic. Is there a theological difference, 
perhaps even an interpretation, that scholars have missed? Do white evangelicals possess 
a stronger or weaker sense of antagonism towards Asian and Latinx than they do black 
evangelicals? These are a few areas that still need fine-tuning. 
A few scholars investigate evangelical perceptions of issues of race and racism. 
Emerson and Smith’s (2000) book is perhaps the seminal work in religion and politics 
research investigating evangelical racial relations. They examine the diverging 
perspectives on race between white evangelicals and evangelicals of other races. The white 
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evangelicals interviewed possessed a limited knowledge and acknowledgment of race and 
racial problems. Intuitively, the Native American and African American individuals 
interviewed felt racial issues were alive and thriving. White evangelicals focused more on 
the individual (as Harris (1994) would predict) by claiming that prejudiced individuals (not 
institutions) are the leading cause of racism. They conjecture that the United States does 
not have a race problem, per se, but rather individuals in society have race relation 
problems (2000, 74). In fact, the focus on individuals was so severe that some respondents 
would not even answer the race questions because the questions seemed to be about groups 
rather than individuals. These findings re-establish Jelen’s (1993a) findings that 
evangelicals focus almost exclusively on salvation at the individual level.   
 Emerson and Smith investigated these findings more deeply. Contemporary white 
American evangelicalism is one of the primary carriers of the accountable freewill-
individualist tradition (Emerson and Smith 2000, 77). Under this belief set, individuals are 
accountable for their actions regardless of the structures and institutions surrounding them. 
This belief starkly contrasts the progressive view of individuality and free-will. The 
progressive conception of freewill posits that social structures and institutions prevent 
humans, who by nature are good, from acting out their free-will. This difference in beliefs 
is key to understanding evangelicals and their individualistic view of humans and human 
nature.  
Emerson and Smith (2000) explain that the difference between progressive freewill and 
freewill-individualism is an important factor explaining why white evangelicals and Black 
evangelicals (and even white evangelicals who have more interracial connections) have 
highly diverging perspectives of the "race problem." Black evangelicals, possessing a more 
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progressive freewill perspective (likely because of their experiences with institutional 
racism) are quick to acknowledge the race problem and quick to give examples. White 
evangelicals (perhaps avoiding the acknowledgment of their responsibility in the 
institutional racism), typically free-will individualists, may acknowledge the problem but 
only at an individualistic level and are hard-pressed to provide any specific examples of 
racism. This disparity in perspective, Emerson and Smith say, is the result of racism itself. 
Even if the white evangelical community is not intentionally being racist, they are part of 
its perpetuation by not acknowledging its real and prevalent existence beyond 
individualism (Emerson and Smith 2000).7 
 Key to understanding evangelicals and race relations is this: “The white evangelicals 
we interviewed do not want a race problem. They want to see people get along, and want 
people to have equal opportunity. They see these as essential to living out their faith. In 
short, they yearn for color-blind people” (2000, 89). White evangelicals are not distinctly 
racist; in fact, Emerson and Smith find that many of them seem to be particularly opposed 
to racism. However, by refusing to acknowledge or understand the characteristics of racism 
itself, evangelicals contribute to the racial divide (2000). This unique disparity in racial 
acknowledgment between African American evangelicals and white evangelicals is 
essential to my study. Emerson and Smith's findings enlarge our understanding of the 
evangelical experience and open the door for more research on these diverging perspectives 
and the feelings and actions they produce.  
                                                 
7 There are many black evangelicals based on the denominational and doctrinal definition. However, this 
does not mean that there are many conservative black evangelicals. Though "evangelical" and "conservative" 
have begun to be considered interchangeable, understand that when I say evangelical, I mean doctrinally 
and/or denominationally. Black pastors typically demonstrated a proclivity to vote and identify as liberal 
(McDaniel 2003). Research shows that the church is the primary civic institution in many black communities 
(Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; McDaniel 2003). 
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 Historically, evangelicals and racism have been connected, especially in the South 
(Cross 2014; Calfano and Paolino 2010; Noll 2001). Some research shows that fervent 
evangelicals tend to be less racist than their other Christian counterparts (Jelen, Kellstedt, 
and Wilcox 1990). In fact, Wilcox and Jelen (1990) find that evangelicals are typically 
intolerant of both ideological extremes. Calfano and Paulino 2010 found that ideology was 
more important than race to white evangelicals when voting between Black and white 
candidates. In other words, research has shown that evangelicals are intolerant of fascists, 
racists, communists, homosexuals and other belief systems. The irony of this, of course, is 
that many consider the evangelical belief system itself to be extreme. However, these 
findings do not negate the research on Christian Right activism and racial prejudice (Jelen 
1991; Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek 2018; Wong 2018a; 2018b) nor does it mean that racial 
anxiety is not relevant to the feelings of marginalization of white evangelicals in 2018 
(Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). African Americans and other racial minorities may be 
fulfilling the sub-cultural identity theory by acting as "out-groups" to white evangelicals. 
Evangelicals and The LGBTQ Community 
 A scant few scholars have researched homosexuality and evangelicalism. Sherkat et al. 
(2011) find that, over the past thirty years, Americans have substantially increased their 
support and acceptance of LGBTQ Americans and LGBTQ rights. Evangelicals and 
Protestants alike have also begun to accept homosexuality and LGBTQ rights over the past 
thirty years (Bernstein and Jakobsen 2010; Olson, Cage, and Harrison 2006; Pew Research 
Group 2016; 2017). Recent data show a dramatic shift in perceptions among young white 
evangelicals. In 2017, the Pew Research Group published that young evangelicals (those 
born after 1964) went from 29% favoring same-sex marriage in March of 2016 to 47% 
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favoring same-sex marriage in June of 2017. This is a marked increase and demonstrates 
some of the dramatic changes happening in the evangelical community.  
 Even with these changes, evangelicals are still one of the few groups left in America to 
overwhelmingly disapprove of same-sex relations (Pew Research Group 2016; 2017). The 
LGBTQ community and evangelicals have operated at odds for decades; conservative 
evangelicals have been one of the gay community’s staunchest opponents (Jelen 1991; 
Lewis 2005; Lewis and Gossett 2008; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Fetner 2008). 
Olson et al. (2006) find that religion, even above race, is the primary influencing variable 
shaping attitudes towards same-sex marriage. Citizens who listed values as one of their top 
two priorities were also more likely to oppose gay marriage (2006). Further, during the 
presidential election in 2004, Republicans found gay marriage and moral values to be key 
mobilization variables in the election (2006).  
The relationship between evangelicals and the LGBTQ community is much more 
fraught with tension than the relationship between mainline Protestants and the LGBTQ 
community. Olson and Cadge (2002) interviewed 62 mainline Protestant pastors and found 
that none of them took a hard and fast stance against homosexuality. While I do not 
explicitly ask the pastors that I interviewed their opinions on homosexuality, you will find 
that these evangelical pastors were much more willing to take a stand against 
homosexuality than the mainline protestants Olson and Cadge interviewed. 
Other research shows that conservative and Republican elites have found the perfect 
framing device to stir up against and frustration amongst evangelicals and thereby increase 
mobilization (Jelen 1991; Miceli 2005; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006). Stokes and 
Schewe (2017) posit that “the Religious Right often builds upon societal homophobia that 
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places LGBTQ people as the societal scapegoat, and, especially with rhetoric combatting 
AIDS, the Religious Right further stigmatizes LGBTQ individuals by comparing them to 
a deadly plague” (63, see also Barton 2012; Diamond 1989; Tranby and Zulkowski 2012). 
Evangelical elites frame a subcultural in-group, out-group identity for their evangelical 
constituents/church members because evangelicals need a reason to feel attacked and 
marginalized to keep them active and involved (Stokes and Schewe 2017).  
The subcultural identity theory (Smith et al. 1998) posits that "conservative religious 
groups, thrive, rather than dwindle, amidst secular society by constructing a strong 
community identity that can be activated to motivate political action" (Stokes and Schewe 
2017, 61). Smith et al. posit three essential components of the subcultural identity theory. 
First, there must be a defined conflict with an out-group. This out-group must be perceived 
as a threat to the religious norms of the community. With this threat comes an increased 
sense of group identification and attachment to the in-group.  Elites use the culmination of 
these symbolic and ideological boundaries to "mobilize movements, resources and 
membership" (Wellman 1999, 187). The essence of Smith's theory is identity maintenance 
through boundaries and distinctions from the "hostile" out-group (Stokes and Schewe 
2017). Thus, the LGBTQ community has become the perfect "out-group" for the 
evangelical elite to frame in the current zeitgeist. 
  Fetner (2008) contends that for the past thirty years the religious right and the LGBTQ 
community have “flowed in concert with each other, the actions of one affecting the 
choices and repertoire of the other” (119). She analyzes how the gay community has 
responded to Christian Right activism and claims that the Christian Right’s fight against 
homosexuality mobilized the gay community in ways it would never have mobilized 
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without the Christian Right. Theoretically, groups feed off each other. When one group 
mobilizes, the other counter-mobilizes (Zald and Useem 1983). In some cases, a movement 
can generate a counter-movement and shape the tactics and structure of the counter 
movement (Zald and Useem 1983). Then these two groups enter a “loosely coupled tango 
of mobilization and demobilization” (1). The LGBTQ movement is part of the current 
cultural zeitgeist of acceptance, tolerance and sexual freedom and has won many cultural 
and political battles recently (Wilcox and Robinson 2010), causing evangelicals to feel 
defensive. Therefore, the "loosely coupled tango" theory and the subcultural identity theory 
are vital to understanding how evangelicals are acting and reacting today and essential to 
my theory. 
Tanya Erzen (2006) found that the relationship between religion and the homosexual 
identity is fluid and ever-changing. Through extensive field research in the evangelical “ex-
gay” community, she finds that evangelicals use the message of “real change” in the gay 
community through conversion to Christianity as their weapon against the gay identity 
(2006). However, she posits that her findings demonstrate that this evangelical argument 
falls flat in the face of reality. 
Again, most of the research detailed above looks primarily at conservative evangelicals, 
or the Christian Right, or mainline Protestants; it does not look at evangelicalism from its 
core doctrinal principles. Jonathan Hill, in his Masters' thesis from the University of Notre 
Dame, tests the real-world application of Smith's subcultural identity theory. He postulates 
that evangelicals should display higher levels of religious fervor as they become 
"geographically and subjectively ‘nearer' relevant outgroups" (2004, 21); however, he finds 
this is not the case. Smith's subcultural identity theory that evangelical interaction with out-
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groups strengthens and increases the fervency of the in-group could not be empirically 
supported. However, Hill's research was still preliminary and only draws attention to an 
area of research that needs more analysis.   
Changes in Society 
There are other reasons, outside of growing anxiety about societal or racial 
displacement, for evangelicals to feel a sense of marginalization. Social liberalism plays a 
significant role in today’s current cultural context. Examples include liberal political 
changes such as Obamacare, the legalization of same-sex marriage, increasing transgender 
rights, and other social moves towards increasing tolerance and acceptance (e.g., illegal 
immigrants) (Hunter 1992; 2007; Moen 1992; Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Recent data 
from both the Pew Research Group and Gallup polls show that Democrats and  Republicans 
are increasingly adopting new liberal social norms. In 2015, 42% of Republicans identified 
as socially and economically conservative (Jones 2016a; 2016b). This is the lowest number 
of social conservatives in the Republican Party ever recorded in Gallup history. The 
increase in social liberalism is likely correlated with the rapid growth in the number of 
Americans who claim no religious affiliation, otherwise identified as "nones." Since 2007, 
this group of Americans has increased from roughly 19 million to 56 million as of 2014 
(Lipka 2015).  
Studies show that since 2008, the entirety of the United States electorate has shifted in 
the liberal direction on every social issue (Jones 2016a). Further, many of the citizens 
shifting to the left on the social dimension are religious conservatives (Jones 2016a). Some 
evangelicals (for example, the influential California evangelical Rev. Rick Warren) are 
embracing a slightly more socially progressive set of values. In conjunction, the Christian 
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share of the U.S. population has been declining.  
One reason for the dramatic increase in “no religion” is that political moderates and 
liberals were driven away from religion when they saw organized religion attach itself to a 
conservative social agenda (Hout and Fischer 2002). This finding is unique given that one 
of the theories regarding religion’s persistence in the United States is that up until recently, 
it did not attach itself to any political party. Much of the decline in religion can be attributed 
to a rejection of politicized religion rather than a complete rejection of all things spiritual 
(Hout and Fischer 2002). The more that religion attaches itself to a conservative or 
Republican agenda, the more society assumes that being religious means being 
conservative or Republican. This attachment causes those who are religious but are not 
conservative or Republican to reject or throw off their religious identity to avoid identifying 
with a mistaken political identity (2002). Hout and Fischer conclude, "If the identification 
of religious affiliation with political conservatism strengthens, then liberals' alienation 
from organized religion may become, as it has in many other nations, fully 
institutionalized" (189). 
The modern cultural context is merely an outgrowth of movements and trends that 
started years ago and that spurred evangelicals into political action. It was the political 
awakening of the Christian Right in the 1970s and 1980s that propelled social scientists to 
theorize about a "culture war" or a "war of values" (Hunter 1992). Inglehart (1977) claimed 
that a modernized society cares more about non-materialist items than materialist items. 
He theorized that Americans were transitioning from economic and security concerns to 
concerns about the quality of life (1977) such as the environment, democracy, and human 
rights. Broadly, Americans, in the post-WWII era, care more about value issues than other 
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issues (e.g., economics, industry, international affairs). According to Inglehart, post-
materialist concerns only exist in an economy that is doing well. A society that is struggling 
to survive economically has no time to devote to issues of morality and values; however, a 
society that is economically stable is more likely to begin to fracture on value-oriented 
issues (1977). Hence, Inglehart's theory gave credence to the idea of a "culture war" 
emerging over values in America in the 1980s. 
Prothero (2016a; 2016b) examines what he claims are centuries of culture wars 
between conservatives and liberals. He argues that conservatives always begin the war, 
direct the war and eventually lose the war. In fact, liberals are hardly even a part of the war. 
What he finds most surprising is that conservatives do not usually start these culture wars 
until the cause they are fighting over is virtually lost (Prothero 2016a, 17). He says, “the 
fight is fiercest when the cause at hand is already well on its way to being lost” (17). For 
example, conservatives only attack same-sex marriage when attitudes toward 
homosexuality have gravitated toward acceptance (2016a). He claims that, essentially, 
conservatives “choose for their rallying cries causes that are already on the verge of being 
lost” (2016a).  
I present a different interpretation of this "lost cause" anomaly. It is possible for cultural 
norms to shift but not enough for a group to feel the need to become outspoken against the 
change. However, as the change increases and permeates society, those who are not fond 
of the change are more and more likely to react publicly. Prothero's argument that liberals 
never really "do" anything in these culture wars does not make sense when compared with 
social movement theory of a "loosely coupled conflict" (Zald and Useem 1983). The theory 
of loosely coupled conflict contends that  all sides of the ideological spectrum are engaged 
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in a political and social dance, affecting change and action in each other. Therefore, in the 
case of Prothero’s conservative “lost cause” anomaly, it could be that as society accepts 
some new liberal social norms, conservatives and evangelicals are reacting to the change, 
not starting a last ditch “culture war” over a lost cause.  
Prothero’s reasoning, of course, is about conservatives, not evangelicals. However, 
given that many evangelical values are conservative values, are evangelicals feeling that 
their cause is a “lost cause”? The Christian share of the U.S. population has been declining. 
The Pew Research Group found that the percentage of Americans who claim to have a 
religious affiliation dropped eight percent from 2007-2014 (2015a). However, the number 
of Americans who affiliate with a religion other than Christianity has increased over the 
past seven years.  
The Christian share of the population is declining and the religiously unaffiliated 
share is growing in all four major geographic regions of the country. Religious 
“nones” now constitute 19% of the adult population in the South (up from 13% in 
2007), 22% of the population in the Midwest (up from 16%), 25% of the population 
in the Northeast (up from 16%) and 28% of the population in the West (up from 
21%). In the West, the religiously unaffiliated are more numerous than Catholics 
(23%), evangelicals (22%) and every other religious group (Pew Research Center 
2015a; Hout and Fischer 2002). 
 
This dramatic change in the religious distribution of the U.S. population is nationwide and 
follows the general trend of secularization. However, while the Christian share of the 
population is declining in many respects, the one group increasing in proportion to the rest 
of the Christian population is evangelical Protestants.   
While the mainline Protestant share of the population is significantly smaller today 
than it was in 2007, the evangelical Protestant share of the population has remained 
comparatively stable (ticking downward slightly from 26.3% to 25.4% of the 
population). As a result, evangelicals now constitute a clear majority (55%) of all 
U.S. Protestants. In 2007, roughly half of Protestants (51%) identified with 
evangelical churches (Pew Research Center 2015a).  
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Hence, the religious vitality that Hunter (1981) and Smith et al. (1998) both grappled with 
is still a present and relevant trend.  
A growing portion of evangelicals are joining the rest of society and inching leftward 
in their socio-moral views. This is evidence that the progressive position is winning in the 
aggregate, much as Prothero (2016a; 2016b) predicts. This does not mean, however, that 
the evangelical population is “dead” or no longer influential. While the U.S. may not be as 
overwhelmingly Christian as it once was (either culturally or numerically), it still houses a 
substantial number of Christians than any other nation (Pew Research Group 2015a). 
Further, the evangelical population is growing relative to the rest of the Christian 
population. Religious actors might not have as much political or social clout as they once 
did, but we cannot fully understand the inter-workings of American politics and collective 
action today without understanding the views and reactions of the evangelical base.  
If evangelicals believe they have lost some of their national political and social 
influence and the Christian population en masse has diminished, might we find a tighter, 
more homogeneous evangelical base today? Smith et al. (1998) would argue this would be 
the case. That is to say, the more the evangelical population interacts with and encounters 
threatening out-groups—be it racial minorities or gender minorities—the more cohesive 
and unified the “in-group” becomes. 
However, what Smith et al., do not research is what evangelicals are doing about these 
out-groups and the perceived threats. Evangelicals are politically involved in the traditional 
sense but there is limited research on evangelicals’ use of expressive mobilization. Are 
modern evangelicals sticking to their tried and true forms of political and social 
participation or are they also inserting themselves into the political and social conversation 
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through expressive mobilization? Any feelings of evangelical social strain are most likely 
being engineered and exploited by elite entrepreneurs who want to mobilize evangelicals 
by stirring up feelings of marginalization. Tilly (2006) posits that incremental “changes in 
the dispersion of power, the openness of political institutions, the instability of political 
arrangements, the availability of allies and supporters, and regime repressiveness” lead to 
incremental changes in the repertoires of influence that a group uses (2006, 45). Guth 
(1996) argues that the Christian Right began to respond defensively in the 1970s because 
of the cultural changes that ultimately triggered the rise of the Moral Majority and the 
broader political engagement of the Christian Right. I conceptualize the rise of the 
Christian Right in the 1970s as an offensive movement because the Christian Right used 
public and political platforms to try and force a change in government. However, their 
tactics backfired to an extent8 with the subsequent rise of the “nones” (Hout and Fischer 
2002; Putnam and Campbell 2012) and evangelicals today have a different world in which 
to operate. 
Social Movement Theory 
Social movement theory, though more prevalent in comparative and international 
politics, can still inform us about social and political mobilization in the United States. 
Social movement theory stems from theories of "collective behavior." Research of 
collective behavior flow from theories of mobilization. These theories are helpful to 
understanding the political and social action or inaction of the evangelical community, 
whether their mobilization is collective or individual.  
                                                 
8 The Christian Right movement of the 1970s did manage to influence some change, in school boards 
(Deckman 2004), in the political agenda (Moen 1989), and even in election outcomes (Oldfield 1996; Green, 
Guth, Smidt, and Kellstedt 1996). However, the vast majority of these have since been overturned or in some 
way nullified.  
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Several theories attempt to explain the how and why of collective action. The mass 
society theory is one of the first and oldest theories of collective action. The mass society 
theory is rooted in psychological reasoning and sees social conflict and collective action as 
an irrational and emotional reaction to the feeling of social destabilization or threats to 
entrenched social identity (Aslandis 2015). Frequently, these social movements occur 
because of strains from dramatic changes in society such as industrialization. This theory 
reasons that individuals are driven to participate in a social movement because of feelings 
of marginalization and alienation; thus, marginalized individuals are the primary actors in 
social protest. Arendt (1951), Buechler (1993; 1995), Kornhauser (1959) McAdam (1982) 
all contribute to this literature.  
Around the same time, other scholars (Turner and Killian 1957; Smelser 1962) 
developed and introduced the theory of collective behavior. They recognized the 
importance of the psychological motivations stressed in the mass society theory but 
conciliated them with specific social conditions. In other words, marginalization and 
alienation are key to collective action but only under a set of specific social circumstances 
that trigger these emotional and irrational reactions. Smelser (1962) contends that societal 
upheaval is frequently to blame. He posits four “determinants” of collective behavior: 
structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth and spread of a generalized belief and 
precipitating factors (1962, 15-16).  
The theory of relative deprivation is another seminal yet obsolete theory of collective 
action that originated around the same time as mass society theory and the theory of 
collective behavior. Gurr (1970) was the primary scholar to spearhead this theoretical 
contribution to the literature. With his theory, he attempts to explain the counter-intuitive 
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reality that social unrest and action tends to emerge from affluent individuals rather than 
from the impoverished ranks. Relative deprivation asserts that these affluent individuals 
who are acquainted with success are hastier to activate collectively than their impoverished 
neighbors. Hence, discontent is still the ultimate reason for collective action but the reasons 
behind this discontent are given more thought than previous theories cared to admit 
(Aslanidis 2015).  
Aslanidis (2015) explains the problematic issues facing these collective behavior 
theories. He explains that within these theories “strategy and deliberate, organized action 
never grew to become part of their rationale: collective action was almost exclusively a 
quasi-metaphysical, grassroots, spontaneous phenomenon which came and went in 
automatic outburst and equally rapid declines” (4). The collective action theories saw social 
movements and collective action as therapeutic for those involved but they never 
considered collective action a political operation (McAdam 1982; Aslanidis 2015).  
These collective action theories were soon considered jejune and a new set of scholars 
(Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Jenkins 1983; Kerbo 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977; 
Olson 1965; Oberschall 1973), experiencing a new social paradigm during the 60s and 70s, 
introduced the resource mobilization theory. Using Olson’s theory of collective action and 
conceptualization of individuals as rational beings able to make decisions based on a cost-
benefit analysis, scholars introduced the resource mobilization theory. Proponents of this 
theory emphasized the need for resource availability and mobilization as well as 
organization and networks (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973). Aslandis (2012) 
describes the theory: "Protest, they claimed, is not an automatic response to social and 
psychological strain: it requires an organization mindset which can facilitate the successful 
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allocation of resources required for mobilization" (6). These scholars accepted that citizens 
feel marginalized, alienated and frustrated and in fact, they consented that societal 
grievances are pervasive. Given this then, why is society not in a constant state of 
mobilization (Aslanidis 2015)? 
Resource mobilization theory stresses the importance of resources. Resources include 
but are not limited to money, time, labor, social networks, friends and connections in 
government and the media, and members themselves (2015). One of the most critical 
resources needed to translate shared feelings into action is a mastermind to lead, organize 
and mold the movement efficiently and responsibly (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Thus, 
marginalization and alienation are not sufficient for collective action and must be paired 
with the appropriate resources to bring about collective action. 
The theories described so far work as building blocks to my theory. Grievance with 
society and government is important but can only go so far in mobilizing a group of 
individuals into collective action. For this to happen, rational actors must utilize available 
resources and organize accordingly. However, these theories lacked an acknowledgment 
of politics, which a new set of scholars have claimed play a central role in collective action. 
McAdam (1982) and Meyer (1999) contend that the resource mobilization model 
overemphasizes the importance of resources and the power of elites to manipulate and 
shape mobilization while completely missing the political context surrounding the 
grievances, resources, and opportunities (Aslanidis 2015). Therefore, a new group of 
scholars introduced the political process theory and the political opportunity structure.9  
                                                 
9 These two theories are interchangeable and are referred to like the same theory (Aslanidis 2015).   
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This theory conceptualizes mobilization as an expression of politics, binding together 
the hitherto divided concepts of politics and mobilization (Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn 
2003; Meyer 2004; Useem 1998; Jenkins 1983; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978; Giugni 2011). 
Aslanidis explains: “Movements are not irrational mobs, but they are not the mere outcome 
of entrepreneurial calculation of resources, either. They provide yet another link between 
the people and political institutions (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996) – they are 
politics” (2015, 7, emphasis by the author). These theories emphasized opportunity as the 
key to successful collective action. The key explanatory variables being a political 
opportunity and the "nature of the institutionalized political systems" (Aslanidis 2015, 8). 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) introduced the idea of "mobilizing structures" in 
which individuals engage in rational political action mediated by the appropriate 
opportunities, resources and networks (Aslanidis 2015). However, empirical findings do 
not support the emphasis that this political process theory put on political opportunity 
(Meyer 2004; Jasper and Goodwin 1999; Useem 1998).  
These theories mentioned above came full circle in recent years with the realization 
that social psychology and the way individuals feel is and must be part of the structure and 
theory of collective action. Though rationality and organization are indeed important to 
social movements and collective action, they should not be considered at the exclusion of 
emotion and culture (Morris 2000). The macro-approach of some of the theories lost the 
importance of the individual and his or her feelings about whatever issue is being protested 
or acted against (Klandermans 1984; Aslanidis 2015). Further, many of these theories did 
not account for religious motivations, which are not always pushing for institutional change 
 57  
but instead personal change (Jenkins 1983). Identity, culture, emotions, and framing are all 
essential to this new theory. 
Thus, the theory of social constructionism was born. This theory is foundational to my 
approach and theory in that, scholars (Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn 2003; Jasper 1998; 
2011; Gamson 1995) of this persuasion argue that “grievances need to be skillfully 
constructed in such a way to bring about action” and further, these grievances need only to 
be perceived, not reality (Aslanidis 2015, 13). Hence, the construction of perceived 
marginalization can lead to social movements.  
Emotions are a vital element to the theory of social constructionism. They are useful if 
framed appropriately and coupled with collective identities (Jasper 1998; 2011). They can 
be used by “social movement entrepreneurs who know how to construct them, bring them 
to the surface and manipulate them” (Aslanidis 2015, 13). Part of this manipulation is 
through framing. Snow and Benford (1992, 137) define a frame as:  
An interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by 
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and 
sequences of actions within one’s present and past environment.  
 
Snow and Benford (1988) construct a three-step process of mobilization through the 
framing lens. First, entrepreneurs engage in diagnostic framing, which is the interpretation 
and creation of a problem and a culprit to blame. Following this, the entrepreneurs suggest 
a remedy for the existing problem. This is called prognostic framing. Finally, the 
entrepreneurs engage in motivational framing, in which they provide a rationale for action 
to stimulate constituent mobilization by explaining why collective action is indeed going 
to help solve the perceived problem. Thus, a feeling of “strain” or “marginalization” or 
“grievance” plays an essential role in collective action, even if, left to itself, it is not enough 
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to stimulate collective action. Smelser (1962) said, “Some form of strain must be present 
if an episode of collective behavior is to occur (48).  
The other theoretical elements of identity and culture are straightforward. For collective 
action to occur, and emotions and framing to matter, the group of interest must possess a 
sense of “we-ness” or attachment to an in-group, usually strengthened by the construction 
of an “out-group” (Friedman and McAdam 1992). This collective identity helps to 
convince members that their individual involvement will make a difference. Hence, 
“injustice and identity have to be framed in ways that lead to actual mobilization” 
(Aslanidis 2015).  
Culture is also important. Ann Swidler (1986) posits that within every culture is a 
"toolkit" that social movement entrepreneurs can utilize as they construct their social 
movement frames and collective identities. It consists of "symbols, icons, traditions, 
narratives, habits, styles, social norms or even heroic figures and events" (Aslanidis 2015). 
All framing, collective identities and emotions function within this cultural context. This 
cultural context then, limits or expands the "strategies of action" available (Swidler 1986, 
276). Hence, Aslanidis explains that a successful strategy and repertoire of action in the 
United States cannot be "just copied and pasted into the French context and be expected to 
work out of the box" (17). Thus, every strategy, slogan, or repertoire utilized within a 
specific cultural context must be in line with the accepted societal norms of the recipient 
group (Meyer 1999; Aslanidis 2015).    
To conclude this section on collective action literature, it is important to note that 
theories on collective action and mobilization are ever changing and ever-adapting. The 
influx of social media and the internet have fundamentally altered mobilization and 
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collective action. I argue that collective action is not the only form of mobilization; instead, 
individuals can also mobilize. Multiple individuals mobilizing creates a type and form of 
collective action. In the proceeding chapters, I utilize the theory of social constructionism 
as the foundation for my theory as it applies to evangelicals.    
One final note regarding religion and social action: Svensson (2007), in his studies of 
conflict in various countries, found that conflicts involving a religious group fighting a 
non-religious group over attempts to separate religion and government are far less likely to 
reach a compromise than conflicts between two non-religious or even two religious groups. 
Members of a religious community are fighting for spiritual and sacred intangible values 
that cannot be appeased materially or economically (Svensson 2007). This scenario creates 
a far more volatile and impassioned conflict than a conflict where compromise is easily 
reached. Thus, in the context of the U.S., any sort of cultural disagreement involving a 
religious group, whose members are fighting for spiritual and sacred intangibles, is also 
likely to be more volatile and impassioned---which accounts for the introduction of various 
social and political theories about the supposed raging culture war in the United States. 
Indeed, research shows that moralized attitudes lead citizens to oppose compromises, 
punish compromising politicians and even forsake material gains (Ryan 2017).10 
Political Efficacy 
 Political efficacy is also relevant to my theory. External political efficacy exists when 
someone feels they can impact politics and government; further, they also feel government 
officials are responsive to their desires. Internal political efficacy is the belief that one is 
personally politically competent. Therefore, an individual can have a high level of internal 
                                                 
10 To the man of rigid morality... .it is better not to agree at all than to agree to an imperfect bargain. (Dahl 
1967, 53) 
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political efficacy and a shallow level of external political efficacy. An individual may 
believe that he/she is politically competent and educated and at the same time believe 
he/she has little to no influence on the government and political system at large. Internal 
efficacy influences voting but is not an effect of voting while external efficacy both causes 
voting and is an effect of voting (Finkel 1985, 903). Research shows that political 
participation has a positive effect on external political efficacy (Finkel 1985). There is a 
strong relationship between external political efficacy and political turnout, explaining the 
recent declines in feelings of external political efficacy (Finkel 1985). 
However, as Weissberg (1975) accurately points out, efficaciousness is not always 
based on reality. Someone can feel highly efficacious while their influence on government 
policy is virtually nonexistent and someone can feel highly inefficacious when in fact they 
do have more influence and access than some other people. Therefore, the reality of one's 
efficaciousness is not the issue; rather their belief in their efficaciousness is the issue. If 
one's feelings of efficaciousness are low then they are less likely to want to try influencing 
government and participating in politics.  
There are a variety of different influences on one’s internal political efficacy. Being 
involved in a politically active community, learning the smaller skills of political action, 
engaging in political discourse, and inclusion in collaborative pluralist contexts are all 
shown to increase feelings of internal political efficacy (Beaumont 2011). However, feeling 
like one is capable and knowledgeable enough to participate in politics (internal efficacy) 
does not mean that they feel like those is politics will listen (external efficacy).   
 The evangelical community provides some of the variables necessary for high internal 
efficaciousness. A community of believers who share political beliefs provides a ripe 
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environment for internal efficacy and is known to be a very influential and powerful form 
of political community (Campbell 2004; Calhoun-Brown 1998; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wald, Owen, and Hill  1988). Internal efficaciousness 
is vital to understanding the mobilization of the evangelical community because they armed 
with a comprehensive set of civic skills which enable them to, on a moment's notice, 
quickly and powerfully organize (Campbell 2004).  
It is of little consequence whether evangelicals have access and influence on 
government; what matters is whether they feel like they have access and influence. As 
Weissberg says, one’s perception of efficacy is not always aligned with the reality of their 
potential efficacy (1975). I theorize that evangelicals, given the Donald Trump presidential 
administration, possess heightened levels of political efficacy. However, increases in 
political efficacy are not the same as alleviated social strain. Evangelicals feel strongly 
enough about the issues they care about and feel threatened enough by society and standing 
law, to be moved to action, but the kind of action is likely mediated by the level of external 
efficacy they feel.11 
I believe that evangelicals still possess moderately high levels of both external and 
internal efficacy. This does not mean that they are not feeling marginalized. A group can 
feel marginalized, socially and even politically, while still feeling somewhat efficacious. 
Evangelicals may feel that they have access to government officials, and may even feel 
that their votes count but still feel marginalized by the policy outputs of government. Select 
                                                 
11 African Americans tend to possess low levels of external efficacy, for various reasons---lack of access, 
poverty, low levels of descriptive representation in government---all symptoms of their minority status and 
institutional racism. Is the efficacy that Black evangelical pastors possess different from or the same as the 
efficacy that white evangelicals possess? 
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scholars conclude that though evangelicals can sometimes impact the election process, 
their influence does not go much further because of the extremity of their policy 
preferences (Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Thus, evangelicals likely believe they have 
political influence and access while at the same time feeling incredibly unhappy with the 
policy outcomes of the government.  
Further, evangelicals can feel marginalized by society while still feeling like they have 
access to government officials. I explain this paradox in more detail in the next chapter, 
but it is important to understand that society and government are not the same things. If 
societal norms change in a way that upsets evangelicals, they are likely to feel socially 
marginalized. Further, elites manipulate and use media coverage to paint a dire image of 
society for evangelicals, tying social changes to possible political changes, motivating them 
to more passionately go to the polls and vote for a candidate whom they feel is not caving 
to the new upsetting societal trends. This understanding of evangelical strain and 
mobilization falls more in line with some of the older social movement theories that keep 
politics, and social movements separated. I explore this in more detail in Chapter Three. 
Conclusion 
 In this literature review, I explored and explained two very distinct fields of literature: 
religion and politics literature, specifically on the Evangelical Christian Right; and social 
movement theory literature. Both fields are fraught with conceptual and theoretical 
disagreements as they attempt to explain empirical and real-life anomalies. However, until 
now there has been little cross-over between the two fields of research. Religion and 
politics scholars tend to stick with their basic understandings of political behavior and focus 
most of their research on the make-up and motivations of the Christian Right, sometimes 
 63  
exploring the reasons for political activism during the years of the Moral Majority. These 
scholars also show great interest in the reasons behind evangelical vitality in such a 
modernized society. They also show an interest in understanding the connection between 
religion and politics. What skills does the church institution instill? What ways do religious 
belief systems affect political behavior? How do the church's surrounding communities 
affect their political mobilization? There is also a burgeoning field within religion and 
politics literature detailing the relationship and interactions between the religious 
community and the LGBTQ community. However, there is still scant literature analyzing 
race and evangelicalism. 
The social movement theory portion of the literature suffers from similar omissions. 
Social movement theory still provides limited research on evangelicalism and collective 
action. Social movement theorists tend to forget religiously motivated collective action and 
have been critiqued for such oversights. Little has been done to remedy these gaps in the 
literature (but see Smith 2014 and Wald, Silvermank and Fridy 2005).  
I intend to begin filling these gaps by first acknowledging them. Evangelicals are not a 
homogeneous block of conservative white southerners whom all adhere to the Christian 
Right stance and attitude. Further, while it is empirically and theoretically interesting to 
study the reasons for evangelical vitality, perhaps scholars should move on from this line 
of research. Given there is vitality and this vitality is in some way shaped by feelings of 
marginalization or threat (Hunter 1992; Smith et al. 1998), how are evangelicals, not the 
Christian Right, expressing these feelings? Additionally, what emotions are needed to 
stimulate the evangelical population to collective action and mobilization? Also, given the 
Donald Trump presidency and evangelical political access, what kind of marginalization is 
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being felt and acted upon? Are evangelicals merely feeling marginalized because of a 
perceived loss of status and power as a result of changing demographics? In other words, 
are evangelicals simply displaying a stronger version of the racial anxieties that scholars 
have found simmering in white Trump supporters (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2016; 2017; 
2018) or is there more to the story? With this dissertation, I am going to analyze one of the 
few occasions of evangelical collective action in the past few decades as well as analyze 
social media to see if any mobilization is happening in this forum.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: TO MOBILIZE OR NOT TO MOBILIZE? 
Using social constructionism's theoretical assumption of collective action, I build my 
theory of mobilization with a few addendums. I believe that groups can feel they have 
political access while also feeling a sense of social and political marginalization and that 
this marginalization, coupled with social constructionism's theoretical requirements, is 
enough to stimulate expressive mobilization. Theoretically, if a group feels politically 
accepted, and possesses a high sense of internal and external efficacy, they are less likely 
to use expressive mobilization (e.g., marches, boycotts/buycotts, social media expression) 
and more likely to stick with conventional forms of political action (e.g., voting, writing 
Congressmen, attending town hall meetings). 
However, I argue that, since groups can feel they have political access while also 
feeling a sense of social marginalization, this marginalization stimulates expressive 
mobilization through "identity claims" (Tilly 2006). I do not argue that this form of 
mobilization happens at the exclusion of conventional political participation even though, 
throughout history, many groups who engaged in unconventional "expressive" 
mobilization lacked access to conventional participation. That these groups usually lacked 
direct access does not mean that all groups who engage in expressive mobilization and 
conventional participation lack access. The LGBTQ movement has been highly expressive 
even though members of the LGBTQ community can vote. Social movement entrepreneurs 
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have had to learn how to make groups who do have direct access feel like they do not have 
access. Emotions and elite manipulation are vital to this type of social construction and are 
even more essential to analyze and understand when looking at a group who possesses 
conventional political access and yet still engages in expressive mobilization. 
Expressive mobilization is key to understanding the modern day political and social 
dynamics occurring in America today. Feelings of social marginalization affect political 
mobilization. Therefore, if we are to understand better why specific groups mobilize 
politically, we must understand the story behind the expressive forms of mobilization and 
their indication of social strain that no doubt speaks to future and past political 
mobilization.   
In this dissertation, I analyze one group within the United States who fits my theoretical 
dynamic. They have political access but also seem to possess a sense of social, and to a 
degree, political marginalization. I perform both qualitative and quantitative analyses to 
see if there are indeed indicators of social strain manifesting through alternative forms of 
individual and collective mobilization. I find that these alternative forms of mobilization 
are dependent on catalyst events that stimulate emotional reactions.  
Theoretical Foundations 
Theorists, starting as far back as Aristotle to Dahl have all wrestled with the concept of 
political participation in a democracy. They all agree that political participation is 
necessary for the maintenance of a democracy. Active political involvement by the 
citizenry is not only essential to the democracy but also to the citizens abiding in the 
democracy. It is imperative, then, to know and understand what makes a citizen, and 
subsequently, a group of citizens, express themselves politically and socially.  
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 Scholars have found that, in America, a decrease in political participation correlates 
with a decrease in mobilization activities (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The more that 
the public is involved and mobilized the more individuals will want to participate in the 
political process. Hansen (2015) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) focus much of their 
work on elite mobilizers. They argue that to mobilize the masses politically, the masses 
need stimulation from political candidates, political parties, campaigns, interest groups or 
social movements. Mobilization acts as a political stimulant. This means that since political 
participation is essential to democracy and political mobilization is vital to political 
participation, political mobilization is important to democracy. Therefore, understanding 
how and why different groups mobilize is important to understanding political participation 
and democracy.  
 I detail various social movement theories in the previous chapter. Tilly (1978) explains 
that most of these theories originate from Millian (2002), Durkheimian (2014), Weberian 
(1978), Marxian (2018) and Tillian (1978; 2006) theories of political participation and 
democratic theory. Both Weber and Durkheim posit that widespread social change is a 
crucial stimulator for collective action while Mill conceptualizes collective action as an 
intentional pursuit of individual interest. Tilly (1978) focuses on the resources that are 
available to groups as they mobilize. He defines mobilization as the “acquisition of 
collective control over resources, rather than the simple accretion of resources” (78). 
Mobilization is costly (Tilly 1978). Collective action by any group requires collective 
resource. This means that groups must be highly motivated to assume the effort and cost 
that it takes to mobilize. Further, he breaks social movements into three forms of "claim-
making." The first form he describes is called "identity claiming" which is when a group 
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attempts to establish their continued existence in society (Tilly 2006). They are not 
necessarily calling for changes in society as much as expressing an identity’s continued 
existence and relevance. They are still a force with which to be reckoned.  
These few descriptions exemplify how these foundational theories paved the way for 
theories like the theory of social constructionism or collective behavior. Most of these 
theories provide different ways to uncover how groups mobilize while a few theories, 
namely rational choice theory, begin to uncover the why of mobilization (Aslanidis 2015).  
A portion of social movement theory is dedicated to counter-movements. Zald and 
Useem (1983) posit that movements of any kind with moderate visibility and impact create 
the condition for the mobilization of counter-movements. Movements and counter-
movements adapt and update their tactics to account for changes in their interactions with 
the opposing movement. Zald and Useem say,  
Central to M/CM [movement/countermovement] analysis is a description of the 
strategies and tactics and forms of conflict, how and where they interact. A wide 
range of forms of battles exists, from direct confrontation, to 1obbying authorities, 
to speaking to disparate audiences, to debating the shadows of previous generations. 
Moreover, they have a wide range of strategic goals and tactics. They attempt to 
inhibit each other's mobilization, as well as persuade authorities and bystanders. 
(10) 
  
Movements must employ a variety of strategies and techniques to both combat the 
opposing movement and to persuade others (government or society at large) to side with 
their position.  
A movement is conceptually not the same as a counter-movement. Mottl (1980) defines 
a countermovement as a “particular kind of protest movement which is a response to the 
social change advocated by the initial movement” (620). A social movement is “a 
conscious, collective, organized attempt” to bring about social change while a 
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countermovement attempts to stop this social change from happening (Mottl 1980, 620). 
Hence, social movements are centered around social change; however, many of these 
social movement groups fight for political as well as social change.  
The critical difference in a movement and a counter-movement is their perception of 
the status quo. When a group is upset or unhappy with the current status quo they are more 
likely to mobilize to change the standing status quo. Scholars call this a social movement 
(Wilson 1973; Mottl 1980). A counter-movement is a movement of individuals who are 
happy with the status quo and are resisting change (Mottl 1980). “Countermovement 
participants develop strategies (institutional resistance, non-violent direct action, violence) 
for the overall conduct of the movement in reaction to the successes of the initial movement 
and to the amount of social control exerted against them” (Mottl 1980, 624; see Snyder and 
Tilly 1972; Turner and Killian 1972; Wilson 1977). Counter-movements use specific 
tactics (lobbying, letter-writing, sit-ins, boycotts) to promote their cause (Mottl 1980). 
Counter-movements are mobilized into different forms of political engagement to defend 
and uphold the status quo.   
I include this philosophical difference because I am more interested in how groups that 
want to maintain a status quo are mobilizing. I am not analyzing what causes a fully 
developed counter-movement per se. Instead, I am interested in analyzing the signals of 
social strain that manifest through individual mobilization and instances of collective 
action as a group attempts to maintain or protect their preferred status quo. 
Moving forward then, my theory rests on a few assumptions. First, it assumes that 
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feeling marginalized is important to mobilization.12 This has been confirmed by multiple 
different social movement theories (Arendt 1951; Buechler 1993; Gurr 1970; Kornhauser 
1959; Jasper 1998; Jenkins 1983; McAdam 1982; Morris 2000; Smelser 1962; Snow and 
Benford 1992; Tilly 1978). Further, I assume that groups can feel social marginalization 
while still possessing a high level of external and internal political efficacy. I call this high 
sense of political efficacy, political access. These feelings of social marginalization, while 
mediated by their feelings of political access, will manifest themselves via expressive 
mobilization as "identity claiming." I am interested in groups who, theoretically, want to 
maintain the standing societal status quo through expressive mobilization. Moving forward 
then, anytime I refer to mobilization or collective action, I mean counter-mobilization, or 
only that the mobilization being referred to is attempting to stop change and preserve the 
status quo rather than promote change and replace the status quo.  
Identity 
Oliver et al. (2003) split the social constructionist milieu into four distinct areas: 
emotions, framing, collective identity, and culture. The social constructionist theory 
contends that for individuals to act collectively, they must possess a shared identity. Tilly 
(1978) defines it as “a population which has some common structure and shared belief” 
(8). Identity influences individual action and collective action (Campbell et al. 1960). 
Kauffman (1990, 67) said that identity politics is “the belief that identity itself—its 
elaboration, expression, or affirmation—is and should be a fundamental focus of political 
work." Identity politics politicizes areas of life such as “sexuality, interpersonal relations, 
lifestyle and culture” (67). If an individual identifies herself with a group that she believes 
                                                 
12 This is something that, aside from a few scholars (Hunter 1992; Smith et al. 1998), has been overlooked 
in the research on religion and mobilization. 
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to be on the margins of society or government, she behaves differently than if she identifies 
with a group she believes to hold a pre-eminent role in society and government. Brown 
(1995) argues that “marginalization forms the basis for the culture of identity politics” 
(Bernstein 2005, 50).  
Taylor and Whittier (1998) argue that "to understand a politicized identity community 
it is necessary to analyze the social and political struggle that created the identity" (352). 
Throughout history, identity has shaped and influenced social movements. Before the 
1960s and 1970s, most identity politics were seen as economic rather than social. In other 
words, one's economic status defined them and was the reason for their unrest and protest. 
However, with the onset of the Civil Rights and Women's movements in the 1960s and 
1970s, scholars were forced to step back and reassess their conception of identity.  Scholars 
promoting the New Social Movement (NSM) literature explain that there is a difference 
between some social movements and others. For instance,  
Touraine (1998) makes an ontological distinction between identity politics and 
NSMs. He does not regard movements such as the women's and lesbian movements 
as identity politics because they have radical and inclusive tendencies and have 
themselves criticized identity politics. In contrast, he does consider conservative 
social movements as identity politics because they respond to economic 
globalization and the decline of a national culture (Touraine 1998, p. 131) by 
forming movements based in ethnicity, religion, or nationalism, such as political 
Islamism or Serbian nationalism. (Bernstein 2005, 55). 
 
This distinction between conservative movements based in identity and exclusion versus 
liberal movements based on inclusion and rejecting identity shows the importance of 
identity to social movements and collective action. In both cases, identity was central but 
is essential to note the difference between those motivated by including identities and 
excluding identities. This is particularly important to note in the current political 
environment where identities, such as the "white identity," are formed as a result of more 
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diversity in the United States and a need to exclude these new identities (Sides, Tesler, and 
Vavrek 2017).  
Individual identities are not the same as collective identities (Pollenta and Jasper 2001). 
Individual and collective identities do regularly interact, but collective identities are not 
merely the aggregation of individual identities (2001). Rather, collective identities are 
"imagined as well as concrete communities" and they involve "an act of perception and 
construction as well as discovery of preexisting bonds, interest and boundaries" (298). 
Collective identities are fluid and relational and create the lens through which individuals 
can make sense of the world (2001).   
Alberto Melucci (1988) contends that developing a well-constructed collective identity 
is one of the most pivotal tasks for agents of mobilization. He says that the construction of 
collective identity is “a process in which the actors produce the common cognitive 
frameworks that enable them to assess the environment and to calculate the cost and 
benefits of the action" (343).  There are two dimensions of collective identity. Individuals 
who ascribe to a certain collective identity participate either to help the group achieve some 
goal or because they simply enjoy feeling a part of the collective group (Gamson 1992). 
The social constructivist theory contends that politically relevant identities are the only 
identities that can lead to social movement. This is problematic since many significant 
identities are not necessarily political (Aslanidis 2015). Klandermans (1984; 2001) 
contends that even more important than a political identity is the existence of an "out-
group" that allows the "in-group" to develop and gives the "in-group" a "they" to fight 
against. 
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Bernstein (1997) defines the concept of identity as it relates to social movements by 
breaking it into three levels. First, for any social movement to mobilize, there must be a 
shared collective identity. Second, “expressions of identity can be deployed at the 
collective level as a political strategy, which can be aimed at what are traditionally thought 
of as cultural and/or political goals” (59). Third, identity can itself be a goal of social 
movement activism, “either gaining acceptance for a hitherto stigmatized identity or 
deconstructed categories of identities such as “man,” “woman,” “gay,” “straight,” “black,” 
or white” (59). The activists within each group must formulate strategies (Hartsock 1983; 
Collins 1998; Haraway 1988) to combat the power structures and establish or promote their 
identities. When enough people share a similar identity and feel the need to make their 
voices heard, the collection of these various individuals takes on an identity of its own. 
This shared identity can lead groups to mobilize when trying to promote or defend this 
identity.  
Theoretically then, a group must possess a solid sense of identity for them to feel 
marginalized enough to act. Perceived societal marginalization of an individual's identity 
or the values with which they identify leads to a sense of social strain. Further, scholars 
stress the importance of collective identity to stimulate mobilization. Without an "us" 
versus "them" mentality, individuals are less likely to mobilize. Thus, a strong sense of 
individual identity and a sense of collective identity is essential to my theory of 
mobilization. 
Marginalization Conceptualized 
While I do not directly examine what makes a group feel marginalized, I do believe it 
is important to conceptualize marginalization and present some theoretical assumptions 
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about what causes it. The basic Merriam-Webster definition of "marginalize" is "to relegate 
to an unimportant or powerless position within a society or group.” Another more specific 
form of marginalization is alienation. Political alienation can be categorized into four 
categories: political powerlessness; political meaninglessness; political normlessness and 
political isolation (Finifter 1970). Extrapolating from the concept of alienation, some 
individual feels marginalized when they feel that they and their opinions, knowledge, 
expertise, experiences or anything unique to that individual or group are pushed to the 
periphery of society and/or politics and considered unimportant or unnecessary. This is 
what I mean by marginalized.  
To reiterate, the only thing that matters is that the group perceives or feels marginalized 
(not if they are). The creators of the social constructionism approach introduce and support 
the idea that what matters is not the reality of marginalization but somewhat the 
construction and perception of marginalization (Gamson 1995; Jasper 1998; 2011; Zurcher 
and Snow 1981; Benford 1997). For the group, what they perceive about themselves, about 
society, and about how society views them, is the reality. Thus, the group operates and 
interacts with society from the viewpoint of that reality.  
What makes individuals or a group of individuals feel such a way? Emotions play an 
important role in social constructionism's theory of mobilization and are therefore 
important to discuss. Feeling marginalized and aggrieved by some societal or political ill 
is nothing new to society (Jasper 1997). In fact, these feelings are so common that many 
social movement scholars began to abandon their importance altogether. However, Jasper 
(1997) contends that the emotional context of a movement is relevant and should be 
addressed. Marginalization is most commonly felt by demographic minorities, whether the 
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minority is based on gender, race or religion. The systemic oppression of women over the 
course of human history is perhaps one significant aberration in that women make up half 
of the human population. In short, marginalization is the feeling, usually sensed by these 
minorities, that they are on the margins of society and lack influence and access to 
government (1997).  
However, it is pertinent for this dissertation not only to acknowledge the 
marginalization of demographic minorities, but the perceived marginalization of those who 
marginalize the demographic minorities. Recent research shows that shifting power 
structures and demographic shifts cause those who hold power, both socially and 
politically, to feel threatened and anxious (Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek 2016; 2017; 2018; 
Tesler 2016; Wong 2018a). This feeling of threat and anxiety creates a feeling of 
marginalization that can and does lead to mobilization. Scholars such as Sides, Tesler, and 
Vavrek (2018) find that these feelings of threat and anxiety, stimulated by racial and 
demographic changes, were essential in mobilizing white Americans to vote for Donald 
Trump. Thus, it is essential to understand that feelings of marginalization can stem from 
systemic, societal or governmental oppression or from feeling that the power to oppress is 
in jeopardy. In other words, it is possible for the oppressed and oppressors to both feel 
marginalized.  
The marginalization of the oppressed (or oppressors) sometimes stems from a 
perceived stigma about one’s culture. For instance, societal expectations likely caused 
LGBTQ individuals to feel marginalized. Standing laws in government that stipulated that 
marriage is only between a man and woman influenced them to feel that their perspectives 
and their voices were marginal and unimportant to society at large. Perhaps a  macro-level, 
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they sensed that the unspoken but understood prevailing Judeo-Christian values of 
American culture were against them. In fact, the LGBTQ movement had a very interactive 
relationship with the Christian Right, one that spurred the LGBTQ community into forms 
of action that they may never have tapped into absent the stimulation of an opposing group 
(Fetner 2008). Broadly, the accepted or understood morality of the culture did not line up 
with their understanding of values and morality. Thus, feeling or perceiving this friction of 
values is likely another reason for feeling marginalized. Ultimately, the creation of an “us” 
versus “them” mentality worked simultaneously with a feeling of marginalization about 
their culture and values to stimulate and mobilize the LGBTQ community in ways it had 
never mobilized before. 
As I mentioned earlier, a key component of marginalization is the feeling of alienation. 
Olsen (1965) explains that "External social conditions are extremely important in 
producing these feelings, but alienation occurs only when a person consciously experiences 
discomfort or discontent in his social relationships. Because of inadequate or undesirable 
ties with his social world, the alienated person feels cut off or separated from society" 
(202). Hannon (2011) explains that feelings of alienation tend to be higher amongst 
conservatives because they are more likely to feel that their values are being ignored or 
under attack (Weakliem and Borch 2006). Alienation tends to increase support for 
expressive forms of political participation such as demonstrations or boycotts (Southwell 
1985; Opp 1990; Weakliem and Borch 2006).  
The social construction of these negative emotions is perhaps the leading cause of 
feelings of marginalization. Jasper (1998; 2011) calls emotional manipulation motivational 
framing and frame alignment. In other words, elite entrepreneurs construct and manipulate 
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these emotions to bring them to the surface. While the emotions may not be constructed 
from scratch, as all the previous examples demonstrate, "a certain amplification procedure 
is nonetheless employed in most cases" (Aslanidis 2015). 
Moving forward, I refer to a group that perceives itself to be on the margins of society, 
who feel a sense of societal strain or emotion-laden injustice, as marginalized. I will not 
always say perceived marginalization because reality does not matter if a group feels 
themselves to be marginalized, they are marginalized. My theory and social 
constructionism are predicated on the assumption that all that matters is the feeling or 
construction of marginalization, not the reality of marginalization. 
Social and Political Marginalization 
Building off the social constructionist theory, I theorize that there are two dimensions 
of emotional marginalization: political marginalization and social marginalization. This 
inevitably leads to the following question: can a group feel politically marginalized but 
socially accepted, or vice versa, politically accepted while feeling socially marginalized? 
In short, can oppressors feel marginalized? I contend that, confirmed by current research, 
individuals and groups with power and access can feel marginalized.  
I conceptualize political marginalization as having low levels of political efficacy and 
low political access. As I discussed in the literature review, when someone has low levels 
of external political efficacy they feel they cannot influence government (Finkel 1985). 
This feeling may stem from seeing few people in power who share their ideological 
convictions, racial or gender identity, or even their economic status. These emotions can 
stem from real life experiences, but they are most likely framed and socially constructed 
(Aslanidis 2015).  The essence of what I conceptualize as political marginalization is 
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feeling like one cannot influence government or government institutions for or against 
something they care about. Groups that feel that they are on the margins of government are 
groups that feel themselves to be politically marginalized.  
Craig (1980) posits that a poor sense of external efficacy is the strongest determinant 
of “popular mobilization” in democratic settings (191). This is directly related to my theory 
as I argue that individuals who possess a high sense of external efficacy can still be 
motivated to mobilize expressively because of perceived societal marginalization. 
Social marginalization is distinct for a few reasons. Both the oppressed and the 
oppressors can feel a sense of social marginalization. To feel social marginalization, a 
group might believe that society does not accept them or that accepted social norms do not 
align with the group’s social norms. Ultimately, society misunderstands them. A socially 
marginalized group may feel that portions of the mainstream media are against them and 
that many people on social media do not understand them. They may feel that institutions 
are predisposed to be against them. They believe that society looks down on them, their 
way of life, their culture. They may believe they experience institutional discrimination. 
They may feel that their way of life, their status in society, and their ability to access 
government or power is being jeopardized by changes in society.  
They may also feel that society stereotypes them wrongly and judges them for this 
stereotyped existence. For example, “rednecks” in the South may feel that society at large 
thinks of them as stupid, poor, uneducated, inbred and worthless, based upon the way elites 
and the media have portrayed them. These types of experiences lead someone to believe 
that society is somehow against them, or wrongly judging them—which leads to perceived 
social marginalization. Social entrepreneurs then take and exploit these feelings and 
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experiences for their benefit and to stimulate collective action (Snow and Bedford 1992).   
To build upon the feeling of threat, social marginalization can come from feelings of 
racial anxiety or status loss (Conover 1983; Crawford 1980; Lorentzen 1980; Wald 1989). 
When individuals feel their lifestyle or their power status in society is being threatened, 
they may begin to feel a sense of social marginalization. Their identity, their values, their 
perspectives are all being threatened by new values, identities, and perspectives. Whites 
during the Civil Rights Era may not have had any reason to feel marginalized except that 
they felt their power in society was threatened by allowing African Americans equal 
footing in society. In other words, innate prejudices against an out-group stimulate feelings 
of angst and anxiety when perceived “out-groups” appear to be gaining power.  
Sometimes, if a group identifies with a set of beliefs, and they feel that these beliefs are 
becoming taboo in society, they will start feeling socially marginalized. In this instance, 
the feelings of marginalization are not about some tangible aspect of the individual as much 
as the feelings about the individuals’ belief system. Individuals who practice polygamy 
believe in the usefulness and virtue of having more than one wife. However, if they feel 
that society at large does not agree with this way of living and this belief system, they likely 
will feel marginalized by society. They feel that they cannot have a voice in society; they 
cannot influence or cause society to view them differently or more favorably because 
society has already put them in their predetermined and judged position. Mainly, they feel 
they have no power or influence in society to be popularly accepted by society. 
 This feeling of social marginalization is inextricably tied to politics, however. 
Polygamists, for instance, may feel that societal acceptance will give their perspective more 
of a voice to speak into and influence government policies about their lifestyle. If the 
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government did make marriage to more than one person legal but society still shunned 
polygamy, the polygamists would still feel a sense of societal marginalization even if their 
political access and representation had been rectified (see Jasper 1997). These feelings of 
societal martyrdom are just affirmed and re-affirmed by the community, news, and social 
media with which each group surrounds itself. Individuals in groups that feel this kind of 
societal marginalization feed off each other’s experiences and stories that affirm the 
perception of societal marginalization. This is part of the “cultural” context requirement 
mentioned in the social constructionist theory.  
The Two Levels of Marginalization 
Political and societal marginalization are intricately connected. In this next section, I 
set up a full generalized image of reality to paint a picture. My broad over-generalized 
assumptions do not mean that in all circumstances they are what happens but rather that in 
many circumstances they have happened and may continue to happen.  
Historically speaking, sometimes societal acceptance is a necessary condition to bring 
about political acceptance. In other words, members of society must come to a point where 
they feel the need to change their judgment or stance on a particular group of people, and 
in doing so pressure government also to change its institutions and laws to treat the 
individuals better. The LGBTQ movement is an example of societal acceptance that 
eventually led to political acceptance.  
Social movement entrepreneurs advanced and framed the LGBTQ movement in a way 
that caused a shift in social mores and understandings that caused society to take the first 
jump. These entrepreneurs used value framing to shape collective opinion about gay rights 
(Brewer 2003). Scholars agree that individuals use their core values to inform their political 
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positions (Feldman 1988; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Rokeach 1973). Value framing 
entrepreneurs found that equality and traditional morality were the two most effective 
frames by which to frame LGBTQ issues (Brewer 2003). These values are an important 
part of public opinion more broadly, not just about LGBTQ rights (Wilcox and Wolpert 
1996; 2000). Using the pro-gay right’s equality frame, entrepreneurs slowly shifted public 
opinion of gay rights in their favor (Brewer 2003). Eventually, government policy caught 
up with public opinion, most notably with the Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) ruling. I do not 
assume causation here, but I do assume correlation.  
Sometimes, the government must act first (usually through pressure from members of 
the group advocating for political and societal acceptance). Government policy sometimes 
affects societal acceptance. The Civil Rights movement is an example of this kind of 
change. The government, in response to social and political activism, made legal changes 
to accept African Americans; however, large portions of society did not want to capitulate. 
Almost every law was contested socially and politically. Eventually, society did capitulate 
and, at least in the areas mandated by government, moved past a portion of their social and 
institutional prejudice. 
These are just two examples. I use them to paint a picture. These two dimensions are 
correlated. Thus, if members of society shift their position on a specific group, it is likely 
that portions of government are soon to follow; and, if government shifts its position 
towards a certain group, members of society are more likely to follow.  
The Oppressors 
What happens when those in power begin to feel threatened, feeling like they may lose 
this power and status?  Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2017) argue that unexpected waves of 
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political participation such as in the election of Donald Trump in 2016 are the result of 
pent-up racial and status anxiety over the potential loss of power. Snow and Oliver (1995) 
find that “individuals who were accustomed to a stable increase of their wellbeing are the 
first to take to the streets when deprivation kicks in, not the ones who have nothing to lose” 
(Aslanidis 2015).  
Naturally, society and government cannot change positions towards specific groups 
without also shifting their positions on other groups (Zald and Useem 1987; Tilly 1978). 
For instance, while the Civil Rights Era brought about great advancements and positive 
changes for African Americans, it completely shifted the autonomy of business owners and 
school boards. Business owners, in this case, the oppressors, were no longer allowed to 
discriminate by race in whom they hired, whom they fired, whom they served, how they 
served and so on. Regardless of the rightness or wrongness of the situation, it is necessary 
to understand that a change in the social and political position of one group resulted in a 
change in the social and political position of another. This is true in all countries and 
circumstances. Zald and Useem (1983) call this "loosely coupled conflict." In other words, 
actions and positions by one group stimulate and effect actions and positions of another 
group. 
Sometimes these losses are merely perceived moral losses. For instance, while there 
was a practical change for business owners during and after the Civil Rights Era, the moral 
loss was likely what many racist whites felt after the change. Racist whites felt a figurative 
sense of loss and marginalization. Society at large no longer accepted their racist views and 
perspectives, nor were they condoned or promoted by the government anymore. They 
experienced a perceived moral loss.  
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Do those in power react to feelings of marginalization differently than the oppressed? 
Presumably, the oppressors engage in politicking and social advocacy in a particular way, 
a way that they had come to accept, appreciate, and believe worked. In other words, they 
cultivated and built a repertoire of useful and effective tactics to maintain and promote their 
accepted position in society and government (Tilly 2006). These tactics likely included 
lobbying politicians, campaigning and promoting candidates sympathetic to their cause, 
voter suppression and discrimination, and in some cases violence and intimidation. 
Theoretically, a group that does not feel marginalized and feels a strong sense of 
political efficacy and social dominance does not feel the need to engage in peripheral and 
expressive forms of political and social activism (Mottl 1980). In other words, they may 
not feel the need to march on Washington or in the streets of their town.13 These are forms 
of political and social activism that marginalized groups engage in since they feel that they 
do not have the same clout or access as the accepted group (Jasper 1997; Mottl 1980).  
Oppressors are not going to feel the need to make symbolic stands for their position, 
nor are they going to feel the need to promote or convince the public of the virtue of their 
position; they believe society already accepts their position. For example, people who 
believe that alcohol should be legal have nothing to grandstand about;14 Society already 
accepts the consumption of alcohol and the government has also accepted it. 
However, what is true for all groups is that they must shift and adapt with the times, 
with the current and prevailing zeitgeist. What once worked for one group, may no longer 
                                                 
13 Just because they do not need to engage in expressive forms of activism does not mean that they will not. 
However, it is more likely for groups who perceive themselves to be marginalized to engage in these forms 
of mobilization.  
14 With the exception, of course, of some counties and towns that are entirely dry and a few small towns, 
primarily in the South, that have dry Sundays.  
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work. This is especially true for those groups who hold a position of dominance in society 
but are now feeling threatened or marginalized. For instance, consider what people may do 
if, for some reason, they began to feel that legal alcohol consumption was being threatened. 
Even if there was no way that alcohol would be made illegal or hindered, for some reason 
alcohol retailers began feeling like the social zeitgeist was turning against them, how would 
they respond? It is the threat or perceived threat that would spur a once dormant or settled 
group into action. Hence, this is an example of a counter-movement. A group who 
previously held the status quo attempts to defend themselves against movements 
attempting to change the status quo. 
The dominant group, who feels that their dominance is being threatened, will likely 
turn to unconventional forms of mobilization to express their concern. They feel the need 
to use the unconventional forms of mobilization that the oppressed groups have used 
throughout the centuries. This does not mean the dominant group does not still use all of 
their conventional institutional access, but if a once-dominant group begins to engage in 
unconventional mobilization, this is a sign that this group is feeling threatened and 
concerned that their station in society is in jeopardy. 
Social movement entrepreneurs have to rush to figure out ways to frame and activate a 
collective identity for a dominant group that has not had to rely on such things before. This 
is what Donald Trump's campaign did. They promoted and constructed a "white identity" 
and stirred up feelings of marginalization in the dominant group in society. They used the 
"us" versus "them" mentality to help strengthen a collective identity and feeling of threat. 
Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek (2017) quote the philosopher Charles Mills as they attempt to 
explain the uniqueness of "white identity." Mills says, "The fish does not see the water, 
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and whites do not see the racial nature of a white polity because it is natural to them, the 
element in which they move" (1997, 76). Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek (2017) explain that 
since whites have always had the numerical majority in the United States, and have been 
afforded a disproportionate share of the political, economic and social resources, their 
“white identity” has been hampered.  
What then are the mechanisms that cause dominant groups to mobilize using 
unconventional forms of expression? The social constructionist theory contends that a 
collective identity, an effective frame, a ripe cultural context, and emotional strain are all 
necessary to produce collective mobilization. I contend that these are true but that the 
emotional strain need only be social. In some countries, groups who fit this model have 
resorted to violence to be heard; other groups have formed coups to try and use force to 
change the government; others have gone to the streets peacefully and violently (Mottl 
1980). In this dissertation, I look at the mechanisms that produce expressive mobilization 
in one “dominant” group.  
Expressive Mobilization Defined in Modern Society 
Accepted scholarly conceptualizations of mobilization define mobilization as the 
“deliberate activation of social networks as a method of diffusing awareness about a social 
or political problem or of exerting social and/or political pressure for its resolution” 
(Theocharis 2015, 5; see also Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Hansen 2015; and Brady 
1999). There are different manifestations and forms of mobilization (Craig 1980; 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Hansen 2015).15 Mobilization can be conventional (voting, 
                                                 
15 Some scholars differentiate between political participation and political mobilization. Rosenstone & 
Hansen (1993) define mobilization as the “process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce 
other people to participate” (25). Hence, mobilization is the activity of inducing participation but is distinct 
from the act of participation itself. However, current scholars argue that this distinction is no longer relevant 
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lobbying, writing Congresspeople) or unconventional (boycotting, sit-ins, marches, 
rallies). Understanding the ways that a group engages in conventional mobilization is 
relevant to political science because it informs us about how and why citizens directly 
influence the political system.  
However, unconventional "expressive" political mobilization is also relevant for many 
reasons. First, expressive mobilization disseminates a message and/or an identity to the 
broader public. It draws attention to an issue. By doing so, it can place the issue and/or 
identity on to the political agenda. This form of manifestation allows for the person or 
group of people to raise awareness about a social or political problem and/or exert social 
and political pressure to solve this problem. Without such forms of expression, under-
privileged members of society such as women, racial minorities, LGBTQ people, and 
people with disabilities, may not have had the opportunity to be heard by elites or their 
identities socially validated/accepted.  
Expressive mobilization also indicates for society and government that the group 
engaging in such mobilization feels aggrieved, and indicates what issues are perceived 
problematic for this group. It also indicates for society and government the potential for 
conventional political action. In other words, expressive mobilization acts as a clue to the 
broader public that there are areas of concern within the ranks of some collective group 
that, if ignored by state and federal governments, could potentially result in a backlash at 
the polls.  
While expression may not fit the formal definition of conventional political 
                                                 
in the age of digital participation (Theocharis 2015). “Digitally networked participatory acts are thus often 
inseparable from a conventional understanding of participation --- even by the standards of the narrowest 
definitions” (Theocharis 2015, 5).   
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mobilization, it is important to the political process. Scholars argue that expression is a 
crucial part of political mobilization (Theocharis 2015; Rojas and Puig-I-Abril 2009). 
Expression is the way that individuals can publicly express their political orientations 
(Rojas and Puig-I-Abril 2009); thus, it is an essential part of the mobilization process. How 
they express themselves can vary, but when an individual or a group of individuals 
mobilizes, it is with the intent of expression. Since expression is mobilization, then how 
expression manifests itself is irrelevant.  
Since this dissertation focuses primarily on extra-institutional means of political action, 
it is essential to discuss some historical context of such protests. Jasper (1997) explains 
that moral protests present themselves in different ways. The commonly used styles of 
protest today include massive public rallies, marches, occupations at specifically targeted 
sites, "provocative verbal and visual rhetoric," and mainstream lobbying and electioneering 
(Jasper 1997, 7). Boycotting, mass petitions and urban rebellions began around the time of 
the French Revolution. These forms of mobilization were used primarily by groups who 
were not afforded full human rights such as political participation or economic protections. 
Jasper explains, "They were movements demanding full inclusion for these collectivities, 
including industrial workers, women, and later ethnic and racial minorities" (1997, 7). He 
calls social movements motivated to gain basic human rights, citizenship movements. Only 
in the 19th century did “post-citizenship” social movements begin to spread across the 
United States and other countries. Post-citizenship social movements consist of groups who 
already integrated into the political, economic and educational systems, but desire to see 
injustices done to other groups or entities (animals, the environment, lifestyle protections) 
rectified (Jasper 1997).  
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American social movements have consisted primarily of "post-citizenship" 
mobilization except for a few key movements such as the Women's Suffrage movement 
and the Civil Rights movement. In the 19th century, “the United States was filled with post-
citizenship movements concerned with drinking and other sins, health foods, the 
environment, spirituality, and other ‘lifestyle’ issues sometimes pursued by today’s post-
industrial movements” (Jasper 1997, 8).   
Thus, social movements are not always aimed at merely gaining legal or institutional 
rights. Many movements also attempt to "rework cultural meanings and tolerance for 
diverse lifestyles" (Jasper 1997, 8-9). For example, women or LGBTQ people may now be 
afforded certain legal rights but are still fighting to change cultural stigmas or 
disadvantages they face in the private sphere due to cultural norms and attitudes (1997). 
Therefore, those engaging in expressive mobilization through extra-institutional methods 
are not always attempting to change government policy but also to reframe cultural norms 
they perceive as damaging to their group and/or society.  
Jasper (1997) admits that most social movement literature is not equipped to explain 
all forms of social movements and collective actions. Specifically, the literature is not 
equipped to explain movements of privileged groups compared to oppressed groups. 
Theoretically, I do not attempt to fully explain this difference either; instead, I start to shed 
light on the mechanisms and emotions necessary for one privileged group to engage in 
forms of extra-institutional mobilization. 
Jasper (1997) explains that every group attempts to come up with new, innovative spins 
on traditional forms of extra-institutional protest. He gives the example of the “kiss-ins” 
that gay and lesbian activists have begun to use in response to entities that oppress them. 
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Animal rights activists have broken into research laboratories to “liberate” the animals 
(Jasper 1997). Anti-abortion supporters have bombed abortion clinics or picketed outside 
them. Women in the Temperance movement came together and knelt outside a saloon in 
protest of alcohol consumption (A Nation of Scofflaws: Prohibition--A Film by Ken Burns 
and Lynn Novick). Recently, anti-gun activist students from the Marjory Stoneman Douglas 
High School in Parkland, Florida, the site of a recent school shooting, promoted a "Die-in" 
at the local Publix grocery store to protest the funds the company donated to a politician 
who backed the National Rifle Association. The method of expression varies, but all of 
these forms of expression are done outside the institutions of government and are therefore 
not conventional forms of political participation. They draw attention to an issue or identity 
that is causing unrest in some portion of the population and therefore should not be 
dismissed. If unrest is happening, this unrest may eventually influence the aggrieved to 
conventionally participate in more politically impactful ways.   
There is now a growing debate regarding what counts as political 
participation/mobilization— precisely because of the inception of technology, the internet, 
and social media. Traditional forms of political participation and mobilization are now 
being joined by an entirely new array of political engagement and expression. Political 
participation must now be categorized as either offline participation or online participation. 
Does political engagement on social media platforms (online participation) count as 
political participation? Is expression via online forums a form of political mobilization?   
The scholarly consensus is that political engagement on social media platforms has 
developed into its own form of political mobilization (Feezell 2016; Oser, Hooghe, and 
Marien 2013; McCosker 2015; Sormanen and Dutton 2015; Theocharis 2015).  Theocharis 
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(2015) says that "the act of (digital) communication as a form of mobilization …[is]… 
understood as integral to political participation" (6). This mobilization is a form of self-
expression and identity (Theocharis 2015). Some argue that digitally networked 
participation is merely an expressive form of engagement that has no real impact on social 
change (Morozov 2009). Social media engagement creates the illusion of participation and 
influence, but it has little real-world implications (Morozov 2009).   
However, scholars have found this negative interpretation of social media political 
involvement to be untrue. Social networking and engagement on digital networks can and 
has had a critical impact on social movements, mobilization and collective action (Bennett 
and Segerberg 2012; 2013; Castells 2007; 2012; Diani 2003; Earl and Kimport 2011). The 
overwhelming evidence seems to be that online political engagement is its own form of 
independent engagement; it is relevant, and it can have an impact on the political process 
and mobilization (Gibson and Cantijoch 2013).16 Theocharis (2015) provides perhaps the 
most succinct definition of online political mobilization: it is “a networked media-based 
personalized action that is carried out by individual citizens with the intent to display their 
own mobilization and activate their social networks in order to raise awareness about, or 
exert social and political pressures for the solution of, a social or political problem” (6). 
Political and social expression, therefore, is a form of political mobilization and has 
become an essential part of the political and social process. Thus, I would expect to see a 
group, feeling socially marginalized, to utilize such forms of self-expression and 
                                                 
16 A key quote in Gibson and Cantijoch’s (2013) article regarding the importance of online political 
participation is this: “Posting one’s opinion to a blog or social network site arguably makes a more immediate 
and potentially influential public statement than wearing a label badge.” (714) In short, online political 
engagement can sometimes be more effective than offline political engagement.   
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mobilization. I conceptualize mobilization that is expressive, with the intent of drawing 
attention to a problem or to one's identity, expressive mobilization as distinct from 
conventional mobilization, which generally means voting, lobbying, writing letters to 
members of Congress and using all the conventional forms of political participation 
available.  
As I mentioned earlier, there have been different social movements throughout history 
that have used these forms of expressive mobilization. The Civil Rights movement, the 
Women’s Suffrage movement, and the LGBTQ movement are all examples of movements 
that engaged in unconventional expressive forms of mobilization in an attempt to make 
their identity known and their voices heard (Freeman and Johnson 1999). The Christian 
Right movement was also a part of many of the mid-to-late 20th-century movements 
sweeping the United States. These movements used different forms of protest, namely, 
marches, boycotts, books/articles, interest groups, and sit-ins. Most recently the Black 
Lives Matters movement, and the #MeToo movement have begun to utilize new forms of 
expressive mobilization such as kneeling during the national anthem and Twitter hashtags 
and other forms of online media expression. The #MeToo movement spread primarily as 
an online phenomenon, indicating the present day importance of online media expression.  
There are a variety of ways that groups can expressively mobilize. In this dissertation, 
I chose to look at political consumerism (boycotting and buycotting) and Twitter 
expression as indicators of social marginalization. Both forms of expression are highly 
relevant in today’s society, with political consumerism being one of the most commonly 
used forms of political mobilization and online media expression growing exponentially 
over the past decade.  
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Evangelicals 
I am interested in understanding evangelicals in America as they are an ideal test group 
for my theory. Globally, evangelicals are a small but significant portion of the population. 
Evangelicals in the United States have enjoyed a rather comfy level of perceived societal 
and governmental acceptance throughout American history (McLoughlin 1968; Coleman 
1980; Smidt 1988). In fact, evangelicalism permeated American culture and values so 
much so that it can be said that “the story of American evangelicalism is the story of 
America itself in the year 1800 to 1900” (McLoughlin 1968, 1). In short, evangelical 
Protestantism has enjoyed a dominant position in both political and social life throughout 
most of American history (Wong 2018a, 94).  
Evangelical Christians have enjoyed an accepted and pre-eminent position in American 
society and government (Oldfield 1996). Feminists argue that patriarchy is a highly Judeo-
Christian value, and patriarchy has been and continues to be a staple in American society 
(Foucault 1990; 1995).  Nominal evangelicals have been in some of the top positions of 
political power and have also had a monopoly on societal definitions of virtue and morality 
(Marsden 2006). Further, there is new evidence of a growing and well-connected 
evangelical elite who hold pre-eminent positions in government, corporations, academia, 
Hollywood and more (Lindsay 2008). Wong (2018a) says that the white evangelical voting 
block today “is buttressed by several structures that reinforce its advantages, enabling it to 
resist the challenges to its strength posed by demographic changes” (89). These are 
examples of past social and present political acceptance afforded to evangelicals in the 
United States.  
Two scholars, Hunter (1981; 1992) and Smith (1998) were aware of this dynamic. Each 
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claim that societal changes and/or the identification of villainous out-groups play an 
essential role in bolstering evangelical vitality. In other words, the more evangelicals feel 
threatened either by modernity or out-groups, the more they thrive. Where these scholars 
differ is in the ways that evangelicals maintain this vitality. Hunter (1981) argues that 
retreat, boundaries and social distance from modernity have kept evangelicalism alive 
while Smith et al. (1998) contend that direct interaction with opposing groups stimulates 
evangelical vitality. Social movement research shows that direct interaction with opposing 
groups should also instigate mobilization. It creates an environment of collective identity 
by establishing an “us” versus “them” mentality.  
Jelen (1991) affirms these findings when he shows that members of the Christian Right 
were motivated primarily by antagonism for minority groups. These "out-group" versus 
"in-group" emotions have become more evident in recent history for many hypothesized 
reasons, most specifically the advent of an African American president being elected. 
Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2016) find racial and status anxieties were more influential on 
support for President Trump than education or income. Where evangelicals fit in the overall 
emotional reaction to changing demographics and power structures is not completely clear; 
however, what is clear is that their support for Donald Trump was high and the reason for 
such staunch support is strongly associated with racial and partisan attachments. 
The question concerning evangelicals then is what emotions might they be feeling? 
Jasper (1997) and his fellow social movement scholars admit that there is no shortage of 
grievances for groups to feel. Given that "white" evangelicals are and have been a dominant 
force in American society for most of American history (Fowler et al. 2013), what methods 
are elites using to stir up anxiety and a feeling of marginalization in a group that holds 
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political access and power (especially in the Trump era)? As my theory explains, there are 
two dimensions to marginalization, social and political. These dimensions are connected, 
but social movement entrepreneurs are more likely to find success in motivating 
evangelicals on social and political grounds than simply political grounds. They need to 
stir up a moral "outrage" in the community (Jasper 1997). 
White evangelicals are a part of a broader paradigm shift happening in the ranks of 
white Americans. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2017; 2018) explain the phenomenon as 
"white identity politics." "Trump showed that appeals to white grievance have the power 
to resonate in a multicultural America where whites increasingly feel like an aggrieved 
minority” (22).  They claim that this is part of a broader global phenomenon. Perceptions 
of discrimination against whites were strong predictors of support for Brexit (2016). Tesler 
(2016) argues that Barack Obama’s presidency may have inflamed this white identity 
phenomenon by intensifying by drawing attention to the relationship between race and 
politics. Hence, white Americans’ growing feeling of being an “aggrieved minority” is 
likely connected to increased feelings of marginalization amongst white evangelicals.  
White evangelicals, in particular, are displaying signs of social strain and threat 
(Jardina 2014; Wong 2018a). Wong (2018a) attributes this feeling to diversifying 
demographics within the evangelical population. Looking at white, Black, Asian and 
Latinx evangelicals, Wong found that they all demonstrated more conservative 
perspectives on moral issues such as abortion and gay marriage. However, on issues such 
as immigration, reparations for slavery, support for Black Lives Matter, and welfare, white 
evangelicals are dramatically different from their racial minority counterparts (Wong 
2018a; 2018b). Generally speaking, white evangelicals are far more conservative on issues 
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than are Asian, Black, or Latinx evangelicals. Wong (2018b) shows that 50% of white 
evangelicals believe immigrants hurt the economy, and she articulates that the difference 
shown between white and non-white evangelical policy preferences is in how they define 
"us" versus "them" (Wong 2018a). She explains: 
Stemming from dominant perceptions among white evangelicals about community 
boundaries and ‘who we are’ may be feelings of anxiety and a sense of peril about 
external threats to those boundaries and the identities they maintain. I show in this 
book that part of what underlies white evangelicals’ more conservative policy 
attitudes compared with the attitudes of nonwhites is the belief that whites face as 
much discrimination as outgroups, such as Muslims, or even more (95).  
 
She found that at least half of white evangelical respondents felt discriminated against, 
which paints a clear picture of “white embattlement against a changing world” (2018, 95).  
Thus, racial and demographic changes are likely a principal source of marginalization in 
the white evangelical community. They are feeling displaced and feeling like they are 
losing their grasp on social norms and political policies that benefit them as a result of 
demographic changes. Elites have been able to manipulate and use this growing unease to 
their advantage as they emphasize the “us” versus “them” rhetoric. As Smith et al. (1998) 
find, this sub-cultural identity unique to evangelicals makes white evangelicals the perfect 
target for amplified marginalization. 
With this status, power, racial and identity dynamic as a backdrop, another point I 
intend to drive home in the succeeding section is the importance of social and religious 
values to evangelicals. Moen (1994) says of scholars during the Christian Right’s era that 
“The concerns of Christian Right supporters were explained as the by-product of 
authoritarian personalities or symbolic crusades, rather than taken at face value. One 
unfortunate result of pigeonholing the Christian Right was that scholars circumscribed their 
research agendas. They neglected fruitful lines of inquiry…” (347-348). It is important to 
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look at evangelicals from an open perspective and acknowledge that many possess a strong 
sincerity for their belief system. Racial prejudice, white identity politics, and status anxiety 
may all be a part of why evangelicals are feeling increasing marginalization, but these 
feelings are all shared by the white population more broadly (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 
2017; 2018). When analyzing white evangelicals as a part of this phenomenon, it is 
important not to miss the theological and religious aspects unique to evangelicals that may 
also be affecting their perceptions of social marginalization.  
The social mores, norms, and Biblical values are unique for evangelicals because these 
values are not just what evangelicals believe but quite literally represent who they are 
(Keeter 2007; Moen 1992; Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Thus, any aspersions cast on these 
values is digested as disrespect directed to them. This makes the situation simple. All it 
would take for evangelicals to begin to feel an increase in social marginalization would be 
for society to appear to embrace values that are opposite the traditional evangelical or 
Judeo-Christian values. In this situation, evangelicals would feel that they are the ones 
being rejected. However, as Oldfield notes, they might not even be concerned with feeling 
rejected as much as they are concerned with their values being rejected for their value’s 
sake (1996).  
Of course, the caveat to this “value-oriented” understanding of evangelicals is that 
white evangelicals and Black evangelicals who share similar “values” engage in politics 
differently (Harris 1996). This is not true for all Black and white evangelicals but for the 
majority of them, and historically speaking, Black and white evangelicals share theological 
beliefs but not political beliefs. In fact, for much of American history, white evangelicals 
have used their faith to justify their suppression of Blacks while Blacks used their faith to 
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justify their right to freedom and every other “God-given” right (Noll 2010). The 
complicated relationship between evangelicalism and race informs our understanding of 
the political disparity between white and Black evangelicals now. Racial angst and 
resentment within the ranks of white evangelicals may be one of the key differences 
between the two groups.  
Every group is unique; this is true of the evangelicals. One critical area of theological 
uniqueness specific to evangelicals and one that I believe is relevant to this dissertation is 
the evangelical's understanding of human nature grounded in their view of biblical 
teaching, which colors his or her reaction to changes in culture and society. Evangelicals 
believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, and the Bible states explicitly that men’s hearts are 
deceitful and desperately wicked, above all things (Jeremiah 17:9). Based on the Biblical 
understanding of the fall of human-kind by Adam and Eve after having eaten the fruit of 
the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, all humans are fallen. This is not the only time 
the Bible states that man’s heart is darkened by sin and has no good in it. In fact, the entire 
message of the Bible and of a Savior revolves around the need for a Savior. Specifically, 
because man is wicked and without hope, man needs a Savior to change the wicked nature. 
The Bible says that there is none good, no not one (Romans 3:10), and given that 
evangelicals believe in the inerrant truth of the Bible, they believe this statement to be true. 
Thus, all worldviews, political systems, or anything else, that are based on the premise of 
human goodness hold no merit for evangelicals. 
Given that evangelicals believe in the wickedness of the human heart, it comes as no 
surprise to them when they see changes in society that do not align with their Biblical 
worldview. According to their beliefs, man is already corrupt, and an increase in corruption 
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is and should be expected. It is likely customary to hear evangelicals say that they believe 
society is “getting worse” but that they are not necessarily rattled or shocked by this; 
instead, it only confirms their Biblical understanding of human nature, which is that it is 
tarnished and darkened by sin. As time passes, more of this fallen nature begins to fester 
and grow and manifest itself in new and various ways.  
Thus, for the average evangelical, changes in societal moral norms (such as abortion or 
gay marriage) that, according to them, do not align with Biblical principles are not all that 
shocking. In fact, many evangelicals would likely expect these changes. Other issues, such 
as growing racial tension or sexual harassment issues, are just further evidence to support 
their understanding of a Biblically fallen and decaying world. However, a lack of shock to 
the changes in society is not the same as a lack of discomfort or displeasure with the 
changes in society. Hunter (1981; 1992) and Smith et al. (1998) both acknowledge and 
utilize the assumption that current societal changes are real and antithetical to evangelical 
values, thereby disrupting their comfort level.  
The formation of an “out-group” identity is essential then to evangelical collective 
identity (Smith et al. 1998). Groups antithetical to evangelicals are groups whose values 
do not align with evangelical “values” and are therefore the ideal villain needed to create a 
coherent evangelical collective identity. One outgroup to form recently is the LGBTQ 
community. Fetner (2008, 120) researches the "loosely coupled" political game played 
between the LGBTQ community and the Christian Right. She attributes the rise and 
success of the LGBTQ movement to the Christian Right. Hence, the Christian Right served 
as the necessary "out-group" for the LGBTQ community's collective identity. 
Fetner (2008) explains that the size and scope of the Christian Right movement was 
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much bigger than the LGBTQ movement. Members of the LGBTQ community perceived 
themselves as marginalized by society and government. The homosexual community 
experienced a great deal of oppression and discrimination during the McCarthy era because 
of claims that they were communist perverts and a threat to the country (D’Emelio 1983, 
41-43). This claim led the federal government to fire and dishonorably discharge hundreds 
of homosexuals from their government positions (D’Emelio 1983, 44-45). This is just an 
example of the different manifestations of marginalization that the LGBTQ community 
experienced.  
The Christian Right movement was far more powerful than some of their opponents, 
specifically the LGBTQ community (Fetner 2008). With radio, TV, film and print media 
outlets, along with a much heavier purse and substantial access to and influence within the 
Republican Party, the Christian Right was a “movement of size and strength that dwarfs 
the resources, access, and constituent base of the lesbian and gay community” (Fetner 
2008, 120). However, Fetner’s (2008) research shows that even with the difference in 
access and influence, the gay and lesbian community made notable gains in both society 
and politics. Many of their gains were a direct result of pressure from the Christian Right 
that mobilized the LGBTQ community into political and social action (2008).  
The LGBTQ community has won many important social and political battles recently. 
Wilcox and Robinson (2010) explain that the speed with which the LGBTQ social 
movement swept across the nation was nothing short of astounding. They won a major 
battle when the Supreme Court legalized gay marriage. Further, they are making gains 
socially. Members of the society are far more favorable toward gay marriage today than 
ever before (Pew Research Group 2016; 2017). Ninety-two percent of homosexuals say 
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society has become more accepting of them in the past decade (Pew Research Group 2013). 
However, evangelicals are one of the few groups in the United States that still disapproves 
of homosexuality.  
Evangelicals, coming from a Biblical perspective, struggle with the societal and 
political acceptance of homosexual norms. In other words, society's acceptance of values 
as opposed to their conception of Biblical values is a loss for them and causes them to feel 
socially marginalized. Thus, in terms of homosexuality, evangelicals perceive that their 
position in society has shifted from accepted to marginalized which causes them to feel 
socially marginalized as a group. Scholars explain that evangelical elites use the LGBTQ 
community to create an in-group/out-group mindset amongst evangelicals and to stir up 
feelings of societal marginalization (Barton 2012; Diamond 1989; Miceli 2005; Olson, 
Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Stokes and Schewe 2017; Tranby and Zulkowski 2012).  
The LGBTQ movement is just one example of a broader change in society, or as Hunter 
calls it modernization,17 that stimulates the ideal environment for the creation of Smith’s 
theorized subcultural identity. The shifting societal and political positions of racial and 
religious minorities and the resurgence of white identity politics is likely a result of elites 
stoking the fires of marginalization for evangelicals (Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek 2017). 
However, my theory goes a step beyond Smith's theory of societal "out-groups." I assume 
that social marginalization also increases the more that society embraces certain activities 
or lifestyles that evangelicals find opposed to Biblical principles. The perception that 
society is disrespecting Biblical principles is troubling at the individual level. As this 
perception of disrespect grows and is propagated by elites, the more evangelicals 
                                                 
17 Sometimes interchangeable with secularization.  
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personally—and as a group—feel marginalization and strain. They feel that their values 
and value sets are being marginalized and therefore believe that they are being 
marginalized. They feel that society looks down on them, considers their way of life, their 
standards of morality and their understanding of right and wrong to be out of date and not 
in line with the current trends and zeitgeist in society. I say this with the acknowledgment 
that there is a difference between the "moral" concerns of white evangelicals and African 
American evangelicals (Noll 2010). While I cannot speak directly to this difference in this 
dissertation, it is something to be noted and studied in the future. 
Over time, and as a result of a variety of social movements and expressive mobilization, 
society has progressed to new levels of acceptance to which the evangelical message does 
not conform. In fact, evangelicalism, as I have defined it here, is highly exclusive in that it 
proclaims that there is only one truth, that there is only one way to God, that there is only 
one God, and that there are concrete rights and concrete wrongs. There is no compromise 
in the evangelical message regarding eternal and Biblical truths. This very premise is 
anathema to secular and even mainline orthodox Christian society.  
Thus, in a society that is now embracing different kinds of truths, different types of 
rights and wrongs, different kinds of religions and gods (or lack thereof), I contend 
evangelicals are feeling increasing social marginalization for saying otherwise. They 
perceive that their position is progressively seen as the outlying position or the position 
that is hindering the current progress being made by society to be more accepting and open 
and equal. The headline in an opinion piece written for the Huffington Post declared, 
“White evangelical Christians are America can’t have nice things” (Tannehill June 13, 
2017). The recent victory by the LGBTQ community is just another notch in a belt of 
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acceptance and justice that has been slowly getting longer with time. These are some of the 
reasons I believe that evangelicals are feeling social marginalization.  
Based on Inglehart’s (1977) theory of post-materialism, and Hunter’s (1992; 2007) 
conception of a "culture war of the body," I can safely assume that, at least in the past few 
decades, social issues have taken precedence over economic issues for most individuals.18 
The interpretation of these statistics is contingent upon one’s conception of morality when 
answering the question. According to Hunter, liberals and conservatives build their 
conceptions of morality from two different worldviews. This means that what a 
conservative might consider immoral, a liberal might consider moral. The evangelical 
message is exclusive and not tolerant of actions the Bible calls sin. Liberals would find this 
exclusivity to be part of the problem with society. Issues like abortion, gay marriage, and 
prayer in schools are more important to many evangelicals than justice, tolerance and civil 
rights (Moen 1989; 1992; 1996; Hunter 1992). Ergo, the more society embraces the left’s 
moral values, the more society rejects the moral values of the evangelicals and vice versa.  
While evangelicals may not feel they have a powerful influence on social and political 
norms, Wuthnow (1988) points out that government has an impact on evangelicals. He 
posits that almost every new policy or judicial ruling impacts religion in the United States. 
Rarely have new governmental policies or legal decisions been neutral concerning 
American religion. Therefore, evangelicals (and/or their values) are consistently being 
affected with almost every new law or new court ruling. The effect that government has on 
religion plays a vital role in shaping evangelical perceptions of marginalization.  
                                                 
18 Given that Inglehart’s (1977; 2006; 2015) theory rests on the assumption of a stable economy, I would 
expect the pre-eminence of value-oriented social issues in comparison to economic issues to waver during 
times of relative economic difficulty (i.e., the most recent recession in 2009).  
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The media is also sending evangelicals signals about their place in society. Newspaper 
articles, internet reports, TV news segments and more decry the Christian Right and predict 
its eventual extinction (Beaty 2017; Gobry 2017; Kivisto 1994; Posner 2016; Rubin 2016 
Tannehill 2015). With titles like “This is the last spastic breath from the Religious Right 
before its overdue death” (Hansen 2016), members of the media argue that the United 
States is progressing, so ideas like “homosexuality is sin” are outdated and people who 
refuse to move away from such ideas will have to change or die off.  
Media coverage of the “culture war” has shifted over the past fifteen years toward a 
new assumption— the left has won the culture war. News stories such as "The Left Won 
the Culture War. Will they Be Merciful?" (Swaim 2016), “White Christian America is 
Dying” (Sides 2016), “They’ll Always Lose the Culture Wars: The Right Loves Fighting 
Lost Causes—But Liberals Keep Winning” (Prothero 2016b), “Is this the End of the 
Religious Right?” (Posner 2016), “Evangelicals and Politics: The Religious Right (Born 
1979, Died 2000)” (Forster 2012), and “The Religious Right: A Eulogy” (Dreher 2016) are 
examples of some opinion leader’s belief that the culture war is indeed ending, or at least 
that the Christian Right is breathing its last breaths. The Christian Right may indeed be 
dead, but that is not the focus of this study. Evangelicals are not dead and still make up a 
solid voting bloc in elections. As Oldfield said, people who say that the evangelicalism is 
“declining, ultimately doomed, anti-modern movement” need to recognize that, if this 
group is doomed to extinction, “they show no inclination to accept their assigned fate” 
(1996, 41). 
There has been an increase in religious “nones” over the past few decades. Religious 
“nones” are individuals who answer “no religion” on the religious preferences 
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questionnaire. Putnam and Campbell (2012) posit that following the cementing of the 
alliance between religious conservatives and the Republican Party, society experienced a 
new aftershock of Americans (primarily young people) turning away from religion (2012). 
This new group of secular individuals is commonly referred to as the "nones" (Hout and 
Fisher 2002). The "nones" have continued to grow while many of the Christian Right 
organizations of the 1980s and 1990s have become obsolete. The Moral Majority ceased 
operation in 1987. It was immediately followed by the Christian Coalition and the 
presidential run of an evangelical Christian, Pat Robertson. However, Pat Robertson never 
got elected, and the Christian Coalition eventually faded into irrelevance (Vaughan 2009). 
These are all reasons that evangelicals may have begun to feel a sense of loss and 
marginalization. Data from the from a survey done by the Public Religion Research 
Institute in 2017 show that white evangelical Protestants in America are the only Christian 
group to feel that they are more discriminated against than Muslims in America. 
Additionally, the Pew Research Group reported an increasing number of evangelical 
Protestants who say it has become more difficult to identify as an evangelical protestant in 
America, increasing from 34% in 2014 to 41% in 2016 (Lipka 2016). This report contrasts 
the 31% of “nones” who say that having no religion has become easier in the past decade 
(Lipka 2015).  
A global survey of evangelical Protestant leaders show that members who live in the 
Global South (71%) expect that the state of evangelicalism in their countries will be better 
in five years, while evangelical Protestant leaders in the Global North (primarily 
secularizing nations) believe the state of evangelicalism in their countries will either stay 
the same (21%) or get worse (33%) over the next five years (Pew Research Group 2011). 
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Further, a majority (66%) of evangelical leaders in the Global North feel that evangelicals 
are losing influence in their societies (Pew Research Group 2011). In the United States, 
this number is much higher, with 82% saying evangelicals are losing influence in society.  
To add to evangelicals’ downbeat outlook and perception of threat, a recent report 
showed that Christians are the most persecuted religious group in the world—according to 
a study done by the Centre for the Study of Global Christianity (Chiaramonte 2017). 
Around 90,000 Christians were killed for their faith in 2016, amounting to one every six 
minutes and 900,000 over the past ten years. This is a staggering number. While Christians 
are not killed for their faith in the United States, these numbers do not likely inspire 
confidence in evangelicals. Perhaps evangelicals see the current secular social and political 
trends in the United States and, rational or not, fear that the persecution they see outside of 
the country may start manifesting inside the country.    
There are other religion-related reasons why evangelicals may feel social 
marginalization. Theoretically, when fighting a war with no apparent winner, both sides 
stand their ground. Only when one side begins to gain an advantage do members of the 
losing side start surrendering to avoid worse consequences. In other words, a war has been 
effectively won when members from one opposing side begin to surrender and assimilate 
with the opposition, or wars have been won when members of the losing side begin to use 
desperate and risky techniques as a "last ditch" effort to fight for the cause. Current data 
show that this surrender is happening in the United States. In the past few decades, social 
liberalism has increased. Gallup polls on "key moral issues" reveal that along with every 
social dimension, the American population has shifted to the left in the aggregate (Newport 
2016). This includes a sizable portion of religious conservatives (presumably not as many 
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evangelicals). Data averaging from 2005-2016 reveal that 61% of Protestants believe 
divorce to be morally acceptable (up from 53% in 2001), 50% found premarital sex morally 
acceptable and 41% found same-sex relationships morally acceptable (Newport 2016). 
While this data does not show that evangelicals are transforming at the same rate or in the 
same way, it is still substantively important to acknowledge the change in Protestants at 
large.  
I discuss different causes for feelings of marginalization, but I do not measure these 
causes. Thus, based on the social constructionist theory of collective action, elite 
entrepreneurs are using everything I just described above as ammunition to increase 
emotional marginalization in the evangelical population. Research shows that elites, the 
media, campaigns and other organized interests, use different methods to coerce citizens 
to mobilize (Hansen 2015). These various entities attempt to convince citizens that their 
situation is so dire that the cost of mobilizing is lower than the cost of not mobilizing 
(Hansen 2015; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Not only are elites trying to stoke the fires 
of societal marginalization but also frame issues in a way that creates more strain and 
feeling of threat. Further, they identify certain outgroups to evangelicals to stimulate and 
develop a collective identity. Hence, much of the marginalization that evangelicals are 
feeling is likely due to elite coercion and framing. 
However, I am interested in the intervening variable in the relationship between elite 
framing and mass mobilization. Hansen and Rosenstone (1993) and Hansen (2015) argue 
that elites trigger mobilization by influencing how people feel, whether that is by 
spotlighting opposition, inflaming polarization or by drawing attention to the poor 
treatment of one's personal identity group. The purpose is to manipulate people's feelings 
 107  
in a way that mobilizes them into action. If someone feels strongly enough about 
something, (whether it is simply anger at the opposing party or worry for the future of their 
children or job), they are willing to pay the cost of mobilization. This is an accurate 
simplification of the social constructionist theory of mobilization.   
I am interested in these feelings of social marginalization. These feelings of social 
marginalization may be a result of elite manipulation, or fed by the media, campaigns, and 
interest groups; however, that does not change the fact that feelings of marginalization still 
exist and that these feelings are key to motivating evangelicals into action. How and why 
evangelicals feel marginalized is not central to my question. Evangelicals may feel 
marginalized from personal experiences that have left them feeling like they cannot speak 
about their beliefs or they may feel marginalized because they are avid Fox News followers 
and the storyline on Fox News is that of persecuted evangelicals. Regardless, if they feel 
marginalized, I hypothesize that one way they will respond is by engaging in expressive 
forms of mobilization.  
I argue that groups can feel socially marginalized while still feeling that they have a 
level of political acceptance. Wilcox and Robinson (2010) conclude that while evangelicals 
have had an influence on elections, their influence all but disappears after elections because 
of the impracticality of their policy preferences. Therefore, evangelicals never see their 
policy preferences enacted once their preferred candidates are elected (2010). Wilcox and 
Robinson (2010) argue that to predict the influence of the Christian Right in the future, 
scholars must consider their successes or failures in the past. “On some of its core issues, 
the Christian Right has experienced significant defeats” (191). Prothero (2016a) 
corroborates these assertions when he submits that conservatives always end up losing the 
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major social and political battles. Theoretically then, it is possible for a group to feel they 
have access to members of government, and yet still feel that their views and preferences 
are marginalized in policy and in society.    
A group can feel that they have political access and possess high external political 
efficacy and yet feel marginalized by society and the policies that are currently in place. 
For example, during the Obama administration, African Americans may have felt that they 
had more access in the federal government while at the same time feeling increasingly 
socially marginalized.  
I assume that the two spheres, social and political, work in tandem; thus, feelings of 
social marginalization may lead to feelings of political marginalization. I expect that 
evangelicals will express feelings of social marginalization but maintain a relatively high 
sense of external political efficacy. However, I also expect to find low expectations 
regarding their place in government and politics in the future.  
Evangelical Response 
Given that I theorize evangelicals are socially marginalized, I predict that one form of 
responsive mobilization will revolve around social issues and issues of morality in society 
rather than government. I expect that they will demonstrate some frustrations with 
government, specifically with standing policies such as abortion, gay marriage, and no 
prayer in schools. However, their frustration is not necessarily with the current government 
but instead with the policies that are indicative of the problems they perceive in society. 
By this I mean, evangelicals are aware that abortion would never have been legalized had 
members of society not put it on the agenda, and the same goes for gay marriage and prayer 
in schools.   
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Evangelicals’ feelings of social marginalization manifest less in mainstream political 
participation and more in peripheral forms of expressive participation that are socially 
visible.19 I theorize that the method of mobilization is contingent on the sphere of 
marginalization. If a group feels marginalized by society, they will rely more on social 
avenues to express their displeasure with society and the reasons they feel marginalized. 
Therefore, because I argue that evangelicals are feeling socially marginalized, I expect to 
find increased expressive mobilization. Direct implications could include social media 
expressions, boycotting companies that support social values they are against, and/or public 
demonstrations (marches or rallies).  
Evangelicals, feeling socially marginalized will not only mobilize conventionally but 
will also engage in different forms of political and social expression, voicing their 
frustrations and attempting to maintain and protect their valued status quos. Social 
constructionist theory posits that if a group possesses a sense of marginalization, a 
collective identity—coupled with the appropriate framing for the target culture—they will 
collectively mobilize. I am not testing all aspects of this theory, but rather a simplified 
version. I am more interested in forms of expression rather than social movements. The 
participation of evangelicals in traditional forms of mobilization and expression—voting, 
donating to campaigns, and so forth—in the 2016 elections underscores the fact that 
expressive mobilization is but one of many forms of engagement.    
Based on the previous theory then, I hypothesize that evangelicals, when they have a 
clearly constructed collective identity with constructed emotional strain framed 
                                                 
19 In some ways, this is also because they already lost these political battles. They could try to get standing 
laws reversed, but it is more worth their while to try and prevent other similar policies from being placed on 
the agenda by a society they feel is trending away from their values and preferences.  
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appropriately for their cultural norms, should be engaging in collective action and 
individual mobilization.   
H1: If evangelical clergy exhibit a feeling of social marginalization and strain, they 
will also engage in various forms of expressive mobilization.  
 
H2: Feelings of social marginalization in the evangelical community stimulate 
individual “identity claims” through expressive mobilization.  
 
H3:  Feelings of social marginalization, conditional upon collective identity, elite 
framing, and cultural context, will stimulate political consumerism, a form of 
expressive mobilization. 
 
H4: Feelings of social marginalization lead to expressive individual mobilization.  
 
These are broad and extensive hypotheses that I break down into specific testable 
hypotheses as they relate to evangelicals in each distinct chapter. The indicators I use to 
test the broad hypotheses speak to an aspect of each hypothesis and my theory more 
broadly. 
Conclusion 
Evangelical Christians are my group of interest. Evangelical social marginalization and 
mobilization are what I analyze. I theorize that if evangelicals, as a group, are feeling 
socially marginalized, one way that this feeling of marginalization will manifest is through 
expressive extra-institutional mobilization. Forms of political expression and mobilization 
have evolved over time and are now categorized as either offline participation or online 
participation. Therefore, a valid study of political mobilization analyzes both forms of 
expression. My hypotheses are direct implications of my theory. The independent variable 
in my study is marginalization, and the dependent variable is mobilization. The more 
evangelicals feel marginalized, the more likely they are to engage in expressive 
mobilization; thus, specific catalyst events and framing are more likely to instigate 
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mobilization. I intend to draw a line connecting these feelings of social marginalization for 
evangelicals and their subsequent activities of mobilization.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PERCEIVED MARGINALIZATION AND EXPRESSIVE MOBILIZATION OF 
EVANGELICAL CLERGY 
“One of the most extraordinary things about our current politics—really, one of the most 
extraordinary developments of recent political history—is the loyal adherence of religious 
conservatives to Donald Trump. The president won four-fifths of the votes of white 
evangelical Christians. This was a higher level of support than either Ronald Reagan or 
George W. Bush, an outspoken evangelical himself, ever received."  
 
- Michael Gerson The Atlantic  
 
Perhaps the first question to answer at the outset of this chapter is, why clergy? There 
is a sizable and continually growing number of works that study clergy and their 
importance as political elites (Beatty and Walter 1989; Cavendish 2001; Crawford and 
Olson 2001; Djupe and Gilbert 2002; 2003; 2008; Djupe and Grant 2001; Djupe, Olson, 
and Gilbert 2005; Guth et al. 1997;  Olson 2000; Olson and Crawford 2001; Smidt 2016). 
Scholars agree that clergy have played and continue to play an important role both in 
religion and politics (Jelen 1993a). Guth et al. (1997) find that evangelical clergy are much 
more willing to engage in political leadership and activity than previously found. They split 
their findings into a two-party system of conservative and liberally minded pastors—where 
the fundamental division is not ideological but rather theological (1997). Other scholars 
find that this ideological division is usually split between clergy who are concerned with 
social justice and clergy who are concerned with evangelicalism (Wuthnow 1988). Beatty 
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and Walter (1989) find that conservative clergy have the potential to mobilize but usually 
only mobilize around the narrow area of moral issues.  
Djupe and Gilbert (2008) measure how clergy "have multiple venues through which 
they can engage members' political interests, although their efforts to influence members' 
decision making can create tensions within the congregation" (7). When a pastor discusses 
a political topic with his congregation, he is able to stimulate interest and action (2008). 
Further, the topics that clergy discuss publicly with their members can shape the political 
agendas of their members.  Djupe and Gilbert (2008) show that in these particular ways, 
clergy are incredibly influential on the political activities and civic abilities of their 
members. However, not all clergy are equal. Evangelical clergy have a different level of 
influence and authority than mainstream Protestant clergy, who also possess a different 
level of influence compared to Catholic Priests and Bishops.20 
Therefore, perhaps most relevant to my dissertation and to the research done in this 
chapter is the consistent finding that evangelical pastors, in particular, hold the most 
influence over their parishioners (Jelen 1993a; 2001). While mainline Protestant pastors 
struggle to find a theological basis for claiming authority as religious or political leaders, 
evangelical Protestant pastors have many sources from which to pull to establish their 
position of authority and influence in the congregation (Jelen 1993a). The steadfast belief 
in Biblical inerrancy serves as a basis for evangelical clergy to proclaim unambiguous 
political messages (1993a). However, Jelen (2001) explains that the “otherworldly” 
orientation of evangelical clergy and their narrow focus on individual salvation have 
usually served to undercut their ability to influence and mobilize politically. Not all 
                                                 
20 Churches vary in their political cohesiveness as well (Wald 1990).  
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scholars agree, however; Guth et al. (1997) found that in recent years evangelical clergy 
have begun to embrace the legitimacy of political activism (2001). 
Evangelical clergy are “opinion leaders” influencing evangelical parishioners (Katz 
and Lazarfeld 1955). They are not the only opinion leaders influencing evangelical action, 
however. Political elites who espouse "evangelical" messages, such as Ted Cruz or Jimmy 
Carter, and evangelical public figures, such as Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson, influence 
evangelical action. As I addressed before, elites must construct a narrative by which to 
stimulate action from their target base. This is no different for evangelical elites outside of 
local clergy except that their voices must contend with the voices of the local clergy. Given 
the effect these outside opinion leaders can have on evangelical parishioner action, these 
outside voices may be a plausible explanation for why parishioners of evangelical churches 
would be more politically mobilized than their congregational minister. In fact, Moen 
(1992) contends that it was the religious parishioners rather than the religious institutions 
that were key to the success of the Christian Right movement. Hence, evangelical churches 
were the place to recruit movement activists, but the churches themselves were not the 
organizational block (Moen 1992). This shows that opinion leaders outside of clergy can 
also have a dramatic effect on evangelical political action.  
Harris (1994) postulates that, while religion has been used as an opiate for the masses, 
it can also be used as a mobilizing force. It provides the needed community and resources 
for mobilization (1994). Djupe and Gilbert (2008) lay out the many ways that the church 
structure, including small groups, informal contacts and the link between the clergy and 
the congregants, play an important role in the politicization (or lack thereof) of the church. 
The leadership of the church then is pivotal. If a pastor treats the church as a political 
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resource, then it will be a political resource, but if a pastor believes that the church and 
politics should be separate, it will be separate. Thus, it is empirically enlightening to speak 
directly with evangelical clergy. What do they think about today's society, the church's role 
in society and what their own Christian identity is? I am able to learn about current 
perspectives on evangelicalism, from evangelical clergy themselves, while also learning 
about how they feel about society and how they think society feels about them. I am able 
to dig a bit more into the convoluted realm of race and religion. I cannot generalize the 
findings in this chapter, but the findings provide an original and unique glimpse into an 
area of research that needs more careful evaluation. 
As I discuss in the literature review, evangelicalism and race is still an understudied 
area in religion and politics; however, scholars have found that Black and white 
evangelicals share similar spiritual beliefs while holding differing political perspectives 
(Harris 1994, 1999; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Fowler et al. 2013). In this dissertation, I 
look for implications of evangelical perceptions of marginalization and the use of 
expressive mobilization as a reaction to this perceived marginalization. However, I am 
aware that white and Black personal and religious experience and history are unique from 
each other and may lead to differing forms of mobilization and differing reasons for 
perceived marginalization. When analyzing political consumerism and Twitter, I am 
unable to uncover many of the racial differences present; however, I am able to uncover 
some racial differences and similarities in this chapter by interviewing both white and 
Black evangelical pastors. I am interviewing Black and white evangelicals, based on 
theological convictions alone; thus, I am interviewing theological evangelicals, I am not 
interviewing Black Protestants and white evangelicals.  
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I expect to find the following differences between white and Black pastors: white 
evangelicals will focus more on individual salvation while Black evangelicals will focus 
on community; white evangelicals will demonstrate concern for moral issues of sexuality 
and express a sense of social marginalization regarding these issues while Black 
evangelicals will show less concern for moral issues of sexuality but give more attention 
to issues of social justice; finally, I expect white evangelicals to demonstrate a stronger 
sense of political efficacy than Black evangelicals.  
In this dissertation, I theorize that if 21st-century evangelicals feel socially 
marginalized, this feeling of social marginalization---coupled with a clear collective 
identity and powerful elite framing---leads evangelicals towards expressive collective 
mobilization. However, I also contend that evangelicals will individually mobilize in 
response to a feeling of social marginalization. Thus, to better understand the feelings and 
thoughts of individual evangelicals and to assess how or in what ways their leaders might 
be mobilizing them, I conducted interviews with evangelical clergy in three different states.  
The fundamental question I intend to answer is this chapter is, how are Black and white 
evangelical clergy feeling and responding to the social changes in American today? Are 
they feeling socially marginalized? If so, are they responding to this marginalization with 
expressive mobilization? Specifically, this chapter is designed to uncover some unique and 
original data regarding the difference between how white evangelicals feel and respond to 
social changes and how African American evangelicals feel and respond to social changes.  
Data Collection 
I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with evangelical pastors in three 
different states. I selected evangelical pastors from three cities in different parts of the 
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country: Columbia SC; Winston Salem NC; and Rochester NY. I chose these cities because 
they have a similar population size. Columbia has 133,114 residents, Winston Salem has 
244,605 residents, and Rochester has 208,046 residents (US Census Bureau). The locations 
of these cities provide regional variation. The religious makeup of the cities also vary.  
Fifty-four percent of Winston-Salem residents affiliate with a religion. The largest 
religious group in Winston-Salem are the Baptists with 16% of the total religious 
population. City-data.com shows that evangelical Protestants are the largest religious group 
in Winston Salem, followed by mainline Protestants and a small portion of Catholics and 
Black Protestants. Religious "nones" make up the majority. Evangelical Protestants hold 
the top spot as well in Columbia, South Carolina; however, there are fewer evangelical 
Protestants in Columbia than in Winston Salem. In Columbia, mainline and Black 
Protestants hold the second and third spots, respectively, followed by Catholics. Making 
up 48.8% of the population, the majority of Columbia residents are not affiliated with any 
religion making. Evangelical Protestants and religious "nones" have both grown in 
numbers since 2000 in both cities (city-data.com). 
Rochester's religious makeup differs from the other two cities because of its Catholic 
population. Catholics are the largest religious group at 25.7%, followed next by evangelical 
Protestants and mainline Protestants at a distant second and third. The religious "nones" 
make up the bulk of the population with 53.6% of the total population. Interestingly the 
Catholic population has decreased since 2000 while the evangelical population has grown. 
Unsurprisingly, the "nones" have also grown dramatically (city-data.com). 
I base the partisan makeup of each city on the 2016 presidential election results. 
Winston-Salem reported that 53% of the population voted for Clinton, and 43% voted for 
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Trump. Columbia reported that 64% of the population voted for Clinton while 31% voted 
for Trump. Finally, 54% of the population of Rochester voted for Clinton while 39% voted 
for Trump. All three cities lean Democratic.  
After selecting the cities, I went through a Yellow Page search of churches in each city 
and selected every 10th church. I then compiled a list of these randomly selected churches 
from each city and narrowed down the list to churches that fit the general definition of 
evangelical.21 I did this by analyzing the statements of faith on the websites of the churches 
or relied on denominational cues. Some churches only had Facebook pages, that did not 
contain much information, while other churches did not have a website at all. In cases such 
as these, for churches in South, if the church was Baptist or Pentecostal, I automatically 
assumed it was evangelical. However, for churches in Rochester, I did not include the 
church unless the information I gathered from websites fit the definition of evangelical.22 
We cannot assume Baptist churches in the North are all evangelical; the American Baptist 
Churches, U.S.A. denomination is affiliated with mainline as opposed to evangelical 
Protestantism. After identifying and discarding the non-evangelical churches, I randomly 
selected churches by selecting every third church in Rochester, every fourth church in 
Columbia, and every fifth church in Winston Salem.23 This left me with a total sample of 
forty-three churches. 
I then sent each church a formal letter requesting an interview with their pastor. I heard 
                                                 
21 If, as I randomly selected churches, one of the churches my search landed on was an obviously non-
evangelical church (i.e., Catholic, United Methodist, etc.), I left that church out of my list.   
22 To reiterate: evangelicals are churches or individuals who believe in the infallibility of the Bible, the need 
to be born again and the importance of evangelizing. The primary indicator I looked for was the belief in the 
supremacy and infallibility of the Bible. All else essentially stems from this basic belief.  
23 I chose a random number based on how many evangelical churches existed in each city. There were fewer 
evangelical churches to choose from in Rochester, so I selected every third church randomly rather than every 
fourth or fifth as I did with the two Southern cities. 
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back from the first few pastors within a week. I followed up with all the pastors the next 
week by phone, calling each church to speak directly with the pastor. A sizeable number 
of churches were closed or no longer in the location provided in the Yellow Pages. 
However, I did connect with over twenty pastors, and successfully interviewed a portion 
of them. Unfortunately, some of the pastors agreed to the interview, but I could never get 
in touch with them after the initial interaction. I recall three pastors saying no, while around 
half of the 43 churches were simply unreachable. In total, I interviewed 16 pastors, three 
of which were pilot interviews with pastors not originally on my list. I formally interviewed 
13 pastors.24 Six of the pastors lived in Columbia, four lived in Winston Salem, and three 
lived in Rochester. Three of the thirteen pastors I interviewed were African American 
pastors. One African American pastor from each different city responded.25 The average 
age of the pastors was fifty-three, with the youngest being thirty-six and the oldest being 
sixty-seven.26  
I interviewed the four North Carolina pastors in person. I conducted the other 
interviews via Skype and phone: four via Skype and the rest on the phone. I recorded each 
interview with the pastor's acknowledgment and permission. I asked each pastor a series 
of thirteen questions.27 I never asked them directly whether they feel marginalized; rather, 
I asked them questions about how they feel about society and the direction they perceive it 
                                                 
24 I did conduct one official interview with a pastor who was not on the official list. The last pastor I 
interviewed introduced me to a few African American pastors he was friends with for a possible interview. 
One of those pastors wanted to be interviewed. At the time, I had been able to talk only two African American 
pastors and was therefore willing to veer from the list for this final interview.   
25 The last pastor I interviewed and one of the African American pastors I interviewed, was a connection 
from one of the final pastors to respond and be interviewed. He was not on the original list. This is the only 
pastor I interviewed as a connection from another pastor.  
26 I use the data from an online survey the pastors filled out to provide this information. However, one pastor 
never filled out the survey, meaning the average is an average of twelve rather than thirteen.   
27 See Appendix A for the list of questions.  
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is heading. I also asked about how they feel society views them and people like them. The 
answers to these questions provide plenty of insight into their feelings about society and 
about their place in society. Further, I asked them about what they and their church are 
doing politically and socially and then asked them directly whether they boycott or use 
Twitter to engage politically and socially. I also asked a question about President Trump 
and whether his election has changed anything for them.  
Almost all the pastors seemed excited about participating in the interviews. Many of 
them, prior to agreeing to the interview, after hearing about my own Christian persuasion, 
were even more excited and open.28 A few pastors did not know about my religious 
convictions until partway through the interview, but I did inform them all. This knowledge 
seemed to lead many to be more conversational and curious about me and my project and 
studies. I was open to answering questions regarding me personally but kept information 
about the project minimal so as not to bias their answers. The pastors were friendly and 
easy to converse with. Many offered me coffee or tea as we talked. The ones I talked to on 
the phone or over Skype were equally friendly. They all appeared quite interested in the 
project by the time the interview was finished. Many of them seemed reinvigorated about 
life and their ministry at the end of the interview and talked about how the questions I asked 
were challenging and caused them to think about things in ways they had not had to 
previously. Apparently, they enjoyed the challenge. 
Most of the clergy I interviewed expressed interest in reading my dissertation once it 
is finished. Many of the ones I interviewed on the phone or Skype expressed a desire to 
                                                 
28 I never told them I considered myself an evangelical or that my study was about evangelicals, unless or 
until the interview was over. I did not want to bias their thinking. They simply knew I was interested in 
interviewing Christian pastors and that I was a Christian, or they knew that I went to such and such church 
and was religiously active.  
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meet in person if I was ever in their area. One pastor from South Carolina contacted me 
months later to ask how I was. While a few of them seemed a little skeptical at the start of 
the interview, all of them seemed open and trusting by the end of the interview. More times 
than not, after the interview ended, our conversation continued for fifteen minutes to an 
hour. 
Those I interviewed in person were eager to show me around their church after the 
interview and introduce me to people.29 I think the excitement stemmed from being 
interviewed by an academic who shared their religious beliefs--- to whom they could 
finally express their frank opinions on controversial issues. Further, they all showed a keen 
interest in the subjects discussed. They wanted to continue to discuss more things after the 
close of the interview; they especially wanted to hear more from me.  
I first asked them to tell me about themselves and their ministry. Sometimes their 
answers to the question lasted thirty minutes. I would usually ask for more information or 
clarification on things as they would give me their life story but forget to tell me anything 
about their current ministry, or vice versa. Most of the information provided by this 
question is not relevant to the research and theory of this dissertation, but it was a good ice-
breaking first question. 
Part 1: Marginalization 
Evangelical Identity 
I use Hunter’s definition of “evangelical” since his conception is purely doctrinal. It 
includes the following: the inerrancy of the Bible, the divinity of Jesus Christ and personal 
                                                 
29 One of the pastors introduced me to his daughter on Skype. She came bounding into his office at one point 
during the interview, and he put her on his lap and introduced her to me. This goes to show the ease and 
comfort level of these interviews. They were light and conversational, and the pastors seemed to feel a 
connection with me that put them at ease.  
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conversion or being “born again” through faith in Jesus Christ, not of works. As I step 
through the answers to this question of evangelical identity, this definition should be used 
as a comparison or baseline. 
As a follow up to my opening question, I asked, “Do you consider yourself to be an 
evangelical?” and “Do you believe this term can also be applied to your congregation?”. 
I asked these questions for several reasons. Primarily, I wanted to know whether the pastors 
adopt or internalize an evangelical identity. How they identify themselves helps me to 
understand better if evangelicals who do identify as such might be more likely to feel social 
marginalization than those who do not identify as such. I also asked this question because 
I want to see how evangelical pastors understand and interpret the term evangelical. If they 
do identify as such, how and why is this the case? Are there commonalities or differences 
among the pastors’ different conceptions of the term evangelical?  
Five of the thirteen pastors interviewed gave me some sort of dictionary definition of 
the word, evangelical. Specifically, most of these five pastors referenced the Greek word 
“euangelion” and its meaning. Beyond the specific definition, many of the pastors 
discussed the historical context and meaning of the word evangelical. Almost every pastor 
gave some sort of explanation or description of the way they wanted me to perceive them 
in the context of the term evangelical. Most of them balked a bit at the term as if it had a 
negative connotation. Many felt the need to shed some perceived or assumed negative 
connotation and teach me the “correct” definition of evangelical, after which they were 
willing to adopt the identity. All but two listed their expected doctrinal standards of 
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evangelicalism as their understanding of evangelical, even if they used different words or 
phrases to explain.30 
I do…Labels change over time. What is considered to be defined one way in one 
period of history it suddenly starts taking on new names…it’s become fairly broad. 
I think originally evangelical would be a way to describe someone who believes 
the Biblical gospel and the need to be born again, and saved by the Lord in order to 
be forgiven of your sin…to be justified…There would be groups that would call 
themselves evangelicals that…we would not be a part of. We believe in the Biblical 
gospel and the need to proclaim the Biblical gospel and that it is the only way for 
people to be saved from their sins, then yes, we are evangelical.  
 
This pastor shows a strong grasp of the basic tenets of evangelicalism but also wants to 
clarify that not everyone who claims to be evangelical is what he would define as 
evangelical. He concludes by saying that yes, he and his congregation are evangelical if 
what is meant by evangelical is what he defined. He was uncomfortable giving a clear yes 
or no answer without defining for me what he meant by yes or no. This defensiveness was 
mild compared to some of the other answers, however. If you notice, the pastor quoted 
above does immediately give an affirmative response and then proceeds to define and 
clarify.  
Not all of the pastors were so quick to take on the evangelical label. This pastor, a 
thirty-eight-year-old African American pastor in South Carolina who pastored another 
independent, non-denominational church, says: 
Um, I heard about thirty different definitions of that. By basic definition, 
evangelical is just of or pertaining to, you know, the teaching of the Gospel which 
we take very seriously. Sharing the Gospel with different people is something we 
take very seriously. For me, the Bible says that we should be fishers of men and a 
fisherman goes where the fish are, they’re intentional about going where the fish 
are biting.  
 
                                                 
30 The irony, of course, is that I did not ask what they think evangelical means. I just asked if they consider 
themselves to be evangelical. Sometimes they wanted clarity or seemed unsure how to answer this question. 
Sometimes, they did ask me to define it for them. I would not define it for them however and explained that 
I was more interested in hearing how they understand it.    
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He describes and explains his idea of evangelicalism definitionally and talks a great deal 
about what it means to reach out to the community and be a “fisher of men”; however, he 
never officially says, yes, he is an evangelical. He seemed almost afraid to associate himself 
with the term. He proceeds and says:  
Go into the nations. It wasn’t about the geographical nations which change every 
one hundred to two hundred years…that word is pertaining to the different people 
groups, and so that we should go to white people, and go to Black people, and go 
to Hispanic people and to go Asian people, with the emphasis being on going to 
them. Many people we deal with…you know…church has put a bad taste in their 
mouth, we try to prove that differently…are we lining up with scripture, are we 
truly going? Scripture says [to go] despite the fact that 85-89% of all churches are 
90-95% one ethnicity. Even Dr. King referred to the church as being the most 
segregated time of the week, Sunday morning. Are we going to the nations? Not 
just people who look like you? 
 
It was finally at this point that I asked this pastor if he considered his congregation to be 
evangelical. He said:  
I would say yes…doing what the Bible says. By definition, evangelical is just about 
of or pertaining to the teaching of the gospel. Are we doing that? I would say we 
are. Church growth, as well as the diversity, is … proof that we're not only doing it 
but doing it according to scripture. 
 
At this point, he does accept the term evangelical for his congregation but based solely on 
his definition. Earlier in the conversation, I asked him whether he was uncomfortable with 
or wanted to avoid other interpretations since he seemed so adamant about clarifying his 
own definition. He said no, and that it is not about avoiding interpretations. He then 
proceeded to talk about how many of the people he ministers to have a bad taste in their 
mouth from other churches about what “evangelicalism” means. Ergo, he does seem to 
want to establish himself and his ministry as unique from other ministries. It was also clear 
that he was keenly aware and concerned about ministering to all people out of a perception 
that not all churches do that. He believes that the Bible is clear about evangelizing all 
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nations, meaning all ethnicities. This is something I would expect a pastor representing a 
racially mixed congregation to be sensitive about.  
Another pastor from South Carolina, a white sixty-seven-year-old pastor of a small 
Pentecostal church, says: "Yes, depending on the definition exactly. We definitely would 
consider ourselves evangelical in the sense that we believe in the Bible; all of the doctrine 
comes solely from the Bible…". As we were talking, he brought up the definition of 
evangelical on his computer and then proceeded to say: "… ‘emphasize the authority of the 
Bible,' ‘personal conversions,' yes, ‘doctrine of atonement’...may have a 
different interpretation of what salvation doctrine really is.”  His understanding of salvation 
is based more on what he called a "fuller faith system"; however, this difference was one 
of doctrine and did not change his acceptance of the evangelical label. He also gave a 
conditional “yes”: he is evangelical if the doctrinal definition [that he looked up online] is 
in line with his doctrinal standards.  
A sixty-four-year-old white pastor from Rochester, New York, pastor of a non-
denominational church, gave one of the most unusual answers. His first response was, “Ha. 
That is a huge loaded question. I don’t ever use that term anymore. I did forty years ago, 
but evangelical meant something different. Now it’s a political term and uh especially what 
we saw the Judge Roy Moore and the whole explosion of evangelicals…”. He shows a 
keen awareness of the political connotations associated with the term. He proceeded to tell 
me a story about how his daughter, in her twenties at the time, came to him asking if they 
were a “born again church.” She had been challenged by someone that if she was not “born 
again” she was not Christian. Being unfamiliar with the term but believing herself to be 
Christian, she asked her father for clarification. He told her:  
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…yes, we are a born-again church but we don't use that term a lot because it is 
jargon, it's an insider term and when people say ‘yeah, I've been born again' now 
they have this entire loaded view that all comes cascading in that it's a certain view 
of scripture, a certain view of inerrancy blah blah blah…the problem is the 
Christian life is not as simple as that…we're not a catchphrase church.   
 
He proceeded to say: “We would be in the line of evangelical with personal conversion, a 
foundation of knowledge that scripture is the Word of God, it is reliable for the course of 
our daily lives and as a source of truth without error.” Thus, he lays out the three 
fundamental tenets of evangelicalism.  
However, his entire discussion of this concept was colored with shadows of disdain, as 
if it pained him to take on the label “evangelical” even though in some sense of the word 
he did seem to believe that he and his congregation were evangelical. He discussed issues 
of biblical inerrancy and said that the problem with that doctrine is that it only applies to 
original manuscripts, so, inerrancy is great in theory but not always in reality. He said, 
passionately, of being called evangelical, "…it's a catchphrase. So, what happens then is, 
‘I know exactly what you believe because you use this term,' you know, you have no idea 
what I believe, it all depends on what you mean by evangelical". 
He then proceeded to reference the “euangelion” root of the word and ended by saying 
that based on that Greek definition, “...I’m evangelical yeah, I don’t use the term, no I’m 
not.” His entire discussion regarding this term was contradictory. I followed that up by 
asking whether his congregation was evangelical and he said yes since they follow him, 
and he's been their pastor for forty years (again identifying as an evangelical). He then said 
that a good number of people in his church would say that they were evangelical.  
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Two other pastors from Rochester demonstrated a similar hesitance to identify with the 
evangelical label. One, a fifty-one-year-old African American pastor of a non-
denominational church, said:  
Uh, I would consider myself to be an evangelical, yes. You know, I’m always afraid 
of terms and labels because other people might consider themselves to be 
evangelical that I might not what to be uh [associated with them]31 …so I’m always 
reluctant when I hear those terms…I’m always leery of using those terms because 
I think people immediately then in their minds assume that you are…they check off 
certain boxes. Certainly, in terms of evangelical belief, those would be my 
convictions, reformed evangelical I guess…[I] hold that salvation is by faith alone 
through Christ’s finished work, the scriptures are the inspired Word of God, in their 
original writings they’re infallible. That the scriptures are our guide for faith and 
practice and those things. Certainly, an imminent return of Christ, I am still a pre-
tribulation believer. 
 
Again, he is cautious when taking on the name evangelical even though he was relatively 
quick to say yes and then explain himself. The third pastor from Rochester demonstrated a 
similar hesitance to say he was evangelical. He, a thirty-six-year-old white male and pastor 
of an independent “Bible” church, said: “Define evangelical, and I'll tell you." When I 
would not define it for him, he proceeded to say the following. 
Let’s start with history ok. Evangelical has been around for hundreds of years. And 
I’m pretty sure that the term started in Scotland and the evangelicals were people 
who had an unwavering belief in the foundations of our faith, the authority of God’s 
Word, the exclusivity of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the cost of discipleship, that 
we are not just Christians by name, but we are followers of Jesus Christ…belief in 
a miraculous faith, that Jesus Christ literally raised from the dead, that Jesus Christ 
was virgin born, that Jesus Christ did heal the sick, that Jesus Christ was a literal 
human being and not some kind of figurative teacher, that He did come from God 
and went back to God…so all these foundational beliefs is what the beginning of 
evangelicalism was. That got rolled into fundamentalism back in the early 
1900s…as…a defense against liberal Christianity.  
 
Thus, he sets the stage, explaining the historical context and whom he believes evangelicals 
used to be. The point of this explanation, of course, is to make sure I understand the 
                                                 
31 Bracketed words were inaudible.  
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definition he wants to be defined by versus the one he wants to avoid. He continues and 
says:  
Then fundamentalists became Bob Jones University, right? Like Blacks and whites 
are separated, and you've gotta walk on different sidewalks for boys and girls, and 
all that garbage, KJV-only stuff became what fundamentalism is, like NO, at that 
point NO, I’m not a fundamentalist. Now, an evangelical is anywhere from Benny 
Hen to Donald Trump, and when I hear about the evangelical voting block I just 
say, what the heck is that? So, I’m trying to defend myself before I even answer 
the question. So, from a historical perspective I would call myself a historical 
evangelical, uh from a contemporary political perspective I would say no to that 
question because I don’t know what the person asking thinks is an evangelical and 
I want to make sure we’re going to define our terms. Fundamentals of faith---yes, 
a political voting block—no. (emphasis added) 
 
This pastor demonstrates obvious defensiveness even though I made it apparent to the 
pastors that I considered myself to be Christian as well. This grounding should have created 
a solid foundation for them to feel free to answer my questions honestly. Perhaps the 
connection he had with me on a human level allowed him to express defensiveness more 
freely. Perhaps he was feeling attacked by society and the stereotypes and social 
marginalization he felt and finally had an avenue of expression? Further, I do not believe 
that he or the other pastors demonstrated as much defensiveness about themselves 
personally as they did about their values and a desire to keep them undiluted with politics.  
A forty-two-year-old white pastor in South Carolina demonstrated a similar hesitance 
to adopt the evangelical label. He said,  
You know that's a good question these days, isn't it? That's kind of a hot topic. You 
know, in the way I would define it I would say yes. That's such a loaded word these 
days…whenever I think of evangelical, I think of someone who views the Bible as 
authoritative, who would argue that the only way to heaven is to trust Jesus as your 
Savior, those sorts of things.  
 
So, in those terms, you know, the word ‘euangelion’ that’s a Biblical word, evangel 
is good news, so gospel. So that’s where that word comes from, so in the gospel 
sense of the word, absolutely I’m an evangelical; but, that question was on the 
survey too and, you know, as far as me filling out the little boxes, I didn’t check 
 129  
the box though. I was going back and forth on whether or not I wanted to check 
the box cuz in our context that word is so politically loaded where it's, uh, people 
will tend to think ok that means you must be an old white Republican and, you 
know, if you think about our context, it's been hijacked for political purposes, and 
I hate that. Really, I need to do some more thinking whether or not this term is one 
worth fighting for and redeeming…  
 
This pastor demonstrated a similar level of defensiveness in that he would not even select 
“evangelical” on my survey because of the stereotypes and assumptions associated with 
that term. While he admitted to being evangelical Biblically, he clearly felt a need to 
distance himself from the label politically.  
Some of the pastors were more readily willing to label themselves as evangelical. A 
Columbia pastor of an independent non-denominational church said, “Evangelical? Yes, 
of course.” After which, as all but one of the pastors did, he defined what he meant.  
Yeah, evangelical in the sense that we want to be as understandably close to 
apostolic era church doctrine. The gospel as given by the Lord, by the Holy Spirit to 
the apostle Paul and others by revelation and was delivered to the saints once and 
for all. We don't want to stray from the original intent of the Holy Spirit for the 
redeeming plan, the plan of redemption for man. If we mess up on that, if we dilute 
that in any way, we're not gonna have the desired effects for our church, and for the 
community and for the culture, as a matter of fact, as we'd like to and that is very, 
very important.  
 
He proceeded to give more details by what he meant but never demonstrated fear of being 
wrongly identified nor did he show that he understood or was troubled by political 
implications of “evangelical” in the way that some of the other pastors did.  
One pastor's answer was simply, "Yes. Yes. It's pretty straightforward for me I guess," 
and that was all. This pastor, a pastor of a Southern Baptist church affiliated with a national 
denomination, was also from South Carolina and relatively young at age forty-five. He was 
the only pastor who simply said yes and did not feel the need to explain.  
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Another pastor, from North Carolina, also a Southern Baptist, was also more willing to 
adopt the identity of evangelical. He said,  
I do. Yeah, I consider myself, and I've actually turned myself old fashioned. Very 
evangelical. Our church is very, very mission oriented. I'm a firm believer in where 
the Lord said that you know, we're to reach our Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria and 
the utter parts of the world. And I take that in a literal fashion. 
 
This pastor, in answering this question, at first came across as somewhat unaware of the 
political connotations and stigma associated with the term evangelical. However, later in 
the interview, he seemed to demonstrate a clear understanding of this stigma. His 
interpretation of evangelical was very mission-and outreach-oriented. When I asked 
whether he was evangelical, he did not seem to identify with the term politically or even 
socially but based on the word’s theological meaning. “Is he evangelical?” Of course, he 
is, his church's mission is to be evangelical. 
Later, when I asked a question about what society thinks of people like him, he showed 
a clear internalization of the “evangelical” identity evincing both a sense of pride in his 
religious commitment and a rather clear sense of social marginalization. He was one of a 
handful of pastors who did not seem preoccupied with the political implications associated 
with the word evangelical; they simply understood it as a definition of outward mission 
work. A Reformed Presbyterian pastor from South Carolina said, “Yes. And I would 
qualify that. The word evangelical is built on the word from the work in the Greek 
euangelion, the good news, the good news is it’s all about Jesus…”. He does qualify what 
he means by evangelical but does not seem to balk at the idea that he would be called an 
evangelical.  
Two pastors did not say they were evangelicals. One was the pastor of a Moravian 
church in North Carolina. This comes as no surprise to me. He said, “I consider myself to 
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be a mainline Protestant. If you had to identify Moravians, we are a mainline Protestant 
church”. He went on the explain what a Moravian is and their ecumenical relations with 
other mainline churches. Later he explained that in terms of outreach, his church is 
evangelical, but, it is not so in terms of a "political persuasion, or a certain identifiable 
cultural context or being white or being Anglo-Saxon. Moravians have always been 
mission-minded, so in that sense they were evangelical.” While he did eventually get 
around to finding a way to be evangelical, I believe the first response is the most telling. 
He immediately said no, and that he was a mainline Protestant.  
A fifty-year-old, Winston Salem African American pastor32 of a non-denominational 
church also said no. He said:  
Not really. I choose to stay away from that. I consider myself as non-
denominational or basically as someone who loves God and someone who 
understands that God will meet anyone where they are. I think nowadays many 
people sometimes associate evangelicals with party affiliations or certain affiliation 
towards certain beliefs and I don’t pertain to that. I don’t believe that God is neither 
Democrat or Republican. I believe He supports what is best for humanity. If you 
are an evangelical and you’re Republican what if God’s telling you to vote 
Democrat …you could miss God because of you not being open to the voice of the 
Holy Spirit because God knows what’s best for the nation and what’s best for the 
country and even for the world nowadays...everything’s connected … so that’s the 
reason I don’t, per se, connect myself to one group because a stigma comes with 
that. ‘Political stigma’ yeah, political and even some of the other issues, my belief 
is that He will meet people where they are I don’t believe that uh everything is 
always Black and white in some situations.  
 
He has some similar reasons for not identifying as evangelical as the previous pastors; he 
was one of two to immediately answer negatively to the question.  
These answers can be categorized in three ways: rejection of the term overall; rejection 
of the political implications of the term but acceptance of the theological implications; and 
complete acceptance of the term. The majority of the pastors (8) rejected the political label 
                                                 
32 He identified as “mixed” for his race on my post-interview survey.  
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evangelical but accepted the theological label evangelical. Two pastors rejected the label 
completely, and three pastors adopted the term completely regardless of any political or 
theological implications they associated with it or perceived others to associate with it. 
 
Social Perceptions of Evangelicals 
One aim of my project is to learn about the way these pastors feel society views them, 
and more broadly how they feel society views evangelicals. For this reason, I ask the 
following question: “How do you feel society views you or people like you?”. I do not 
define what I mean by “people like you,” but rather allowed them to interpret the idea for 
themselves and respond accordingly.  
Each pastor had a different take on what this question meant and subsequently how to 
respond. Many of them did interpret the question as “how society views evangelicals,” but 
quite a few gave other varying answers. Almost all of them demonstrated a sense of 
marginalization, at least in terms of being stereotyped. They each had different experiences 
regarding stereotyping, but all seemed to be trying to avoid or refute some stereotype. For 
some of them, the stereotype was less about their Christian identity and more about their 
racial identity; however, even for the African American pastors, race was not the only 
identity they internalized since it was wrapped up in their evangelical identity. For instance, 
the African American pastor from South Carolina said,  
…as far as being a pastor, I would say that pastors have, you know, gotten a bad 
rap and there's a negative connotation right now. You have people who are involved 
in scandals, and you know, you see the stuff on the news...I would say that there's 
a negative connotation right now. 
 
I would also say a very close second to that, being a young Black man also carries a 
negative connotation and I'm working against that as well. Most people, when they 
think about a young, Black man, integrity is not what comes to mind… A lot of 
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young Black men by the way that they carry themselves and their life pursuits, they 
have earned a reputation that's not positive…I would say of pastors, that reputation 
hasn't been earned, you're talking about a few who are deciding the image of many, 
and most pastors I know are great men whether they be Black or white, I would say 
that that image… shouldn't be earned…  
 
The first thing to notice about this pastor’s response is that he immediately took my 
question to mean “how does society view pastors?” In other words, the identity that first 
came to mind for him, perhaps because of the nature of the interview, was his position as 
a pastor. Thus, he did not lead with a sense of being evangelical. He more profoundly 
internalizes being a pastor and the stereotypes he feels because of that, while also 
identifying himself as being a Black man; both identities are clearly important to him and 
essential to his worldview. However, he does not seem to display a strong sense of societal 
marginalization regarding either his religious identity or his race. Both identities seemed 
like a part of life to him, and the stereotypes and hardships involved are just something to 
work through and hopefully prevail against. He told me that on multiple occasions he had 
been harassed by police officers for no apparent reason. He attributed this to his race; 
however, even in discussing these clearly disturbing run-ins with police officers, he never 
showed a sense of anger or frustration, but rather an acceptance of it being the way life is 
(see Gaventa 1980 for an explanation of this sentiment that he calls “quiescence”) 
Instead, his focus seemed to be on reaching out into the community and helping other 
Black men, specifically, overcome challenges they face. He indicates that he’s “…trying 
to show young Black kids, hey, …you can carry yourself intelligently and, you know, you 
don't have to look like and act like what you see on TV, you can stand tall and be proud of 
who you are and... intelligence is sexy anyway”. He goes on to talk about how he wants to 
show other young Black men that it is possible to only be with one woman and have kids 
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with one woman because he has done that. He said that most young Black men, even in the 
church setting, are floored when they hear that about him. He hopes he can provide a 
tangible alternative for them so that they can prove the social stereotypes wrong. Here we 
see an African American pastor balancing his evangelical and Black identities by reaching 
out into the community to help people one individual at a time. This is how he tries change 
culture, and his focus on individuals embedded within culture is profoundly evangelical.  
The Reformed Presbyterian pastor also answered my question from the perspective of 
a "pastor." He internalized his identity as a pastor and discussed how society sees him and 
other pastors. He says, 
That’s easy. It’s the last thing I ever tell people that I’m a pastor, ok. It really is. 
Because I’ve grown to expect that people will not trust me if they knew I was a 
pastor. Because they're a lot of charlatans, there are a lot of people who call 
themselves ministers of the gospel and are some of the biggest hypocrites…I'm a 
broken, sinful man, I need Jesus just as much as anybody probably more so it's 
troubled me when that title, that title evokes a sense of awe… 
 
He identifies the same stereotype the South Carolina African American pastor identified: 
one of a hypocritical, false pastor. He shows a sense of humility and an unwillingness to 
fully embrace the label “pastor” because of stereotypes.  
Two pastors responded by identifying society as their immediate community. They 
detailed the positive image they have developed for themselves and their churches in the 
community. For instance, one pastor in Rochester said, “Around town [his church name] 
and [name] kids is very very highly regarded…”. Another pastor in South Carolina said 
something similar: “… we're well accepted and well viewed here in our community, yes 
we are...we, we've helped so many people." Both pastors therefore identified with their 
"evangelical" identity but identified society as their immediate surrounding. However, both 
did talk of how society, in general, viewed them and their churches. In fact, the Rochester 
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pastor gave one of the clearest examples of a feeling of social marginalization in my 
interviews. 
The African American pastor from Rochester did not once mention his race throughout 
the course of answering my question. He started by saying he had never really thought 
about this question before. He then proceeded to give a vulnerable and deeply personal 
answer. He says,  
I think society, and wrongly so, I think society believes…been lead to believe, 
that Christians hate people who are not like them. That because, say, for instance, 
the position I would have with regards to abortion or homosexuality or even for that 
matter, drug use, that because we would take a particular position toward these 
things, that that, in turn, means that we hate the people who do these things and 
nothing could be further from the truth....you know, starting from the back forward, 
I don't hate drug addicts, I was a drug addict, and I just want to see people who are 
on drugs liberated from that because I recognize the bondage that drugs bring into 
people lives… 
 
He continues by giving detailed examples about each group of people he mentions: drug 
addicts, women who have had abortions, and homosexuals. He explains how he does not 
hate these people but rather cares for them and desires to help them. He states that the view 
society might have of him or people like him is inaccurate.  
Such attempts to rectify false conceptions of evangelicalism seem to stem from a few 
sources. Pastors and evangelicals feel they represent something bigger than themselves, 
namely God. Thus, the way that society sees them is how they see God, and representing 
God truthfully is perhaps the evangelical’s greatest concern. Thus, it seems part of the 
exasperation demonstrated by these pastors comes from this concern. 
The challenge of representing God was a common theme throughout all the interviews. 
Most of the interviewees spent a great deal of time disputing some societal perspective of 
them that they had internalized. Many felt the need to either defend or distance themselves 
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from a certain meaning of evangelical. Whatever societal marginalization they had 
internalized was so real to them that when given the chance to defend themselves to 
someone who was willing to listen, they did so readily. I do not believe that they were 
always defending themselves or even their personal identity per se, but more so, their faith. 
They were attempting to rectify a false image of who God is.  
One pastor from Rochester gave a personal example of an interaction that displayed 
one societal perspective of him and his beliefs that he had internalized. He said,  
A couple months ago I was in a coffee shop, and I was doing some work, and this 
guy started talking to me and asked me what I do. I told him I was a pastor, kinda 
rolled his eyes, and we started talking about the Bible and he starts bringing up all 
sorts of scientific questions that he thinks that God's Word does not answer or that 
he thinks that is contrary to the Bible and as best as I could to tell him, no, you're 
coming with assumptions that I don't have, you're assuming a lot of things about 
me and about my faith that aren't true, you're closing yourself off from an actual 
conversation. So, I guess I dunno, I guess people come to the table thinking that 
we're dumb, that we haven't thought things through, that faith is opposed to reason, 
and that faith is opposed to science and it kind of starts our conversations from a 
bottom rung of a ladder rather than at an equal spot. 
 
It is these sorts of experiences and interactions that contribute to an internalized feeling of 
social marginalization as expressed by this pastor. Such internalizations create a feeling of 
isolation and inability to connect or explain oneself to others, as well as a helpless feeling 
that one has no recourse or way to shed incorrect stereotypes.  
Another Rochester pastor (we will call him Pastor Rob for the purposes of this 
example) shared a similar experience about interacting with some auto mechanics. In 
conversation, one of the mechanics mentioned knowing a friend of Pastor Rob. This friend 
also happened to be a pastor. Pastor Rob says he asked why the mechanic liked this other 
pastor so much, to which the mechanic responded, “…he was not a Bible thumper, he never 
thumped his Bible in my face.” Pastor Rob said of this answer, “That was his first 
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statement. I said, ‘that's an interesting description of this guy, I don't know why you say it 
that way". The mechanic replied, "I've met those Bible thumpers before, and they're always 
trying to hit you over the head with the Bible…” At that point, Pastor Rob says he informed 
the mechanic that he is a pastor as well and received the following response: "You're not 
one of them, are you? You're a pastor. You're kidding! Do you thump people with your 
Bible?". Pastor Rob, clearly miffed by this type of stereotype describes for me how he felt 
about this whole experience:   
That was the only thing he wanted to talk about…The other two guys were very 
silent, but they were very much in agreement. I think in terms of a prejudicial view 
when they don't actually know anybody…the view is basically negative. Here in 
the Northeast, the view of people in the Bible belt where you live is there's Bible 
thumpers on every street, and all the churches are after everybody to save their souls 
and get them into heaven. That's not really true, but it's a view based on a pre-
judgment…that allows them to sit comfortably and evaluate the world in terms they 
understand…I never wack people over the head with that stuff even though I know 
it, I took a very different approach. I would say when people actually know me the 
regard is very high, if they have a prejudice, it’s probably pretty low.   
 
This is an excellent example of an individual experience, likely not the only one, that led 
to feelings of social marginalization. Nothing speaks as powerfully to or influences as 
much as the direct interactions that feed feelings of marginalization. Thus, the two 
experiences described above are likely indicative of experiences other evangelicals have 
had. Therefore, it is presumptuous to assume that all feelings of social marginalization 
within the evangelical community stem from elite and media frames. We cannot discount 
personal experiences and their influence as well.  
 While the pastors from the North did show a heightened sense of social 
marginalization, some in the South did as well. The intensity with which they expressed 
feelings of marginalization varied but was apparent in almost every case (this is not entirely 
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true for the two pastors who did not identify as evangelical). The South Carolina Southern 
Baptist pastor said:  
You know, in the mainstream culture that you would see on television news, on an 
average show I guess, most Bible-believing Christians are probably thought of as a 
little bit behind the times, or a little bit less than intellectual. I guess I'll leave it at 
that. I guess that's how we are portrayed in the mainstream culture.  Most 
Christians, Bible-believing Christians, are portrayed like that, a little bit dumb, 
insecure, a little bit backwards. 
 
This pastor was the least interactive of them all, but he still gives a clear indication of the 
stereotypes he perceives in his daily life. Take note that he uses collective identity language 
when describing the way he think he or people like him are viewed. He says, “that’s how 
we are portrayed." While he does demonstrate some sense of marginalization, the North 
Carolina Southern Baptist pastor takes this perspective to the next level, saying: 
I think that I'll just say the past 15 years, I think the way society views evangelical 
Christianity has taken a downward turn…it seems like, to me, like the most 
persecuted bunch in the United States today are the Christian people. If Christianity 
says something like homosexuality is bad, and yet what they've done, they've kinda 
turned that around to say that all Christians hate the homosexual community which 
is not true. I have sat down and had face to face talks with those in the homosexual 
community and pointed these things out and said you know you've come in very 
militant, you know, in wanting to try to squash me like a bug and you say I hate 
you and the thing about it is I don’t hate you, I don't agree with your lifestyle 
because of ... what the Bible says about it.  
 
So, if we take the Bible and we believe in the Bible we have a world and a society 
that doesn't want that because it puts restrictions on them, you know, we're in a 
society that doesn’t want any authority over them…I think that society in and of 
itself no longer views church and Christianity with the same value and respect that 
it did even as much as it did 10-15 years ago. 
 
This pastor demonstrates a strong sense of marginalization verging on martyrdom. He says 
that he believes “Christian people” are the most persecuted people in the United States and 
proceeds to vehemently defend that claim. He talks of the society’s refusal to accept the 
“Christian” perspective that homosexuality is Biblically wrong and then couches this 
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challenge in a deeper problem he sees in society. Society does not want authority or 
restrictions, and because “Christianity” is predicated on authority, society rejects it and has 
lost respect for it. According to this pastor, this change has been happening over the past 
ten or fifteen years. This perspective is not an anomaly either. One Rochester pastor says:  
So, faith in our culture is very much to the point where you can think what you 
want to think and it's supposed to be accepted; and I think a lot of times that is true 
for everything but Christians. Where, if we stand up for what we believe God's 
Word says, we're going to get persecuted for it. Let's just take, for example, the 
Christian baker in Colorado…what happened? You had a Christian saying, this is 
against my beliefs, and I can't support it, I love you, and I would love to have a 
relationship with you, but I don't want to participate in what you are doing because 
I think it is wrong… 
 
Another pastor in North Carolina echoed a similar sentiment regarding authority, he says:  
What you're really talking about is the issue of authority. That is the issue, at the 
end of the day, is the issue of authority. What is somebody's authority for what they 
believe and why they believe it? I believe the Bible is completely true, inspired by 
God and without error, everything we believe and practice and do is based on the 
scripture. That might lump me in, in their minds, with some groups that I probably 
wouldn’t want to be associated with… 
 
This idea of being persecuted or an anomaly for standing on an unyielding authority 
became a familiar refrain during the interviews. The prevailing logic is that American 
society does not want anything restricting freedoms or desires. According to many of the 
pastors, the more society moves in relativist direction, the more obsolete or outdated the 
idea that there are set boundaries and a final authority outside of oneself becomes. This 
thought process is one of the major reasons for the feelings of marginalization and 
displacement cited by the pastors.  Most of the pastors echoed the sentiment that they felt 
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they and other evangelicals33 were viewed as behind the times, or an oddity. Earlier in our 
conversation, the pastor from North Carolina said:  
…well I would believe each day that goes by we’re viewed more and more as an 
oddity, out of step with the culture, out of step with the times. If they find out what 
we really believe (they may think we’re just a social organization), I think they 
would probably call us narrow, unloving. What else would they wrongly think 
about us? Maybe even a cult?  
 
Notice the language here. He says, “what else would they think wrong about us?” The first 
thing to note is his assertion that the beliefs he thinks society has about him and his church 
are wrong. Secondly, he clearly identifies with an "us." The way this pastor answered my 
questions and presented himself leads me to believe that by "us," he does not mean 
evangelicals as a whole, but is more specifically referring to himself and his church. He 
demonstrated one of the most individualistic worldviews I encountered among the pastors 
and thus, I do not believe he has adopted a broader "collective identity" outside of his own 
church identity. 
One pastor from Rochester, humorously, but to make a point, says of the Christian 
bakers, who are the plaintiff’s in the high-profile Supreme Court case, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), and of evangelicals in general,  
…and obviously, there's an uproar in society saying that those people are bigoted, 
that those people are nasty, that those people are unloving and unkind and behind 
the times and… they're dinosaurs; you know what I mean? That they're on the 
wrong side of history, and I think that is, for the most part, the way that our society 
would see me and my church.  
 
                                                 
33 Typically the pastors did not use the term “evangelical” but rather “Christian” when referring to other 
believers like them. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, I refer to the “others” as evangelical, 
assuming that the pastors mean, other people with their same religious tenets.  
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The tone in which he said this was as impactful.  He is dripping with sarcasm as he lists 
the various stereotypes and sweeping assumptions made about evangelicals, as if to 
insinuate, naturally, evangelicals are seen in this way, because it is just how things are.  
These pastors all seem to be internalizing a societal perspective of themselves that they 
are "dinosaurs," behind the times, or prejudiced and hateful. These are stereotypes they 
disagree with and refute. Yet, peculiarly, at the same time, they seem to agree that there is 
some group of evangelicals out there that fit this stereotype. Hence, they want to make 
clear that they are not part of those people. In other words, many of the pastors believe 
there is some amorphous group of evangelicals out there that is bigoted, prejudiced, and 
hateful, but they are not those people. On numerous occasions, the pastors say in various 
ways that they are lumped into “this group” of people simply because they agree with and 
espouse some of the same religious beliefs.  
The pastors also made clear that the stereotypes stem from their unwillingness to 
compromise on Biblical truths, sin, and right and wrong. Thus, there is an implicit 
suggestion of a radical group of “evangelicals” out there misrepresenting real evangelicals, 
but also a resignation to the fact that their perspectives, as they are, are going to be 
considered hateful, bigoted and behind the times. Further, the pastors show a resignation 
to the assumption that this perspective of them is set no matter what they contend otherwise. 
They do not, however, necessarily treat this situation as a problem. They have come to 
expect, both from experience and what the Bible says, that society will treat them as 
outcasts. One pastor from South Carolina, a self-proclaimed optimist, says; 
…a hotbed topic would be same-sex marriage if you look at our church's website 
and our church's statement of faith, you'd see that we believe marriage is for one 
man and one woman. Up until the past thirty years that's been…not all that 
controversial of a statement. The speed in which the conversation is changing on 
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that, and particularly if I was to say I hold marriage to be one man and one woman, 
if I was to say that in a different context there's the chance I could be looked at as 
kinda like, uh, almost akin to the Civil Rights movement, almost as someone who’s 
prejudice or discriminatory and that’s definitely not our church’s heart, not my 
heart, but then again it could be viewed that way.  
 
He knows his views are considered prejudiced and bigoted even though he contends his 
church is not that way. Almost all the pastors acknowledge that there are evangelicals out 
there with whom they do not want to be associated. They also acknowledge that their 
Biblical beliefs are the main reason society calls them hateful or bigoted and prejudiced. 
This specific pastor goes on to say that in his context, in Lexington, South Carolina, he and 
his church do not experience the kind of stereotyping he talks about; however, he says that 
if it does get that way for them personally, “then so be it." 
 Three of the pastors, at some point in the conversation, mentioned the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop bakers in Colorado. Though the pastors were not directly experiencing what the 
bakers are experiencing, as parties to a high profile court case, they seemed to identify with 
the bakers and use them as a symbol. For the pastors, the bakers’ situation symbolizes 
something sinister happening in society that somehow underlines the pastors’ feelings of 
social marginalization. The bakers’ situation provides a concrete example the pastors could 
utilize to support their argument that society is no longer embracing evangelicals but rather 
castigating them for living by their religiously based worldview, as illustrated by the 
bakers’ refusal to create a wedding cake for a gay couple.  
 The two pastors who did not identify as evangelical had a slightly different take on how 
society views them or people like them. Both pastors identified with their church’s identity 
or denomination more than anything else. The African American pastor from North 
Carolina said,  
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I wish sometimes people would judge ministries not by their names but by the 
content of their character as well, just go visit the church, see what’s it’s like, just 
because it’s a Baptist church doesn’t mean that they’re all the same, just because 
it’s a Pentecostal church doesn’t mean that they’re all the same, you can go down 
the line….sometimes people think all Black churches are the same, I don’t like 
saying the word church because I believe there’s one church but different 
congregations. The body of Christ is one church, but we have different 
congregation… 
 
Here he shows a sense of marginalization and of being stereotyped but by other churches. 
His own community struggles with stereotyping each other’s denominations. This makes 
sense, given that he is pastor of an African American church and likely experiences 
negative or wrong assumptions about the way his church operates because outside 
observers fail to appreciate the diversity inherent in African American Protestantism. He 
tells me that just because his church is primarily Black does not mean they sing all the same 
songs people might assume they sing and then lists the various types of music they play 
there.  
 The Moravian pastor also answered from a denominational approach. He talked about how 
other more contemporary churches or today's society might think his church is a bit too 
traditional or old-fashioned. He said,   
I think society at large would view mainline churches as being an acronym as being 
somewhat out of touch with reality, no praiseathon, but I think we see that because 
since the 1960s mainline churches have gone down so …. You’re not getting it, 
you’re out of touch with reality or want to have a monumental light show. We’re 
kinda more the liturgy.  
 
His form of Christianity then might be considered out of date since Moravians are not 
engaging in contemporary ways of practicing Christianity. He identifies as a Moravian and 
a mainline Protestant; thus, his answer stems from how society views mainline Protestants. 
His answer was markedly different than answers of the pastors who did identify as 
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evangelicals, as he makes no mention of Biblical standards, authority, or values. Rather, 
he talks about society's perspective on his style of church. 
Where Is Society Headed? 
While the point of my dissertation is not to uncover why evangelicals are feeling 
marginalized, the interviews do provide insight on this front. I asked the pastors: “What do 
you think about the direction society is headed in both socially and politically and how 
does it make you feel?” I asked this question specifically to find out whether these clergy 
are feeling socially marginalized which is relevant to my project because I assume social 
marginalization. As I have shown above, the answers to the first few questions set a tone 
of social marginalization; however, this question gets at these feelings more directly and 
also, to a degree, uncovers why the pastors feel the way they do.  
 Across the board (save for the two pastors who did not identify as evangelical), all the 
pastors said that society is headed in a bad direction. One pastor says, “…the culture will 
constantly find more ways to express their hatred of God and hatred of truth, and so we get 
better and better at expressing our depravity…" while another says, "It breaks my heart. As 
a society, we're broken people, and we need God to change our hearts." Each pastor had 
his own understanding of why society is heading in the wrong direction, but most of the 
explanations all boiled down to one central problem with one central solution: the problem 
is sin, and the solution is Christ. The ails of society are just the outward manifestations of 
individual inward darkness. 
 Some of the pastors expressed concern about the future, especially for their own 
children. One pastor’s concern was centered around safety. He bemoans his perception that 
society has become far less safe. He talked about how his wife does not feel she can do the 
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same things that she could do thirty-forty years ago because of how dangerous the world 
is. He believes things have changed due to the moral breakdown in society, and specifically 
a lack of moral boundaries. In his view, American society began demanding more moral 
liberties to do whatever they wanted but in doing so brought upon themselves more 
dangers. He says,  
…our society has granted people the loss of moral fiber, the failure to hold up, ‘No, 
this is wrong, we don’t do that, that’s not ok, that’s not how you treat women, that’s 
not how you treat men, which seems terribly limiting and all that, but you know 
what? It’s like the fence around the playground; yes, it’s limiting but doggone 
there’s tremendous freedom when you don’t have to worry about kids running into 
the street to chase a ball. So, God’s Word is very limiting, but it's freeing! Stay 
inside the fence; you'll be fine. Yeah, you're gonna miss a whole lot but thank God 
for that. 
 
Breakdown of moral boundaries was a common theme throughout the interviews. The 
pastors all expressed a sense of societal moral degradation that all of them attributed to sin 
and felt the solution was individual and personal salvation. The North Carolina Southern 
Baptist pastor communicated a similar sentiment when he said,  
I think that socially and politically our country is going in a wrong direction. For 
me, as an evangelical Christian...I think they're going away from Biblical principles 
on both a social level as well as a political level. Our society today doesn't want any 
absolutes, because if there are absolutes, then that will make somebody wrong. If 
you look at things socially, the uptick, (and I'm just taking some of the social things 
that we have seen on the forefront) homosexuality, that's one of those things, 
transgenderism... 
 
He sees a trend in the wrong direction both socially and politically. He then draws the 
issues of “homosexuality” and “transgenderism” back to what he believes is the root cause 
of the problems he perceives, a rejection of absolutes.  
The use of words like "boundaries" and "authority" and "absolutes" set the tone for 
what the pastors believe sets evangelicals apart from society. As I have argued above, 
evangelicals may feel social marginalization because of their unwillingness to compromise 
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on matters of theology in a society that no longer values the idea of one single "truth." 
These pastors acknowledge this societal shift by claiming that society no longer has moral 
boundaries or respect for values and authority due to the root problem of sin.  
 Another pastor, one from Rochester, expressed concern regarding the future of his 
family and his safety as a pastor and evangelical. “…so, I don't like the way society is 
heading. I wonder what it's gonna look like for my kids. I look at the secularization of 
Europe and how ostracized Christians are becoming in Europe, and that's the way that we're 
going to go so you know I don't like the trajectory." He proceeds to say that he is praying 
for religious revival and for people to have a face-to-face encounter with Jesus and be 
changed by Him; however, he does expect that circumstances could get bad for him and 
his family. He says, "I've believed for a long time that I'm probably gonna spend some time 
in jail at some point for preaching the truth of God's Word. I've wondered if that's going to 
happen if that's going to affect my family. I would hope that it doesn't, but that's the 
trajectory that I see in our culture." He is representative of most of the pastors in this 
viewpoint that emerged in response to my question about where society is headed.   
 Societal division and divisiveness was another common theme. The same pastor 
referenced above says, “Our culture is becoming one where if you are not extremely on 
one side then you are extremely on the other, and we can't have conversations." He 
proceeds to give examples of this phenomenon. He says if he claims to understand, 
empathize with and appreciate the conversations being started because of NFL quarterback 
Colin Kaepernick’s protest action of kneeling during the National Anthem, then suddenly 
he is seen as hating police, veterans, and America itself. However, if he says he thinks 
Kaepernick should not kneel then suddenly he is considered racist without a heart of 
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compassion for the African American community. I ask him to clarify this as he had used 
this for an example of something he experiences spiritually. He explains by connecting this 
example to how he, as an evangelical, feels in today’s divisive culture.  
When that comes to the way that we talk about different societal and cultural issues 
whether it's gay marriage or it's abortion, we just can't have a conversation anymore, 
and I just think that's a terrible loss. The exclusivity of the gospel is a big deal if we 
say to somebody that Jesus Christ is the way, the truth, the life, I instantly hate all 
Muslims and … I think all Muslims are terrorists. I do believe that there's one way, 
and I do believe that Muslims are wrong, but I want to have a compassionate 
conversation to be able to say, ‘This is what is I believe the truth is'; but if I say that 
I'm instantly ostracized as a hater and as closeminded and bigoted and an 
Islamophobe, and you know, why can't I just keep my own beliefs to myself? 
 
The frustration this pastor feels is rooted in his perception that society is so divided that no 
one can empathize with the opposing perspective. If anyone says they support or 
understand one political or ideological perspective, they automatically are lumped in with 
all the extremes associated with that perspective. 
What causes this division? One pastor says that the division in society is the work of 
the devil, society itself, and the media. He says, “…society is inciting division. I can say 
that it's like our society wants us divided …or at least the media does, because of what's 
promoted.” He (an African American pastor living in South Carolina) expressed frustration 
with how the media seemed to be intentionally inciting division as if their goal was to 
create anger and frustration across races. He says, “…it’s almost as if everyone's not going 
to be happy until we've gone forty years back in time and schools are again Black or white 
and restaurants are too, and it's like maybe then everybody will be happy, it's like they just 
want to be in their corners...”.  
This frustration with polarization shows up in many of the interviews. The reasons and 
causes for the perceived divisions vary, but the pastors were similar in their overwhelming 
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sense that the country is painfully divided and their sense that they are on the losing side 
of cultural change.  
Further, there seemed to be an assumption, primarily among the African American 
pastors, that polarization was intentional and in some way conjured up by elites. The 
African American pastor from Rochester says, “…socially it seems that society is 
becoming increasingly divided and I think that's intended. I think that there's great political 
advantage in dividing people and the society has followed suit, it has embraced that. We 
see a lot of divide going on in society”. He goes on to say that society is not as divided as 
the “world” would have us believe, but that there are only two types of people in the world: 
those on the narrow path to heaven and those on the broad path to destruction. He truly 
believes that division in society, especially racial divisions, are somehow being 
intentionally conjured up and promoted. He reiterated this belief multiple times in the 
conversation. The African American pastor from South Carolina echoed the same 
sentiment. 
Many of the pastors shared the belief that the politics of our times is just a reflection of 
society. In their view, the worse society gets, the worse the political realm gets. This finding 
supports my understanding of political marginalization and social marginalization. These 
pastors seemed more concerned with society than with government. They saw problems 
with government as simply a symptom of greater problems originating from the collection 
of individuals that make up American society. One African American pastor said, 
"politically I think that's a reflection of what we see in society, I think that the political 
divide is becoming greater." He believes divisions in government are simply a reflection 
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of the divisions in society, rather than society reflecting and being shaped by elites in 
government. Another pastor echoes this sentiment and gives a more detailed explanation:  
…moral issues etc. that I think are very wrong and have progressed in a wrong 
direction uh, and politically likewise. Politically, …I think is just a lot of times … 
reflecting what is happening socially. People that get elected have to please their 
constituents, have to identify with their ideals, so I think politics a lot of times is 
just a reflection of what's happening socially. 
 
Yet another pastor, the North Carolina Southern Baptist, said the same thing in his own 
words, "society is actually dictating polity…that's kinda scary as well because essentially 
it appears that society is dictating the politics of our generation." He said that if he had to 
put a one-word title on how all of this makes him feel, he says it would be "overwhelmed." 
This finding speaks directly to my assumption that evangelicals are feeling socially 
marginalized and concerned about society. I ask about the direction of both society and 
politics; however, most of the pastors focused on the “society” part more than the “politics” 
part. 
Political Efficacy 
I found that the pastors’ feelings of marginalization do not seem to be associated with 
any lack of political efficacy or access to government. I ask the pastors this question. “Do 
you, as an individual and as a congregation, feel that you have or can have, an impact on 
the political process?” Surprisingly, or perhaps unsurprisingly given the current 
presidential administration, almost every pastor responded with an immediate yes. They 
demonstrated a strong sense of efficacy and trust in the system. Many of them talked about 
how they encouraged their congregations to vote or felt they could write their member of 
Congress if they needed to express their concerns about something.  
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I use one pastor from North Carolina as an example of the other pastors. This pastor 
said: “We encourage our people to stand for the truth and contact your representatives 
contact your senators for any law that's coming up…be a good citizen and be a good 
Christian stand for the truth…let's hold our leaders accountable…". He and many others 
said they pray for their leaders, vote, and are happy with their level of political 
participation. “Our approach is to encourage Christians as individuals to get involved…” 
This pastor felt that an evangelical who has impact on the political process was the same 
as one who has an impact on any other social section. Someone can try to impact the 
institution they work for by urging it to operate with integrity and Biblical values, but any 
change they might effect is temporary. Thus, the impact he is more concerned about is 
glorifying God.  
Towards the end of the interview, the same pastor says of impacting government: “I’m 
not under illusion of thinking that what we’re trying to do is create a Christian nation with 
a Christian government…no I don’t believe that’s what we’re called to do… That’s not 
what the government was founded upon...but I think we can glorify God by being salt and 
light”. He concludes by saying he thinks Christians can have a “Measured temporary 
impact in the political process and it will never be more than that … I think that’s 
scripture…”.  
This answer is representative of many of the others. Many pastors' answers were shorter 
than his, but almost all demonstrated a similar refrain. Some pastors felt that they can have 
an impact. Others felt less so, but they all demonstrated a solid sense of external political 
efficacy. Their priority was teaching their congregants to love, to be good citizens, to vote 
their conscience, and train their children up "in a Godly way." If people do these things, 
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according to the pastors, they can have an impact. Moreover, their focus tended to be on 
the individual. Most of the pastors made it clear they were not interested in holding rallies 
or protests, but instead wish to encourage individual congregants to live quiet Godly lives, 
love their neighbors, vote and passionately pursue whatever career (government or not) 
they are interested in pursuing.  
The answers to my question about political efficacy show that it is possible for someone 
to feel highly efficacious while also demonstrating a strong sense of marginalization. These 
two feelings seem contradictory. How can someone possess a high level of political 
efficacy and yet also feel marginalized? I theorize that there are two dimensions of 
marginalization at play here: social marginalization and political marginalization. 
Individuals may feel as though they have access to government and that they can impact it 
through their votes and other forms of participation, yet at the same time feel shunned and 
marginalized by society. This is exactly the dynamic these pastors demonstrated.  
Some of the pastors articulated a feeling of political displacement. One pastor says, "I 
feel like there's really nowhere to go in terms of a side when it comes to being a Christian." 
This statement concludes a small rant about how he feel he cannot say he is a conservative 
Republican because people will assume he does not have compassion for the poor. 
Likewise, he thinks that if he says he is a liberal Democrat, he cannot hold to the exclusivity 
of his faith because he would be expected to have compassion for everyone. At this point, 
he exasperatedly says, "So, as a whole, politics is a joke. I think it's broken. I don't think 
anything is going to change our society but the power of Jesus Christ, so as long as we can 
preach I could care less who’s in power and that’s about it”. This pastor clearly 
demonstrates a frustration with politics, as if he wishes he could participate more; however, 
 152  
he feels that, as an evangelical, he does not fit in on either side. Neither side allows him to 
fully live out who he is. Also, note that he said he could care less what government officials 
are in power “as long as we can preach”; thereby insinuating, if something threatens or 
appears to threaten his ability to preach he would care about who is in power. This is 
something to keep in mind moving forward.  
Notice also that this pastor says he thinks politics is broken and a joke and immediately 
transitions to saying he does not think anything can fix society but Jesus Christ. A logical 
upshot of his thought here would be that the only thing that can fix or change politics is 
Jesus Christ since it was politics that he just stated was broken. This means that he was 
thinking in terms of politics being the answer to the ails of society. Many want to look to 
government and politicians for a remedy for ails in society. However, this pastor and many 
others say that politics and government is not that answer and cannot do anything for 
society; therefore, he cares little about politics. There is nothing that politicians can offer 
as a cure for what ails society; only Jesus Christ has that cure.  
The pastors’ perceptions of marginalization did not necessarily originate from their 
identity, but rather from their values: a particular set of Biblical values, or what they 
consider “traditional” values. Many of the pastors, when discussing the direction society is 
headed, bemoaned a move away from their own Biblical social values or, as one pastor put 
it, mores. One pastor from North Carolina said,  
Through the centuries…what happens is, the world stays out here and does its thing, 
and it comes up with rules and laws and regulations…but through the centuries the 
world has started, and the government has started, encroaching into more and more 
of the things that the Bible addresses...the more that it starts saying things that are 
the opposite of what the Bible says the more Christians are gonna get 
concerned…you’re dabbling now in moral things that the Bible addresses and 
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speaks strongly about and we cannot remain silent…we must stand against things 
and preach the truth.34 
 
His language sounds more activist than he says he is. He uses the phrase, "stand against 
things," but he does not mean through corporate or public displays. He made that point 
very clearly later in the conversation. I believe he is referring to a position of standing 
against things as an evangelical pastor whose job it is to preach the Gospel. 
Most of the pastors do not seem surprised by the downward trend they see in society; 
Many of them expect this trend because of the worldview that human nature is depraved 
and sinful. However, this belief does not equate to any lack of frustration, sadness, or in 
some cases, fear. One pastor says, “My perception is that our society in America is probably 
moving, you know, further and further away from Christian beliefs, um, you know that 
makes me sad. At the same time, you know, Biblically, I think that we are kinda told that 
things will get worse." Another pastor claims that society is moving away from Biblical 
principles, while others claim society does not want boundaries, society no longer has any 
morals, and society hates authority and absolutes as the North Carolina Southern Baptist 
pastor says, “Our society today doesn't want any absolutes, because if there are absolutes, 
then that will make somebody wrong… I think that's why people are so adamantly against 
the Bible is because there are absolutes”.  
Some pastors say that the way they see society going makes them feel more 
evangelically missional. They have a job to do and seeing the depravity of society only 
stimulates them to more missional activity. One pastor says, “…there's a weight of 
responsibility that you feel to help society or to stop that downward flow or just reach any 
                                                 
34 This answer came in response to Question 6. However, because of the vast amount of material I have from 
these interviews, I had to focus on the answers to a select few questions. Therefore, I do not detail the answer 
to Question 6 in this chapter but feel this pastor’s answer is relevant and fitting for this portion of the chapter.   
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individual that you possibly can to bring them to a point of salvation from all that." The 
sense of mobilization expressed here and by most of the pastors was religious in nature 
rather than political. This is somewhat counterintuitive to my expectation that evangelicals, 
feeling socially marginalized, are mobilizing politically to express themselves and defend 
their values. Even though these pastors are feeling marginalized, the increased 
marginalization and concern for society instead makes them feel more spiritually 
missional. This standpoint, unsurprisingly, originates from a belief that the only thing that 
can change humanity and subsequently society is individual conversion; therefore, no 
amount of change in government would be able to cure the root problem.  
While all the pastors express a gloomy outlook on society, their faith has built into them 
an innate expectation of moral and societal decay. Therefore, they all give a similar 
response when discussing how they feel about the way society is trending. One pastor 
explains, "I'm not shocked and dismayed when I hear reports of somebody doing this or 
that. I don't expect anything to be different because we live in a fallen world and sin is a 
terrible thing, and sin devastates people's lives, and if people don't know Christ there's no 
telling what they'll do". Others echo a similar sentiment by saying that the Bible says to 
follow Christ without fear. The most recently quoted pastor later says, “My hope is not in 
this world, so I don't feel fear over all…now I'm not gonna lie to you and not say there's 
never an anxious moment. I'm still in my fallen body…so, of course, I have those moments 
where I'm tempted to be anxious and fearful, but I've come to a place where those 
movements are few and far between." Another pastor more confidently says, "… Jesus is 
on the throne, so I don't have any fear, I don't have any anxiety". 
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Given that pastors are admitting reasons for fear, what is going on in the evangelical 
community at large? Presumably, average evangelicals who are not pastors deal with these 
emotions and probably do not handle them the same way---which paints the picture of an 
unsettled, fearful, stereotyped, repressed, and marginalized group of individuals. 
Therefore, if these pastors’ answers are in any way representative of the general population, 
it supports my belief that evangelicals are indeed feeling socially marginalized. 
Part II: Mobilization? 
For the past thirty pages, I presented answers to questions intended to illustrate, albeit 
in a small sample, how the evangelical community is feeling. The answers paint a picture 
of social marginalization. The descriptions vary, but the overall feeling that emerged from 
all the interviewees was one of marginalization and trepidation about the future. The 
feelings of marginalization manifested in the following ways: an overall hesitance (in some 
cases a disdain) to ascribe to the evangelical label; a feeling of being stereotyped; feelings 
a martyrdom and prejudice because of their “old or outdated” values; a defensive need to 
explain or defend oneself; expectations of eventual persecution; personal experiences of 
prejudice; and finally, an overall gloomy outlook for the future of the society and 
Christianity in society. They also displayed a sense of repressed frustration with society 
and the way they feel their values have been stereotyped. They universally expressed 
concern and frustration with government, but usually in the broader context of society. In 
other words, they seemed to believe that the problems they see in government are just a 
reflection and result of corruption in society.  
The social constructionist approach to collective mobilization posits that emotion is an 
important variable needed for collective mobilization (Jasper 1998; 2011; Snow and 
 156  
Benford 1988; 1992; see also Goodwin, Polletta, and Jasper 2001). Mobilization is “the 
deliberate activation of social networks as a method of diffusing awareness about a social 
or political problem or of exerting social and/or political pressure for its resolution” 
(Theocharis 2015, 5). Based on this definition, and based on the theory that marginalization 
is an important pre-condition for mobilization, I expect to find these pastors mobilizing, at 
least to some extent, to combat the social problems they see in society. Further, I would 
expect to find their congregations mobilizing, as mobilization is the deliberate activation 
of social networks (Harris 1994). A pastor’s most immediate social network is his 
congregation, which sometimes reflects and participates in the political or social activities 
a clergyperson promotes (Crawford and Olson 2001; Djupe and Gilbert 2008). I also expect 
to see individual mobilization among clergy; specifically, individual public expressions 
against the social values they feel are unrepresentative of their faith. Many pastors said 
things like, "we must take a stand," implying some kind of individual or collective 
expression. 
There is a story to tell here. I interviewed a group of people who, for the most part, all 
shared a sense of social marginalization because of their beliefs and values. How strongly 
this marginalization was felt varied; however, even across states, regions, and races, social 
marginalization was present. I detail how they respond to this feeling in this next section. 
I attempt to answer the “mobilization” portion of my theory with the second half of my 
interview questions.  I devote this next section to answering this question: how, if at all, 
are the pastors responding individually and/or collectively with their congregation to these 
feelings of social marginalization. 
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A comment one pastor made about mobilization works to tie together many of the 
pastors’ attitudes about political activity, social activity, and feelings about Donald Trump. 
This pastor, who is from South Carolina, said of all these external actions and activities, 
“You know, those things amount to nothing more than rearranging the deck chairs on the 
Titanic." The message here is clear: American society and government are the Titanic, 
headed towards imminent destruction. Sure, being politically or socially active may help a 
few temporal things, but in the end, those activities amount to nothing more than putting 
Band-Aids on a lethal gash. They may slow the bleeding, but they cannot prevent the death. 
The pastors’ recurrent concerns were much more “eternal” than temporal; therefore, doing 
something individually to see people come to know Christ one at a time was far more 
beneficial and effective than any external political or social activity. 
Donald Trump 
How important is politics and government to these evangelical pastors? I asked a 
question about Donald Trump to get a clearer picture of the evangelical sentiment and 
thoughts about Donald Trump. This is relevant for a few reasons. First, 81% of white born-
again/evangelical Christians voted for Trump (Smith and Martinez 2016). This is a 
staggering percentage and one that scholars are still struggling to fully grasp and begin to 
understand. It is also important because the pastors' satisfaction with this administration 
sheds light on feelings of political efficacy. Also, this question helps shed light on how 
important these pastors think government and government officials are. Are these pastors' 
worldviews in any way shaped or affected by who is in political office? Finally, it is 
important because it can help us understand more clearly what the draw to Donald Trump 
was. As certain pieces of literature say, Donald Trump's "us" versus "them" rhetoric 
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appeared to strike a chord with white evangelicals, given the demographic changes 
happening within evangelicals themselves (Wong 2018a; 2018b). 
My interview question is: Has Donald Trump’s election or his presidency so far had 
any effect on your answers to my previous questions? The answers varied, but most of the 
pastors said no. Indeed, many of the pastors seemed almost eerily aloof toward the specifics 
of American electoral politics. The attitudes towards Donald Trump and other political 
officeholders was one of willingness to pray for whoever is in office, but disengagement 
from – almost disinterest in – who actually is in office.  
One pastor says, "I don't think anything is going to change our society but the gospel 
of Jesus Christ, so long as we can preach that, I could care less who is in power and that is 
about it." Another pastor, the African American from South Carolina, said, “whether you 
like the guy or not, whether he believes what you believe or not, our response should be 
the same, we should just pray for them…". Another pastor said, "I vote and certainly have 
a desire that a certain kind of person be elected, but if they aren't in any given election I 
don't lose sleep… if Hillary Clinton had won the election, I would have answered those 
questions the same way". Most of the other pastors answered in a similar fashion, with a 
similar reasoning. Candidates, elected officials, and Supreme Court Justices are far less 
important than eternal issues.  
Earlier in the interview, the African American pastor from South Carolina talked about 
how important it is for him and for all Christians to always wave their Christian banner 
higher than all other banners. He says everyone has multiple banners; he personally has 
banners for basketball, for being Black, for being a Democrat, and for being a believer in 
Christ. Without knowing it, he is listing elements of his social identities. He stresses that 
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no single component of identity, or in his words, no banner, should ever be waved higher 
than the banner of Christ. He expressed frustration with believers he has seen who wave 
their political or racial banners higher than that of Christ. He says:  
...You know there's nothing wrong with being a Democrat or Republican. It doesn't 
matter whether you like Obama or you like Trump, that’s fine, but like, none of that 
is more important than your relationship with Christ and that you represent more 
avidly that than you represent anything else. I've even caught slack about not 
waving my Black banner high enough but I'm not gonna alienate other people ... 
the only banner that I have that I want you to look at and be jealous because you 
may not believe what I believe is that of Christ, and if you look at my Black banner 
and you're not Black you can't be Black. I’ve just condemned you for no reason or 
made you feel condemned for no reason, but if you look at my Christian banner and 
you feel Godly sorrow and think, man, I don't know the Lord, and I see how he 
does, and I want to know the Lord, then that's great, then let's talk about it in love 
and I can introduce you to Him! To wave anything higher than that, I’m not gonna 
do that.  
 
These pastors identify with their evangelical Christianity decidedly and completely. It is 
not just a way of life or a list of rules or principles to follow; it is who they are. This 
hearkens back to my claim that an attack on evangelical Christian values is perceived by 
evangelicals as an attack on them personally because of how strongly they identify with 
their religious identity. This Black pastor knows and understands the significance of his 
race and even admits that he has been accused of not prioritizing his race above other 
banners yet his race is not what he claims is most important for him to promote about 
himself. His answer illustrates just how unconcerned some of these pastors really are with 
politics, especially since racial identity is so politically charged in American culture. They 
say they acquiesce to whoever is in office because eternally, politics is not the answer to 
the problems they perceive in society. All that truly matters is that individuals meet Christ.  
A few pastors seemed to find a silver lining in the Trump presidency. One pastor says:  
[My] hope would be just to stay off the downward motion of these moral issues...be 
it deterioration of the original traditional definition of the family … a stronger voice 
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in the White House against (abortion)… just there would be more of a traditionally 
wholesome environment along the lines of morality... you see America going down 
the tubes, slouching towards Sodom...you then would see a conservative president 
who would veto certain legislation that might tolerate more, you just see that as 
more hopeful than someone in the White house who purposefully wants everything 
to go in a downward... a more liberal direction... so I think that's the hope... America 
could remain as a good wholesome family culture than what seems to be trending 
at this point. 
 
Some religion and politics scholars (Hunter 1992; Jelen 1993a; 1993b; Smith et al. 1998; 
Wilcox and Robinson 2010) would expect to hear an answer more along these lines from 
a traditionally religious white evangelical. However, this pastor still did not put much stock 
in Donald Trump’s victory. Perhaps it provides a reprieve of sorts from political liberalism, 
but it is still temporal. The result of the 2016 presidential election is still a chair on the deck 
of the Titanic. This same pastor said,  
Yes, it has. I think that one of the biggest things that he actually said on the 
campaign trail…he said that…evangelical Christians are the most persecuted group 
of people in the United States right now. That tells me that he has seen that based 
on what is taking place and what is going on.  
 
This pastor, like many evangelical Trump supporters, appreciated being recognized having 
someone in power who he sees as being on his side. He went on to say he is not sure where 
Trump stands spiritually but perhaps that does not matter because society, in his view, has 
become blatantly anti-Christian that even non-Christians notice. He proceeded to discuss 
some of the specific policy priorities he appreciates from the Trump administration as well 
as his sense that Trump has kept his word and is trying to make good on enacting his 
campaign promises. He criticized Trump for the way he says things and explains that he 
wishes Trump would express himself differently. However, he still appreciates what he 
says even if he has a problem with how he says it.  
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 Unsurprisingly, one of the African American pastors, the one who does not identify as 
evangelical, was one of the few to say Trump’s election and presidency have affected his 
answers to my previous questions in a negative way. He said,  
Yes, it has. His mannerisms, misunderstanding that as a leader you have the power 
to influence…the things that he says and does, whether he’s aware of it or not, 
influences others to walk in light or to walk in darkness…darkness is racism, 
sexism, any injustice…it’s denial of things that are not as they really are. 
 
After this comment, he said little more about Trump or his presidency; however, he did 
talk more about the “darkness” he used in reference to Trump’s presidency and what it 
means to him. It is interesting that the two African American pastors who did identify as 
evangelical said the Trump election had no or little influence on their previous answers, 
while the one African American pastor who did not identify as an evangelical did say the 
Trump election affected his answers. The African American pastor from Rochester said,  
No, he's just another president. No, not at all. No, he hasn't had any effect on any 
of those answers. If our worldview is shaped by the world, then every change that 
comes about in the world, our views change, but if our views are shaped by 
scripture…the way I look at the world doesn't change. Every leader is actually put 
in place by God for His own purpose. God put them in place for His own purpose. 
I just bow to His sovereignty. Whoever's in charge I obey the governing authority. 
I don't bad mouth them. I pray for them because that's what the Bible says we're 
supposed to do. So, my view doesn't change because the Bible doesn't change. If 
my worldview came from CNN or Fox News, then my view would be constantly 
changing. 
 
The African American pastor from South Carolina said he thinks the political and social 
division in the U.S. have gotten worse since Trump’s election. He believes some of the 
things Trump has said have instigated more division. However, this pastor moderated his 
response with the following statement: "…so I would say it has affected some of these 
things that we've talked about today, but those things were already happening." He seems 
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to be saying Trump’s presidency has not helped anything and in some cases, has 
exacerbated the problems and issues that were already there.  
 Answers to the Trump question were more varied than many of the other answers 
though most pastors seemed unaffected by the Trump presidency. My sample is admittedly 
small and may not be representative of the evangelical population at large. Further, since I 
only interviewed clergy, it is possible that evangelicals in the pews think and feel 
differently about Donald Trump.  
Marginalization to Mobilization? 
 Thus far, we have seen that many of the evangelical pastors demonstrated indifference 
to the Trump election, and we know they possess a sense of social marginalization; 
however, what I have yet to show is their response to this perceived social marginalization. 
Are they responding with action, and if so in what ways? Have they changed their political 
tactics at all over the past few years because of this perceived social marginalization? Are 
they mobilizing in any way? 
 The short answer to all of these questions is no. They are not responding socially or 
politically nor have they changed their political tactics in recent years (primarily because 
most of them admittedly have no political tactics). Save for one evangelical pastor, the 
North Carolina Southern Baptist pastor, the only two pastors who indicated they were 
politically active were the two pastors who did not identify as evangelical.  
A few quotations summarize this narrative about mobilization. One pastor says, “We 
express ourselves politically only through voting and as a congregation, you know, praying 
and living our lives in light of the truth that we believe…”. Another says, “I would say 
probably we are as engaged in the quiet side of society as best we can… some people go 
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to town board meetings or school board meetings and voice their opinion…”. In the words 
of another, “We don’t. We don’t. We’re very, very intentional not to ever bring that into 
the picture”. With the metaphor of the chairs on the Titanic still in place, another analogy 
from the African American pastor from South Carolina is instructive. He says, 
The Bible talks about…the fiery darts of the enemy…in those days, …the thought 
was that you had the arrow…you shoot it, and there's this little point that's on fire, 
and the thought was that this little small point that is on fire would hit the target and 
it would only hit a very small space on the target but …the idea was to catch the 
whole thing on fire through hitting a point... the goal wasn't to catch that point on 
fire it's to catch the whole thing on fire...and so we believe as far as acting politically 
and those things... what we're doing in regards to promoting Christ and drawing 
people to God and encouraging community… getting people to have a responsible 
relationship with God …we believe if we are accurate and are able to, through the 
Holy Spirit, hit that, well, then, the change that that would incite would, like a fire, 
spread to politics... does that make sense? …So we want to, it's not that we don’t 
care about politics, but it's our method, we're not trying to hit politics, you 
know?...and so we just have a different method as far as causing the change.  
 
For him, as with many other pastors, politics is not the priority. Changing politics is not a 
bad thing. Though many of pastors would like to see government operate in a certain way, 
it is only temporal. The eternal things are what matter. So, if the church can create change 
in individual lives, this change eventually will spread and affect things across sectors, 
including politics and government. Another African American pastor says, “Politically I 
mean we vote. We don't make any tremendous effort to be political, you know, we're called 
to be Biblical." Earlier in the conversation, he spoke about why he and his congregation 
are not concerned about political or social involvement. Much of what he says is just a 
different version of the fiery darts analogy. His quote is key to understanding the 
perspective presented by these pastors. It is an excellent proxy for how many of the pastors 
regard political and, to an extent, social involvement. He says,  
The scripture is very clear that the gospel is offensive to man...and we have to 
accept that. …The message we bring is offensive because the message we bring 
 164  
tells man of his complete inability to save himself, it tells him of his desperate self, 
it tells him that there's nothing he can do in himself to repair that condition and that 
his only hope is in the mercy and grace of God to save him through the sacrifice of 
another and that's an offensive message to the pride of man. But if the church tries 
to mask the message with social activism or getting involved too much in 
political things and those types of things, then we lose the one thing that the world 
truly needs…no one else has the gospel. Only the church has the gospel...there are 
tons of agencies that can provide food for people...clothing...shelter…but nobody 
else can do what the church can do; the church can bring the gospel of Jesus Christ 
to the world which is the only remedy for man's condition. 
 
 This is what the pastors believe sets them apart. Spreading the Gospel is their primary 
mission. Though political and social change might be nice, it simply amounts to 
rearranging chairs on the deck of the Titanic. Further, by preaching the Gospel and reaching 
people individually, it is plausible that these individual changes may indeed spread.  
Social and Political Mobilization 
With this “not of this world” point of departure worldview as a backdrop, let us now 
consider, “How, if at all, do you and your congregation express yourselves politically and 
socially?” One pastor says, “…Just being the, um I guess you could use the word ‘best’ 
Christian you can be...to be the nicest, kindest, most forgiving grace-filled person out in 
the community doing ministry and to have an impact on the world primarily that way". 
Another says, "So politically none, I have no interest in that. Again, we're a young church; 
we want Rochester to be different because we're here. So socially, not marching in a rally 
but socially filling needs that need to be met, we want to do that, so that's how we're gonna 
make a difference in that sense.” 
A pastor from South Carolina says, “Well, again, by voting…by encouraging one 
another...we do discuss political things...bolster and encourage one another, anyway that 
could trickle down to other family members, friends…”. He proceeds to say that one of the 
ways his church is politically and socially involved is through social media. Specifically, 
 165  
he says, “Social media, that comes to mind, expressing ideas on social media... um, just 
things like that, sharing about who you are with anybody you can by whatever means...”. 
While only he and one other pastor mentioned social media before I later asked about 
Twitter, this form of expression is the exact form I have predicted evangelicals would use. 
It is a highly individualistic form of expression and one that scholars (Theocharis 2015) 
have begun to consider a viable form of mobilization. 
As I explain the answers to my interview questions about Twitter and boycotting, it 
will become clear that neither avenue is something the pastors commonly use. However, a 
few of them do mention that their congregations use social media and that they sometimes 
must confront congregants for engaging in visceral political conversations on social media. 
While pastors and religious leaders may not be highly active on Twitter (or at least active 
around political topics) their congregants, not being held to the same standards, are more 
willing to engage on Twitter.  
The pastors answered the mobilization questions by focusing primarily on the role of 
the individual. Ergo, these pastors were not interested in getting the church involved in 
anything collectively as a congregation but were fine with individual members choosing to 
be as active or inactive socially and politically as they chose to be. These answers are not 
surprising given other scholars' similar findings (Emerson and Smith 2000; Jelen 1993a; 
Smith et al. 1998).   
The pastors who did not identify as evangelical had similar responses. They were 
neither highly active themselves, nor did they promote collective action. The pastor of the 
Moravian church said, "Well we are a voting place. Right here where we're sitting now, so 
we support the political process…is to be supportive of the process but not come to the 
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point where we say we're going to shoot you if you are of a different political persuasion.” 
The African American pastor who also did not identify with evangelicalism said, “we bring 
people in from all spectrums...you choose…go by what you feel. We don’t let them get in 
the pulpit…we feel that if you let someone who has a certain affiliation get in the pulpit 
what you’re saying is this is what I endorse…”. These two pastors demonstrate a similar 
refrain. They utilized traditional political participation as their means of mobilization, and 
feel that politics and the church should be kept separate.  
One evangelical, the North Carolina Southern Baptist pastor, did say he was mobilizing 
in response to his sense of social marginalization. He also organizes congregational 
mobilization. Most of the mobilization he is involved in is traditional, like voting for a bill 
or a member of Congress as opposed to boycotting or Twitter venting, however. He said: 
“I am not the guy who necessarily wants to preach a political agenda from the pulpit 
because that’s where the gospel is to be preached.” However, he proceeded to say that he 
led his congregation to support and promote North Carolina’s well-known Amendment 
One, which defined marriage as being between one man and one woman.  He said, "as a 
pastor, I did lead us getting behind approval of Amendment One. We put signs out. We 
went on record as saying we are supportive of Amendment One." He was the most 
politically active pastor I interviewed. He did, however, stress the importance of not 
treating the pulpit as a place for politicking but rather a place for preaching the Gospel and 
allowing the Holy Spirit to direct how the spiritual turns into the political. His answer was 
an aberration from the other evangelical answers and fell more in line with how the two 
mainline Protestant (non-evangelicals) responded. His activism is the only real aberration 
from the individuality espoused by the rest of the pastors.  
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Earlier in the interview, during his answer to the question “how does this [direction he 
sees society and politics going] make you feel?" the North Carolina Southern Baptist pastor 
explained that he was less concerned about causing actual change as much as simply 
expressing his opinion and the opinions of the religious community to his local town 
council. He gave this example after explaining that he believes no real change in society 
can come until a majority speak up, but that does not stop him from still trying to 
individually mobilize even if it does not always make a difference. He said: 
I’m just gonna give you an example. In this particular community, there was a vote 
here recently about whether or not to allow businesses to serve liquor two hours 
earlier, and essentially, I wrote, … to not make that change, and I know people are 
going to do what they’re going to do…but I said you know what, it’s a good tip of 
the hat to say, ‘you know we still respect Christianity and we still respect religion 
in our community not to make that change.' And I said we’re only talking about a 
two-hour difference, but to take a stand and say that we’re gonna at least 
acknowledge our community of religion…just give us the honor of leaving it like 
it is to say that this is something that is still important. And once again it fell on 
deaf ears, but nonetheless, I still did what I felt like I had to do…I also felt like I 
would be doing a discredit and a disservice to my God to not at least express my 
opinion in regard to that. …It didn't turn me against any of the town council, and 
we still have a great relationship to this day, and my thing was I simply expressed 
my opinion based on my beliefs on that regard.   
 
This observation perfectly exemplifies the social marginalization I expected to observe 
among evangelical pastors: the desire for society to still “respect” and give “honor” to 
religious values and traditions. In his own words, this pastor wants government to at least 
give a “tip of the hat” to Christianity. Many evangelicals have felt betrayed by social 
change since at least the 1960s (Wilcox and Robinson 2010). The language he uses here 
originates from a feeling that society and government no longer respects or values his 
religion. Further, the importance of mere expression is confirmed in this example. All this 
pastor hoped to do was, at the very least, express his opinion, even if he knew it was not 
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popularly accepted anymore. Further, his expression was less about any particular issue as 
it was about the respect and honor of Christianity he felt was missing.  
Quite a few of the pastors espoused the “vote your conscience” message. They were 
not in favor of collective congregational politicking even though they were all in favor of 
being good citizens. They were happy to vote, write members of Congress if or when 
necessary, or hand out political pamphlets; however, they would not want any of these 
activities to be turned into a congregational activity. They would rarely, if ever, even 
suggest that the congregation should all vote for a particular candidate (of course, doing so 
could cost their church its tax-exempt status) or participate in a church protest. One pastor 
said, “what I tell them to do is vote according to their conscience and their world view…and 
we have also created the climate here, do not judge somebody else because they have 
concluded that they need to vote a certain way based on certain issues." 
Many of the pastors supported and promoted social activity as a congregation. Social 
outreach, in the form of benevolence to people who struggle, is a part of the church’s calling 
even if it only temporal. Evangelicals believe God calls the church to meet temporal needs 
as a means of spreading the Gospel. 
Political Tactics 
The next question I asked was “How have you changed your political tactics over the 
past few years?” I asked this question to see whether the pastors might be increasing or 
changing their political tactics because of my theory of social marginalization. As I explain 
in my theory, extra-institutional forms of political participation can tell us a whole lot about 
if and how evangelicals are feeling aggrieved. However, most answers went something like 
this: “Well I don’t really have any tactics…so no. I’ve gone from nothing to nothing”. 
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Many of the pastors had no tactics, or if they did, they had gotten less active in their tactics. 
One pastor says that he has not changed his tactics and that he has felt “this” way for a 
long time. I asked him to clarify what he meant by this, and he said, “…that the answer, 
the solution is not politically” changing things. Again, we see the focus on spiritual 
conversion at the individual level as the pastors’ top priority.  
The African American pastor from Rochester chuckled and said, "I don't have any 
political tactics. Again, for me, it's business as usual. God raises up one, and he sets down 
another." He then mentioned Nero and the persecution Nero wrought on Christians in the 
Roman Empire during the Apostle Paul’s time of ministry. Yet, Paul still encouraged 
Christians to submit, honor and pray for those in authority. Further, this pastor argues that 
Paul’s views were not shaped by who was in power but by the throne of God, so "it's 
important for me to maintain that as well."   
There was one evangelical pastor from South Carolina who expressed excitement about 
politics, especially with growth of political activities at the state and local level. He was 
not hopeful about the federal government but was excited about political opportunities 
locally. In context, he had changed his tactics. He had gone from being cynical about 
politics to perceiving strategic openings at the local level. Here he clarifies that his church 
does not engage in politics congregationally, but he personally has developed enthusiasm 
recently because of some matters he was privy to at the local political level. He says, "I see 
things like that [a member of his church running for local government office] I get 
excited… in that sense, I've become more involved in the process … again we don't have 
signs…". He explains he has increased his political involvement at the local level, but he 
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clarifies that is not involved in alternative forms of political expression such as boycotting 
or Twitter venting. 
The African American pastor from South Carolina said that he has changed his tactics 
since becoming a pastor. He used another analogy to describe this circumstance. He says, 
“There’s a certain way that you drive when you’re by yourself…You drive differently 
when there’s people behind you…much more deliberate, much more methodical”. He said 
that his activity has neither increased nor changed, but that he puts a lot more thought into 
what he does say politically and how he votes because he now has a congregation to 
shepherd and lead.  
Another pastor from South Carolina said that he has not changed nor has his 
congregation; instead, where he sees change is in the Democratic Party. He says,  
The Democratic party has changed. At one time, they were a good party especially 
down South here...they really were for the blue collar they were for the 
worker...They wanted to look out for the little guy…but now the national Democrat 
party...the past 30 years maybe has been on decline because they have been 
hijacked by special interest groups that are the elite of our society…any party that 
promotes abortion on demand and promotes homosexual marriage, I can't stand 
behind that, it's not good for society. 
 
I asked this pastor whether he has changed his political tactics recently and he explained 
how the Democratic Party has changed their tactics. This tells me little about his tactics, 
but it does give me an idea of his political opinions and indicates clearly where he stands 
in the context of polarized American politics. 
Another, the pastor of a Pentecostal church, said something I found particularly 
noteworthy. He said that neither he nor his congregation have not made any changes other 
than becoming more involved in social media. He says, “I can’t say I’ve changed unless it 
would be just the new use of social media…I think that's another outlet or it’s another 
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means of expressing your view or sharing ideas, many of which could be political...I think 
that might help get beyond your little sphere”. As I suggest above, he was the only pastor 
to mention social media as a form of activism. This fits my theoretical expectation that 
social media provides an ideal avenue for individual expression. It is an avenue that 
previously did not exist, but now provides an outlet for evangelicals to mobilize without 
having to physically “rally” or “protest” collectively.  
The African American pastor in North Carolina who did not identify as evangelical was 
very politically engaged. He described his time politically campaigning for President 
Obama,  
I get involved…I definitely get involved. I go to voter registration handouts…I did 
it years ago when a certain individual was running for office… he was Republican. 
I recently did it with President Obama…it was a voter’s registration volunteering 
center, where people came and you…I thought he was gonna bring some change…I 
felt that he was competent and capable. I felt that it was time for American possibly 
to have someone of color in that position…it was fun. Everybody was excited, and 
it was fun…there was no Black no white…it was a sense of the human race having 
one objective...It’s [his political tactics] changed a little bit. It’s not like it was… 
you know, with the family.  
 
He mobilized during the Obama campaign, as well as for other campaigns in the past. This 
is noteworthy because the pastors who identified as evangelical did not report being active 
at all, other than voting.  
Boycotting 
After hearing broadly how each pastor acts politically and socially, I asked each pastor 
specifically what they think about using boycotting and Twitter as a means of social or 
political expression. The questions were worded as such: “Do you see boycotting (Twitter) 
as an appropriate outlet for establishing political positions and/or expressing your feelings 
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about today’s society?” In sum, ten pastors said yes, boycotting can be useful, while three 
said it cannot. Nine pastors said yes to the use of Twitter while four said no.  
 
Figure 4.1 Is Boycotting or Twitter an Appropriate Form of Expression? 
Each pastor offered different reasons for their answers. Most of them were not personally 
engaged in either activity but spoke more generally about whether these activities were 
useful ways to express frustrations with the current social or political environment.  
The North Carolina Southern Baptist pastor said that boycotting can be useful 
sometimes and in specific circumstances. He stressed the importance of being consistent 
with oneself choosing to boycott. He gave an example, “I’m not a proponent of drinking, I 
think that hurts your testimony but yet I still go to the grocery store and buy groceries, so 
does that mean that if I buy a roast up at Lowes grocery store that I am supporting their 
cause of selling alcohol?” He then said, “I’ve never actually stood up [in the pulpit] and 
said we should boycott this.” He seemed fine with the idea of someone choosing on their 
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own to boycott but, he explains, they must be careful that they are consistent and not 
hypocritical in their actions. He explains that many companies support or sell things that 
someone may not appreciate or be against; the question then is, are they going to boycott 
them all? He says that people must be careful in what they choose to make an issue and 
boycott. He says, “You have to take each instance along the way and determine whether 
that cause is really going to bring about an incredible amount of change to start with and I 
think that if hypocrisy comes into play, then it's defeated…society will see right through 
this." He ends by establishing that he has never done anything collectively in terms of 
boycotting; however, he feels that if he sees a situation is bad enough or blatant enough, 
he might consider it.  
A North Carolina pastor gives a different explanation for individual boycotts versus 
collective boycotts.35 He believes that boycotting is appropriate if it is used at the individual 
level. He proceeds to explain a passage in the Bible from Romans 14. He explains how 
Romans 14 defines the conscience, as well as the importance of individuals not violating 
their personal conscience. He says,  
…if you, before God, believe that it is offensive to you to use a certain cell phone 
company because that cell phone company uses some of their money to support 
Planned Parenthood then if that violates your conscience then I think you should 
not violate your conscience. 
 
If an individual feels their conscience is violated by patronizing a company with values 
they dislike, then he believes avoiding that company is essential. However, he did not seem 
to interpret this question with a political slant. If someone wants to boycott because they 
cannot in good conscience spend money at some company, then so be it; however, this has 
                                                 
35 Note here that I never mentioned or said anything about individual versus corporate actions. The pastors 
make this distinction themselves.  
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nothing to do with making a political statement or expressing oneself politically. He later 
says of collective boycotting,  
Would we as a church ever do some sort of corporate public…encourage our people 
to boycott some sort of company? I'm not going to say never...I won't say never. 
We might get backed into a corner, the way our culture is going, we might get 
backed into a corner where it is so clear and so obvious, ‘listen guys we have got 
to altogether make a stand here.' I think we would. I don't know of one …. A 
corporate boycott maybe? Kinda where we are politically, the way that the world is 
going I'm not gonna say that it would never come to a point that we believe as 
pastors should not get up and say something publicly. 
 
This specific pastor was perhaps one of the most individually oriented, least politically 
concerned, most spiritually-minded of the pastors I interviewed. He could not care less who 
holds political office and feels that all social and political activities are only important or 
relevant in the temporal context.  
Earlier in the interviews when we were talking about what his church does politically 
and socially, he repeatedly expressed the importance of not taking collective action and 
making sure instead that the church maintains respect for people who share or hold 
different political positions or opinions. At one point he said, “…what we don’t do as a 
church is take corporate stands or corporate actions like protests or things like that…we do 
not see that as the role of the church to do…we don’t get involved as a church in trying to 
lobby government.” He also invoked the importance of respecting individual’s conscience 
and reason for voting the way they do. 
However, in response to my question about boycotting, he admits there may come a 
time when he would feel the need to do something corporately as a church to stand against 
something blatant, something with which they so blatantly disagree that it must be publicly 
addressed. Again, take note that he is still not evoking a political stance but rather a spiritual 
and almost collective conscience. He uses more than once the phrase “the way our culture 
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is going” as the reason that he feels a collective response may eventually be evoked. This 
idea of an eroding culture alludes to the idea that, while actions like boycotting are only 
temporal and not really the focus of many evangelical congregations, expressive 
mobilization such as boycotting and Twitter venting may one day be seen as necessary. 
This means he believes society is getting so depraved that there may come a point when 
even he would feel the need to take a public stand against it. This is key to my theory. Can 
these spiritually minded evangelical pastors be pushed far enough that they eventually snap 
into action, or were they ones that did snap into action during the 1980s and 1990s with the 
emergence of the Religious Right? Portions of the evangelical population have become 
politically active in response to certain events in society such as prohibition, abortion, and 
prayer in schools; however, rarely does the literature speak to the percentage of the 
evangelical base that was activated. Are these pastors part of the population that was 
mobilized or are they still maintaining a sense of “separation” from society and politics?  
If this pastor says, he may be willing to make a collective congregational stance on a 
social or political matter, after demonstrating high levels of perceived marginalization, 
what then might this mean for the average evangelical churchgoer? Presumably, it would 
take more to push a pastor of his mindset to mobilize than it would to push an average 
evangelical churchgoer into public action. Therefore, if an average evangelical churchgoer 
feels the social marginalization these pastors display, the churchgoer is might be more 
likely to have already been pushed to their limit (see Djupe and Gilbert 2002, 2003 and 
2008 for more on the relationship between clergy and parishioners).  
One of the Rochester pastors says that my boycotting question cannot be answered with 
either a yes or a no. He then gives personal examples of boycotting companies as a younger 
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man. He boycotted because of clear racism and prejudice demonstrated by the companies. 
However, he said he would never organize a boycott of Target (as some evangelicals have 
done as a result of the transgender bathroom policy). He says of that type of boycott,  
Ok, you can do that if you want, that, to me, is an irrelevant way of dealing with 
that particular issue. But that doesn’t mean that boycotting of itself is the wrong 
thing to do … so the answer? I think under certain circumstances that [boycotting] 
would be appropriate. Are there places I don’t shop or won’t invest because of their 
policies? Sure, but it’s a boycott of one. 
 
Here he demonstrates a striking contradiction. Earlier in the conversation he talks of 
boycotting companies that were clearly racist and seems to argue that this type of 
boycotting is useful and the kind he would support. However, he would not organize a 
corporate boycott against Target because he feels it would be an irrelevant means of dealing 
with the issue. He ends by saying that boycotting is fine, individually, but it cannot do a 
whole lot when it is a boycott of one. This is curious. On one hand, he says that his personal 
boycotts at a young age were relevant to the issue, but does not see the relevance of 
organizing a collective boycott. Yet, he ends by criticizing individual boycotting because 
it is not effective. I interpret this progression of thought as his way of saying the same thing 
the pastor above said: individuals can boycott because of personal conviction, but it really 
has little ability to influence or promote change. 
The African American pastor from Rochester said boycotting was not a useful tactic. 
He says, “I am certain as a Christian that I have far more influence on my knees than I do 
in boycotting."  At first, he did not seem to be strongly against boycotting but rather saw it 
as something trivial in the larger scheme of things. However, the more he talked about it, 
the more he seemed to dislike it. He said, 
You know that I don't know that I would want to...there are people that work there 
and those people are counting on a paycheck at the end of the week to feed their 
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families...if I'm hurting that company at some point I'm gonna be hurting those 
people because that company's gonna start laying people off...people are gonna start 
losing their jobs...I'm not really interested in hurting people...so I'd rather pray and 
ask God to affect those changes. 
 
He believes that if all he is trying to do is make a political point or social statement by 
boycotting a business, his actions could affect the people who work there and who have 
nothing to do with the political or social stances the company has taken. Therefore, in his 
mind, he would rather leave these changes to God and not get involved. His reasoning has 
little to do with politics or mobilization or marginalization. His convictions and concern 
for people’s wellbeing simply are more important to him than any political or social 
statement. He did not seem to think about some of the angles other pastors had mentioned 
such as violating one’s conscience by buying from a company due to questionable moral 
stances. His mind was focused on the individual people around him whom his actions 
would affect, and that was all that really seemed to matter to him. 
 Further, this Rochester African American pastor did not seem to think much about or 
even consider the role that boycotting played for African Americans during the Civil Rights 
movement. The African American pastors in South and North Carolina showed a clear 
appreciation for the use of boycotts. Perhaps then, this lack of acknowledgment is simply 
due to the fact that he lives in the North. Or perhaps his worldview is so shaped and molded 
by his faith that he only sees two types of people in the world (as he said during our 
conversation), those going down the broad path to destruction and those on the narrow path 
to eternal life.  
This particular Black pastor did not really conform to the generally accepted 
understanding of what a Black Protestant should be like. Unsurprisingly, he possessed a 
strong understanding of the tenets of evangelicalism, but surprisingly he demonstrated 
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feelings of marginalization similar to what the white evangelicals demonstrated. On his 
survey, this pastor identified himself as Republican. Research would stipulate that this 
pastor is simply an aberration.  
Harris (1994) and Fowler et al. (2013) admit that there was a sizable portion of Black 
pastors during the Civil Rights Era who did not want to involve themselves in political or 
social activism. In fact, there were some pastors, such as Rev. Joseph H. Jackson, who 
opposed the social action of the Civil Rights Era (Fowler et al. 2013). In fact, Day (2012), 
explains that the majority of Black churches did not support the social and political 
involvement of the church during the Civil Rights Era. These churches opposed such action 
for both theological and social reasons. Day points out that theological beliefs of churches 
such as the Church of God in Christ “interpreted justice issues as issues that would 
ultimately be resolved by God in the coming eschaton” (2012, 8). Hence, there has been 
similar theological motivations for political indifference between some white and Black 
evangelical churches. This is not to say that the Black churches who stayed out of the social 
and political realm because of social, political, institutional threat are similar to white 
churches. Rather, it is simply important to note that where the theologies between the two 
churches lined up, their political and social actions did as well. 
Which leads to the question. Are there African American pastors who, like this pastor 
from Rochester, still ascribe to the theological convictions of the latent Black churches 
during the Civil Rights Era? If so, how can we uncover who these pastors and members 
are? Thus far, the literature has predominately accepted the notion that Black Protestants 
and white evangelicals should be categorized in two separate groups, and yet I contend that 
there may be a small, yet important, overlap in the middle somewhere. I cannot, of course, 
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draw any conclusions from the data provided in this dissertation that could speak to or 
answer this question but I am able to bring light to a new area of research. 
In short, I found that the two African American pastors that demonstrated the closest 
theological convictions to the white pastors also shared many of their political and social 
convictions as well. Are there theological beliefs that transcend the historical and racial 
components that have shaped religion for both Blacks and whites? In other words, are 
issues of social justice, that seem to be missing from the list of concerns for most white 
evangelical pastors, also affected by differing theological beliefs and not just racial 
experience? If so, does this mean that Black Protestants who happen to share these 
theological beliefs are somehow less concerned about social justice as well, despite their 
racial experience? Or are white evangelicals simply harboring racial prejudice, which 
keeps them from supporting policies that Blacks tend to support?  
Previous research has convincingly shown that race and religion cannot be 
distinguished from each other (Emerson and Smith 2000; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990). If 
this were unequivocally true, I should have found evangelical Black pastors who 
demonstrated a very different understanding of the church’s political and social 
involvement, and strong sense of community within their own church and their own race. 
Instead, I found the opposite of most of these expectations. The one African American 
pastor who did not identify as evangelical, fulfilled my predicted answers and yet his 
beliefs aligned more clearly with the beliefs of the one mainstream Protestant in my 
interviews. Hence, the differences appeared to stem less from race and more from the 
fundamentals of faith. These interviews show that evangelical African American pastors 
and white pastors shared many similar concerns, specifically that of individual conversion 
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and personal outreach. Future research is required to better understand all the nuances that 
exist in the evangelical population, specifically regarding race. Though some work has 
been done on evangelicals and race, I believe this area of research nonetheless merits more 
attention and care.  
Twitter 
Social media activity has evolved into a new form of political expression. Scholars now 
agree that social media activism is indeed political activity (Oser, Hooghe, and Marien 
2013; Feezell 2016; McCosker 2015; Theocharis 2015; Sormanen and Dutton 2015). If an 
individual chooses to go online and express themselves—their feelings and thoughts about 
a political/social issue in a public forum—they establish themselves as uniquely different 
from someone who does not put the same time and effort into expressing those feelings or 
thoughts publicly. Social media activity is a form of mobilization (Theocharis 2015) and 
therefore should be treated as such. I choose Twitter to analyze evangelical political 
expression because it is both a form of political mobilization and a highly individualistic 
activity. Given evangelicals’ individualistic tendencies (Emerson and Smith 2000), Twitter 
is an ideal form for political expression.  
 Of the thirteen pastors interviewed, four felt Twitter was not an appropriate means for 
expressing one’s thoughts and feelings about society and politics. The other nine offered 
various reasons for feeling Twitter was appropriate. Only the African American pastor in 
North Carolina who did not identify as evangelical, explicitly said he had a personal Twitter 
account.  
In response to the question about Twitter, one pastor said, "Sure yeah…I think it's a 
great way to make your thoughts known… Twitter's not really meant for conversations it's 
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meant for statements. I think as a pastor I wouldn't have a problem posting something 
politically, but I can't remember the last time I have, just because I just want to stay out of 
the mess.” The “mess” he references, is the stereotyping that often occurs when making a 
simple statement online. He expresses his frustration with the division and polarization he 
personally experiences. It is for this reason he does not engage in politicking on Twitter.  
If I say “Wow, look, Trump did something I really like!” … all the sudden, where’s 
your MAGA hat? If I say "Man, Trump, you're a bonehead cuz you did this!"…all 
the sudden I'm a flaming liberal. You just can't even have opinions. It's frustrating. 
It's an appropriate way to express things; I just wish I was more witty and snarky 
so I could have better opinions.  
 
This pastor demonstrated a longing or desire to be able to express things via Twitter. 
However, because of the vitriol, he perceives in society and the stereotypes he expects, he 
avoids the situation altogether. 
The African American pastor who did not identify as evangelical said, “Oh yeah. It’s 
part of the culture we live in today. I believe if Jesus was living today, and Peter and Paul, 
they’d be on Twitter. I’m on Twitter…I’m on Facebook”. The African American pastor 
from South Carolina felt Twitter was fine to use but had never used it himself. He says, “I 
mean, social media gives you a voice, a public voice, and so anytime you have a 
public voice it can be used for good, but a lot of bad can come from it too." Another pastor 
agrees with this same sentiment. He does not use Twitter himself but feels it can be used 
for good or for bad. He says, 
Twitter is a tremendous social network tool to send out a message…You have 
multiple tens of millions of people on that list. Yeah, you can influence a lot of 
things...Again, a car is good. But if you're gonna run over people, then that's no way 
to use a car...Twitter is the same way...it's a good tool… 
 
Many of the pastors who said Twitter can be a useful way to express thoughts politically 
and socially expressed similar sentiments to those presented above. They did not have 
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personal Twitter accounts but felt that because of the large number of people who could be 
reached, it could be a useful tool. However, it could also be a dangerous and harmful tool. 
One pastor, the pastor who had already mentioned using social media a few times during 
our conversation, seemed to appreciate Twitter more than most of the other pastors. Again, 
he did not personally have an account, but he said, "I think it could be a format for sharing 
to the world with whatever is on your mind, political, social…I think it's great; it does give 
people a means of expression." 
 The pastors who were not keen on the use of Twitter shared similar reasons for not 
appreciating it. They feel Twitter has taken away personal face-to-face interactions. One 
pastor says, "No, no I do not. No, I don't…Communication is a challenge at best. So, the 
further we get away from face to face conversations the more likelihood for 
misunderstanding and misinterpretation…I don't think it's appropriate at all." Another 
pastor says he does not find Twitter an effective means of expression for him personally, 
but would not tell others not to use it. He reasons, “I don’t think it’s effective. I think that 
sort of thing probably emboldens and encourages people to agree with you and antagonizes 
people who disagree with you. You have to be really clever to change somebody’s opinion 
or crack their armor through a tweet or something like that.” Both pastors agree that this 
platform is simply not the platform use when engaging in sensitive conversations.   
 Most of the pastors had a limited knowledge of Twitter but enough knowledge to have 
a general opinion of it and the benefits and downfalls associated with it. I entered these 
interviews believing that Twitter would be a principal avenue of mobilization for 
evangelicals who feel marginalized. However, this was not the case among the pastors. 
While Twitter seemed fine in theory for some of them, only one (who did not claim to be 
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evangelical), had his own Twitter account. Apparently, the marginalization they feel has 
not led them to use Twitter as a means of expression.  
This does not mean, however, that no evangelicals are mobilized on Twitter. A few 
pastors did mention that their congregants can be quite active on Twitter and other social 
media platforms. Some of these pastors said they have challenged congregants because of 
the poor “testimony” they thought their social media activity displayed. One pastor says, 
"I'm not opposed to the use of technology whenever it comes to exercising your opinions I 
just think you gotta do it in a decent way." At this point, he proceeds to say that his 
congregants have been and can be very active on Twitter, but that he must keep an eye on 
their online presence.  
This tells me that although the pastors may refrain from tweeting for various reasons, 
the perceived social marginalization apparent in their answers may be felt even more 
strongly by their congregants. This leads me to believe that these congregants, 
unconstrained by some of the existential pressures facing pastors (Crawford and Olson 
2001), are more likely to publicly express themselves and mobilize for political action. 
Since social media has become a significant avenue for this type of expression and 
mobilization, we should expect to see more and more evangelicals using it in the years 
ahead. 
Conclusion 
 Although I was only able to interview a small selection of pastors, several key finding 
emerge. Perhaps the most striking finding is that African American clergy have some 
similar fears, concerns, and feelings of marginalization as white evangelicals. As much of 
the previous literature confirms, they do not have to share political convictions with white 
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evangelicals to share their spiritual convictions. However, I also found that theological 
differences, rather than racial differences, appeared more integral to each pastor's approach 
to collective political involvement. Though the data is too limited in allowing me to 
generalize these findings, I do believe that there is more work to be done in this area of 
race and religion. Scholars, notably Emerson and Smith (2000), Harris (1999), Jones and 
Francis (2012) and Lincoln and Mamiya (1990), show that race is unequivocally yoked 
with religion. While I do not dispute these findings, I do contend that my research shows 
there may be a yet unstudied "middle-ground." What of the racially mixed evangelical 
churches? Are there vital theological differences between white and Black evangelicals 
that contribute to their different political and social actions or, as most research shows, is 
race the only variable causing a difference?  
Again, as I said during a lengthy discussion of this very topic earlier in the chapter, I 
was only able to interview three Black pastors. It is possible that these pastors are an 
aberration from the norm. Alternatively, there may be an understudied and unrepresented 
group of Black evangelicals in the United States, who perhaps go to racially heterogenous 
congregations. Wadsworth (2012) noted the growing trend within the evangelical 
population to engage in congregational racial blending. What contributes to this 
willingness to attend these racially diverse congregations? Wadsworth notes various 
differing motivations. One motivation she did not address was theological agreement. 
Some African American evangelicals may feel that their theological beliefs are better 
represented in a church that is not racially homogeneous. Would I find that these Black 
evangelicals demonstrate similar feelings of marginalization and concern for society? They 
may not fit what the media and society portray as evangelical (white, southern, poor, 
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Republican), but they also may not fit in with the typical African American Protestant 
(Black, Democratic). I say this with the acknowledgment that these are mere musings that 
require much further research to speak to with any authority.  
 My findings also provide support for my theoretical assumption that evangelicals today 
are feeling socially marginalized. Most of the pastors I interviewed articulated such 
feelings. Many of them seemed keenly concerned about the social stereotypes and 
assumptions applied to them because of their religious beliefs. Many of the pastors 
expressed concern about society because they see values and norms being changed. Most 
of them conveyed consternation about the direction society is headed and the future. They 
all pointedly drew the conversation back to their commitment to sharing the Gospel as their 
central calling. 
While I found that most of the pastors feel marginalized, I did not find evidence that 
these feelings have led to any kind of sustained social or political action apart from voting. 
All the pastors were happy to engage in the political process using conventional methods 
of participation, such as voting or writing a representative. This finding is intriguing given 
the perceived social marginalization I found; however, it also makes sense. These pastors 
displayed relatively high levels of both internal and external efficacy. They believe 
conventional political participation is useful since they believe such participation can have 
an impact.  
This finding provides support for my theory that evangelicals are feeling socially 
marginalized while still possessing a sense of political efficacy and access. I believe this 
perceived social marginalization is affecting them, and I believe it played a part in Donald 
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Trump’s election. They may feel that their last hope is a King Cyrus36 of sorts, an ungodly, 
immoral individual whom God uses to protect His people. This "Cyrus" is being 
personified in Trump (Gordon 2017). Few of the pastors seemed enamored with Donald 
Trump personally, and none of them held him in high regard, but a few of them did express 
thankfulness for some room to breathe socially and politically. Others felt they finally had 
someone in office who could speak on their behalf, something that evangelicals have felt 
about previous presidents such as Carter, George Bush, George W. Bush and to an extent, 
Reagan.  
I did not find evidence that these pastors are feeling marginalized because of racial or 
demographic concerns. However, given the taboo nature of such feelings, feelings of this 
nature are less likely to manifest in this form of research. I did not find as much difference 
between white and Black pastors, however, which was unexpected. I did find that white 
pastors were less likely to address race or racial issues as a significant concern in 
comparison to Black pastors. 
 I think one of the most important takeaways from these interviews is this: if these 
pastors are feeling marginalized, worried, and out of place, their congregants may well be 
feeling similarly, and perhaps with a higher intensity. Quite a few pastors alluded to this 
possibility as well. Scholars should be alert in the years to come for evangelicals mobilizing 
using new tactics, especially social media and boycotting, despite the twin emphasis 
evangelical theology places on individual salvation and skepticism of all things temporal.37  
                                                 
36 The Bible talks about King Cyrus of Persia in 2 Chronicles and a few other books. In the biblical account, 
he was a secular and immoral king whom God raised up to do good for and protect the Jews. The Bible says 
that God moved in his heart to rebuild the temple of Jerusalem. 
37 I discuss this in more detail during my chapter on boycotting, but the Chick-fil-A controversy is a prime 
example of this type of collective activation.  
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 While there is still much to be uncovered and discovered, these interviews provide 
some useful insights into the mind of evangelical clergy in 2017/2018. The media’s 
portrayal of an “evangelical” is not necessarily representative of all evangelicals. Instead, 
evangelicals are diverse in many ways, as we should expect of a group that comprises at 
least a quarter of the U.S. population (Pew Research Center 2015a; 2015b). Further, not all 
evangelicals are white. There are Black evangelicals who share some of the same concerns 
about society as white evangelicals. What does this mean moving forward? As a few of the 
pastors said, if they think things get bad enough, which they emphasized was highly 
possible given the direction they see society heading, they may be forced to take a 
collective, public stand. Notwithstanding the still-existent Religious Right, there are many 
evangelicals who have never mobilized publicly. The question then is this: what happens 
when the quiet, reticent portion of the evangelical population begins to mobilize? 
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CHAPTER 5 
POLITICAL CONSUMERISM: THE NEW OLD TACTIC? 
 
"[T]he market is turned into a powerful discursive terrain where commodities not only 
embody but also mediate religious ideals and qualities." 
--- Echchaibi, 2012, p. 33  
 
When you hear the word “chicken” what do you think of? You probably think of a lot of 
things: chicken wings, football, food, a bird, animal rights, KFC, Chick-fil-A, or an easy 
dinner. You probably do not think of marginalization, evangelicals, LGBTQ rights, and 
mobilization. Yet, chicken, or any other neutral commodity, can symbolize these concepts 
and more. Research shows a growing trend of individuals expressing their values and 
ideologies through what they consume (Hannon 2013; Holzer 2006; Michelleti 2003; 
Michelleti, Follesdal, and Stolle 2008; Neilson 2012). In this chapter, I analyze how 
“chicken” became a symbol of hate and discrimination, or alternatively a symbol of free 
speech and Biblical values, and how this case represents an unstudied segment of 
evangelical collective action. I also analyze the way that a popular supermarket became 
involved in a war of values.   
Political consumerism is the intentional buying of a product or the intentional rejection 
of a product for political or social reasons. In layman’s terms, political consumerism is 
boycotting or buycotting a company. Anyone can engage in political consumerism. 
Boycotting is not, in and of itself, a collective act, even though it has been used as a form 
of collective action. Individuals can engage in a boycott of one. This makes political 
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consumerism one of the most individualistic, and yet potentially collective, forms of 
political participation available to citizens (Newman and Bartels 2011).  
Micheletti (2003) creates an entirely new concept to categorize political consumerism: 
individualized collective action. Micheletti challenges the long-standing assumption in 
political science that political participation is group-oriented behavior. She distinguishes 
between individualized collective action and "our more common notion of political 
participation, here called collectivist collective action" (2003, 1). Scholars find that citizens 
of Western societies are shifting away from the traditional forms of political involvement 
to more “flexible, network-oriented, and applied” forms of political engagement (2003, 6). 
Micheletti coins the term individualized collective action to capture these new forms of 
political and collective, yet individualized, action. She defines it as “the practice of 
responsibility-taking through the creation of everyday settings on the part of citizens alone 
or together with others to deal with problems which they believe are affecting what they 
identify as the good life” (2003, 7).  
Political consumerism, then, is one form of individualized collective action. Micheletti 
defines political consumerism as “actions by people who make choices among producers 
and products with the goal of changing objectionable institutional or market practices” 
(2003, 2). Political consumerism provides a way for citizens to express their dislike of 
policy issues or societal issues without having to use conventional political participation.  
Consumption as a Political Act 
Political consumerism, as defined by one of the leading scholars in this field, is merely 
the "use of the market as an arena for politics" (Micheletti and Stolle 2008, 750). Micheletti 
and Stolle (2008) contend that "shopping is now an established part of social justice 
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activism" (749). When people use the market to express their political concerns either 
through boycotts or “buycotts” they are engaging in political consumerism (Micheletti 
2003; 2010; Michelleti, Follesdal, and Stolle 2008; Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti 2005). 
There has been some debate among academics about whether political consumerism is 
truly a form of political participation. Micheletti (2003; 2010) argues that it is, and 
Newman and Bartels (2011) find that political consumerism is an “individualistic” and 
“high-initiative” form of political participation. Micheletti (2003) claims that this type---
political consumerism---of political mobilization is the result of increasing micro-level 
politics and is a distinct form of political participation, or, as she calls it, individualized 
collective action (2003).  
Scholars agree that many countries are experiencing an increase in political 
consumerism (Copeland 2014; Neilson 2012; Neilson and Paxton 2010; Friedman 1985; 
Strømsnes 2009). Zukin et al. (2006) find that political consumerism is the most commonly 
used form of political participation second only to voting. Inglehart’s (1977; 2015) theory 
of post-materialism is cited as one leading explanation for the increase in alternative forms 
of political participation (Copeland 2014). In a post-materialist society, citizens are more 
concerned about promoting non-material, value-oriented issues, which generally fall 
within the political spectrum (2014).  
The three primary forms of political consumerism are boycott and buycott and 
discursive consumerism. Hitherto, boycotting has been the primary form of political 
consumerism and is the oldest form of political consumerism (Friedman 1999; Michelleti 
2003; 2008). Boycotting is the deliberate rejection of a product for social or political 
reasons. It is “an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging 
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individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in the marketplace” or 
“the intentional buying or abstention from buying specific products for political, social, or 
ethical purposes” (Newman and Bartels 2011). Consumer boycotting has frequently been 
used in the United States and other countries as a form of political activism and has been 
“very important for people marginalized in conventional politics” (Micheletti 2008, 751). 
Activists who organize and stimulate these boycotts find boycotts incredibly difficult to 
frame and organize (Friedman 2003; Micheletti 2008). The financial impact of boycotts is 
debatable (Micheletti 2008, see also Koku and Springer 1997; Smith 2003; Vogel 2005).   
Political consumerism can only affect change if it is done collectively (Hannon 2013). 
Individuals can engage in political consumerism but rarely if ever is their individual choice 
to consume or abstain going to cause corporate change. Since boycotts are most successful 
when done collectively, the media plays a crucial role in organizing and involving 
individuals by making individuals feel like they are part of something bigger (Hannon 
2013). Media helps frame an individual choice "as collective action, potentially motivating 
participation either because boycotters would interpret the participation of others as 
normative behavior, or because the participation of others would provide reassurance of a 
boycott’s efficacy" (Neilson 2012, 216).  
Buycotting is the intentional buying of a product for social and political reasons. 
Hannon argues that buycotting is moving from the periphery to the forefront as a form of 
activism. It is less contentious than boycotting and easier to mobilize (Hannon 2013; 
Michelleti 2008). Proponents of buycotting say that it is a constructive way to show support 
for an issue by allowing consumers to “consume and support causes at the same time” 
(Micheletti 2008, 752). Also, buycotts are not as beholden to the media for collective 
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stimulation and action as boycotts. They can be organized through word of mouth, social 
media and local networks (Hannon 2013).  
Boycotting and buycotting are the same action with a different motivation. In other 
words, in most cases, they are both the result of an individual purchase transference from 
one place to another (Hannon 2013). Hence, boycotting a place means, by default, 
buycotting another place (2013). "The key nuance is, therefore, going to reside in the intent 
of the action: is an individual seeking to punish a company or reward it?" (62-63). 
The third form of political consumerism is "discursive political consumerism" 
(Micheletti 2008).  This form of consumerism focuses on other vulnerable aspects of 
business such as their brand name, reputation, and logo (2008). It uses a "variety of non-
economic tools to convince the public and/or business leaders that social responsibility is 
good for the corporate world" (2008, 753). I do not test this form of political consumerism 
in this dissertation, though it could provide some interesting insight for future research. 
These forms of political consumerism do more than push for corporate change or 
justice; they also create an avenue of expression for individuals who want to make a 
statement about themselves through consumption. Thus, consumption is as much an 
extension of one’s identity as political action (Hannon 2013). Some argue that individuals 
are consuming the label rather than the product (2013). However, "[the] bulk of mundane 
consumption is normally outside the area for reflective choice" (Jacobsen and Dulsrud 
2007, 478).  
While Jacobsen and Dulsrud’s statement is true, Hannon counters: "a reflexive choice 
is still being made to purchase one item over another. Even without reflection, one is 
choosing to participate in consumption rather than to abstain and to consume product X 
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over product Y. Agency is being exercised, and in some cases, consumption can be moved 
to inhabiting a reflective space" (Hannaon 2013, 58). Consumption, whether it is 
intentional or not, makes a statement about who an individual is: an ice cream person or a 
cake person, an Apple person or a Samsung person (2013). Political consumerism, 
therefore, is just a step above mundane consumerism. It is the active choice between 
products, not because of price or aesthetic appeal, but because of one’s political leanings 
and their desire to affect change and express their identity through the consumption of one 
product and abstention from another (Hannon 2013).  
Thus, consumption has turned into a way for individuals to express themselves and 
connect themselves to a public identity. “Consumption is … an external marker of internal 
beliefs. What and how an individual consumes not only builds an image of who they are, 
but how others should interact with them” (2013, 48). Where an individual consumes 
creates an identity for who they are and places them in a pre-conceptualized community 
while also serving as an “external declaration of belief” (48). Hence, political consumerism 
provides the perfect environment of expression for those who possess a collective identity 
and desire to express their connection to that collective identity through consumption. 
 Scholars find that a consumer’s religion is an important variable influencing individuals 
to engage in political consumerism (Delener 1994; Lorentzen 1980; Hirschman 1991; 
1982; Sheth 1981; Swimberghe, Flurry, and Parker 2011; Vitell 2009; Vitell, Paolillo, and 
Singh 2006; Vitell, Singh, and Paolillo 2007; Wilkes, Burnett and Howell 1986). 
“Consumption, therefore, provides the venue through which religious individuals can 
outwardly declare their beliefs” (Hannon 2013, 48). Market goods have begun to take on a 
religious meaning (Echchaibi 2012; Hannon 2013). Hannon distinguishes between goods 
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that are expressly religious, such as Veggie Tales or the Passion of the Christ, and those 
goods that made for secular consumption but somehow imbued with religious qualities 
(2013, 52). For example, Chick-fil-A, an organization founded and run by Christians, is an 
emblem of traditional Christian values. Thus, individuals can make a public statement 
about their values, their religious convictions, and identity, both collective and individual, 
simply by eating a chicken sandwich. The assumption of religious value, bolstered by 
media narrative, means consuming a product somewhere is now imbued with “reverent 
quality and transform[s] a trivial act of consumption into a committed act of faith” 
(Echchaibi 2012, 32). “Consumption, therefore, provides the venue through which 
religious individuals can outwardly declare their beliefs” (Hannon 2013, 48).   
Hannon (2013) posits that “consumption is a generative space in which individuals can 
express religious belief within modernity” (1).  She performs a case study of the Chick-fil-
A controversy with special attention given to Facebook posts regarding the controversy. 
She argues that consumers make individual and communal identity construction through 
what they choose to consume. Consumers express their values and identity through what 
they consume. 
The literature provides conclusive support that political consumerism is indeed a form 
of political mobilization. Also, research shows that alienation, a key component of 
marginalization, increases support for nontraditional forms of political participation such 
as demonstrations or boycotts (Southwell 1985; Opp 1990; Weakliem and Borch 2006). I 
chose political consumerism as an indicator for my theory because of its unique position 
in politics and society. It is both political and social, collective and individual, expressive 
and impactful. Since I am interested in expressive extra-institutional forms of political 
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mobilization in response to social marginalization, political consumerism is the ideal 
indicator of marginalization because of social strain over politically charged social issues. 
Political consumerism is not a conventional form of political participation (hence the 
scholarly debate about its place in politics), which makes it an alternative form of 
participation and a valid implication of my theoretical argument. Further, it provides the 
ideal set of circumstances to test social constructionism's necessary conditions for 
collective action. It is also a form of expression, and I am interested in evangelicals' 
expressive mobilization as a form of identity claiming. Finally, I chose political 
consumerism as an indicator for my theory because it allows me to examine whether 
specific mechanisms are sufficient to stimulate evangelicals into collective action.  
Data and Methods 
How does an unpleasant feeling translate into social and political collective action? 
What causal mechanisms are crucial to this transition? I contend that for evangelicals, a 
catalyst event must present itself. This event acts as a catalyst for evangelical response. 
However, without the appropriate elite framing within the cultural context to stir up a sense 
of collective identity around a constructed emotion, evangelicals would merely grumble 
and mobilize individually rather than mobilize collectively. There are, of course, more 
moving parts here than a single case or a small number of cases will allow me to examine. 
So the results that follow are suggestive at best of a causal chain. 
What is a catalyst event? It is an event that stirs up emotions and reactions and draws 
media attention, critique and support. The event can be purely political such as a Supreme 
Court case or a new political policy. However, it can also be social—Starbucks hires or 
fires a gay President. A corporation can publish a politically or socially charged 
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commercial, pull a product or introduce a product for political and social reasons, or make 
a public statement for those very same reasons. These events can cause a reaction, 
depending on how much of a reaction the media and elites want. Of course, in today’s 
social media context, sometimes grassroots reactions on social media force elite and media 
attention.  
A catalyst event provides an avenue for response. Since evangelicals generally support 
the status quo, incidents that threaten their preferred status quo (and perhaps their historical 
social and cultural dominance) cause evangelicals to feel the need to mobilize. However, 
just because an event occurs does not mean that evangelicals will automatically engage in 
collective mobilization. Only under specific circumstances will evangelicals engage in 
collective mobilization. Using the four elements of social constructionism, and Snow and 
Benford’s (1988) three-step process to collective action, I set up the following chain: 
A group feels socially marginalized and alienated → Catalyst event → Increasing 
feelings of marginalization→ Social entrepreneurs frame the event, and the 
relevant out-group → Social entrepreneurs stir up emotional strain using cultural 
symbols, phrases, etc. →  Entrepreneurs suggest a viable solution to the problem 
and encourage participation and mobilization → Group engages in collective 
action in response to elite mobilization.  
I propose five different hypotheses which I test using two cases studies. I derive these 
hypotheses from the social constructionist theory of social movements and the literature on 
political consumerism. 
HI: A catalyst event is a necessary condition for evangelical collective 
mobilization.  
 
A catalyst event can be anything from a Supreme Court Case to a corporate statement—
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the key attribute being the event draws attention to some social or political issue relevant 
to evangelicals. The social or political issue need not be new, although it may be. 
Regardless, the catalyst event, by drawing attention to the issue provides evangelicals with 
the option of responding or remaining neutral and silent.  
 H2: Elite mobilization and framing according to the cultural milieu is a necessary 
condition for evangelical collective mobilization.  
 
Elite mobilization is a little easier to define. Elites are individuals who hold a position of 
power in whatever domain in which they exist. This position provides them with a platform 
to speak and influence, and resources to draw upon when needed. Lindsay (2008) 
conducted an in-depth field research study of evangelical elites. He claims that elites 
“provide critical resources, produce cultural goods, and facilitate the legitimation of a given 
movement to external audiences” (64, see also McCarthy and Zald 1997; Peterson and 
Berger 1975; Tilly 2006). Elites are respected by the community they speak for and 
represent; therefore, their word means something. Elites can be individuals and/or 
organizations that speak on behalf of evangelicals.  
H3: A coherent collective identity, predicated upon an in-group/out-group frame, 
is a necessary condition for evangelical mobilization.  
 
A coherent collective identity provides members with a common goal and common 
cognitive framework (Melucci 1988). Individuals feel a connection to and desire to be a 
part of this collective membership. I add “predicated upon an in-group/out-group frame” 
because of the difficulty of identifying a feeling of "collective identity" by assessing 
boycotts. Thus, based on Smith's subcultural identity theory and his assertion that 
evangelicals' collective identity grows stronger because of a clearly defined "they," the 
presence of a clear "out-group" is a proxy for evangelical collective identity. If there is no 
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clear out-group in any example, I consider a coherent collective identity absent. 
H4: Social marginalization is a necessary condition needed for collective action.  
 
I am most interested in the presence and absence of this variable. Social marginalization is 
a feeling of social threat and strain, coupled with frustration and feelings of societal 
rejection. This is not predicated upon a feeling of low political efficacy or feeling like one 
has no access to or influence on government policy; instead, it stems from the societal 
marginalization of valued norms and issues. Though I cannot access the minds and psyche 
of evangelicals to show indisputable evidence of these feelings, I am able to gain insight 
into the motivations of their actions by assessing the frames and rhetoric used by elites (and 
in a few circumstances the evangelicals themselves) to motivate the evangelicals into 
action. If they utilize certain phrases and words, invoking any assumed social strain, this is 
evidence of assumed societal strain in their culture. Further, I infer from events and the 
societal trends at the time of the boycott the probable level of strain that evangelicals are 
feeling at the time. Presumably, the higher the feeling of strain the more likely they are to 
mobilize. I believe that collective political consumerism itself is evidence of feelings of 
social strain/marginalization and am not alone in this assumption.38 
H5: All four hypotheses combined are sufficient for evangelical collective 
mobilization.  
 
This final hypothesis is simple and does not need to be defined since it is the combination 
of the four previous concepts that I just defined. If the four previous variables are satisfied, 
then I expect that evangelicals will indeed engage in political consumerism. My analysis 
tests the veracity of these hypotheses based on real-world occurrences. Perhaps 
evangelicals have collectively boycotted/buycotted in the absence of one or two of these 
                                                 
38 Evangelical emotions are something I uncover with more nuance in the next chapter. 
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hypotheses; hopefully, my analysis can uncover such circumstances. Either way, this 
analysis sheds new light on evangelical mobilization.   
Data and Methods 
Most research on political consumerism has been theoretical, qualitative and/or relies 
heavily on survey data. Because of the lack of extensive empirical data, I rely on a variety 
of different data sources that allow causal process tracing to test my hypotheses. Using the 
General Social Survey (GSS) codebook, I first provide a descriptive snapshot analysis of 
evangelical boycotting trends during the two years that GSS asked questions about 
boycotting—2004 and 2014.  
There are only a few cases of evangelical collective political consumerism available to 
analyze, which, in and of itself says something. Most collective evangelical boycotts were 
started, promoted and carried out by the same set of evangelical elites: The Southern 
Baptist Convention and the American Family Association (AFA). I use process tracing to 
analyze the mechanisms surrounding boycotts, in addition to more deeply analyzing the 
one evangelical buycott launched in recent American history. These boycotting and 
buycotting examples provide support for my theory of evangelical social marginalization 
and mobilization while leaving the door open for future research and new questions. Using 
process tracing, as well as an in-depth analysis of the cases through the lens of the 
hypotheses, I can analyze the moving parts of the theory. 
ANES and GSS Data 
I believe, based on other scholar’s previous findings and on Micheletti’s conception of 
individualistic collective action, that evangelicals are involved in political consumerism 
primarily at the individual level (Shamir and Ben-Porat, 2007; Swimberghe, Flurry, and 
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Parker 2011; Lorentzen 1980; Sheth 1981; Vitell 2009; Vitell, Paollilo, and Singh 2006; 
Vitell, Singh, and Paolillo 2007).  
An ANES survey recently included two questions about political consumerism in a 
2016 Pilot Study. The study asked 1200 people “In the last 12 months, have you bought a 
certain product or service because of the social or political values of the company that 
provides it, or have you not done that in the past 12 months?” followed by the same 
question about boycotting. The unique aspect of this question is that it touches on values 
rather than pure partisanship or political reasons. A recent study on political consumerism 
used this dataset, in conjunction with two original datasets, to pinpoint the variables with 
the most influence on one's propensity to engage in political consumerism. Endres and 
Panagopoulos (2017) find that Democrats are more likely to engage in political 
consumerism than Republicans and find that political knowledge, political interest, and 
ideological intensity are all positively related to political consumerism. They did not, 
however, include a variable for religion. 
 Using their same dataset but adding in a variable for religion, I assess some descriptive 
characteristics of evangelicals and political consumerism. I use a question about being 
"born again" as my proxy for evangelicalism. If the respondent answered yes to being born 
again, they are considered evangelical, and if they answered no they are not considered 
evangelical. The percentage of evangelicals in the whole group who also answered yes to 
either boycotting or buycotting in the past 12 months is 10.8%. A total of 26.8% of the 
evangelical respondents engaged in political consumerism, which is over 10% less than the 
overall total percentage of participants at 39%. Evangelicals also made up 27% of the total 
number of respondents who did engage in political consumerism.    
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There are some demographic differences in the boycotting evangelical population. As 
the chart shows, whites make up the most considerable portion of the 10% of evangelicals 
who did engage in political consumerism, followed by Blacks, Hispanics, and others. 
However, proportionally Black evangelicals and white evangelicals engaged in political 
consumerism at the same rate. For white and Black evangelicals, 37% of them engaged in 
political consumerism, while members who identified as other were the most active at 41%.  
 
     
Figure 5.1 Percentage of Evangelicals Who Engaged in Political Consumerism in 
2015 
Hispanic evangelicals were the least active with only 30% of them engaging in political 
consumerism. After running a basic probit model with race and evangelicalism as the two 
independent variables and political consumerism as the independent variable, the only 
variable that showed any statistical significance was the "other" category in race. Thus, at 
least for 2016, evangelicalism seems to have little statistical effect on the probability of an 
individual engaging in political consumerism. 
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Figure 5.2 Evangelical Political Consumerism in 2015 by Race 
The information provided in the figures is limited and supplies a mere snapshot of 
evangelical involvement. Ergo, this chapter is not designed to analyze individual 
expression but rather collective expression. I believe that evangelicals are willing to 
mobilize collectively, given a specific set of circumstances; however, because of their 
focus on the individual, occasions of evangelical collective action are few and far between. 
When a group feels unappreciated and marginalized, they respond; however, this response 
is contingent upon elite framing and elite manipulation (Dicsh 2011; Goffman 1974). Elites 
are the glue that connect feelings of marginalization to mobilization.39  
 
                                                 
39 Many times, elites are also responsible for stirring up or creating feelings of marginalization (Benford and 
Snow 2000; Pizmony-Levy and Ponce 2013; Slothuus and Vreese 2010).  
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Political Consumerism: Boycotts 
Evangelicals have launched a few boycotts over the past few decades. I analyze a 
boycott launched and carried out by the American Family Association (AFA). I analyze 
boycott cases by the AFA because it is one of the only evangelical organizations to boycott 
with media coverage consistently. I cannot analyze boycotts that did not receive notable 
media coverage. 
Using the Lexus Nexis (now called Lexis Uni) All News search, I searched for 
keywords and phrases such as "boycott," "evangelical" and "political consumerism" to 
assess the frequency of news articles discussing evangelical boycotts. Combing through 
the articles, I discovered that there have been a few, though not an abundant, number of 
evangelical boycotts. Launching a successful boycott is a strenuous and challenging 
process for elites, given the amount of framing and stimulation needed to fully involve 
enough people. I also learned that most of the evangelical boycotts launched in recent 
history have been launched by the same few evangelical organizations. Namely, the AFA 
and the Southern Baptist Convention. Neither of these organizations is explicitly political 
but because of their stances on social (politically charged social) issues, have waded into 
political waters through this form of expressive mobilization. These are not the only two 
evangelical organizations in America, but they are the two that seemed most adamantly 
involved in political boycotting instead of focusing exclusively on individual mission- 
oriented evangelical work.40 That is not to say that these are the only two evangelical 
organizations engaged in politics or political action; instead, these are the primary 
                                                 
40 Evangelicals for Social Action, The Christian Embassy, the Center for Faith and Work, and the National 
Christian Foundation are a few examples of Christian organizations that engage in primarily spiritual and 
mission-oriented action.  
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organizations engaging in the expressive form of political mobilization that I am interested 
in testing.   
After further research, I found that the single Southern Baptist Convention boycott was 
initially launched by the AFA. Thus, it became apparent that most of the nationally known 
and media covered evangelical boycotts in recent history are and have been sponsored by 
the AFA.41 In my analysis then, I overlay one AFA sponsored boycott against the social 
constructionist theory to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of evangelical 
mobilization better. I select the only current boycott, which also happens to be their most 
successful boycott ever. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I am confined to the one 
current boycott.   
The American Family Association (AFA) 
The American Family Association is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization, created in 
1977 by Donald E. Wildmon, pastor of First United Methodist Church in South Haven, 
Mississippi. It is not a political organization and promotes no overt political agenda but 
does have a clear evangelical set of doctrinal values. The organization is engaged in various 
kinds of activities. The AFA has its own radio show and online coffee shop that sells 
ground coffee. The ad on the front of coffee shop webpage says, “When you purchase 
American Family Coffee, you are supporting our parent organization, American Family 
Association whose goal is to restore a strong sense of biblical values to American public 
life” (Americanfamilycoffee.net). Hence, this otherwise mundane item is imbued with a 
sense of morality and family values. I am not sure how purchasing this coffee 
accomplishes their stated goals, but this is the sentiment presented nonetheless.  
                                                 
41 I later came across a boycott launched by Focus on the Family, but it was a boycott that the AFA was also 
involved in and therefore does not change my research. 
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The AFA also has an online store, a journal and a studio. They started two tangential 
organizations called One Million Moms and One Million Dads42 whose goal is to activate 
and connect evangelical dads and moms across the country to speak out against "trash on 
TV." The first lines used in the One Million Moms "who we are" page is telling. “Mom, 
are you fed up with the filth many segments of our society, especially the entertainment 
media, are throwing at our children? Are you tired of all the negative influences our 
children are forced to contend with? If so, we urge you to become a member of 
OneMillionMoms.com” (OneMillionMoms.com). The language is indicative of the 
framing and emotional manipulation prevalent in the language assessed below. 
Evangelicals, holding a historically dominant social and political position in society must 
feel that their position is being threatened. 
According to the parent organization (AFA.net):  
The mission of the American Family Association is to inform, equip, and activate 
individuals to strengthen the moral foundations of American culture, and give aid 
to the church here and abroad in its task of fulfilling the Great Commission. 
 
Their philosophical statement gives more insight into their motivations and focus:  
The American Family Association believes that God has communicated absolute 
truth to mankind and that all people are subject to the authority of God's Word at 
all times. Therefore AFA believes that a culture based on biblical truth best serves 
the well-being of our nation and our families, in accordance with the vision of our 
founding documents; and that personal transformation through the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ is the greatest agent of biblical change in any culture. 
 
Note the culturally appropriated language used. The AFA stresses the importance of 
personal transformation through the gospel and that this is the greatest agent of Biblical 
change. The irony, of course, is that the AFA is not an organization engaged exclusively 
                                                 
42 In the “who we are” description of One Million Dads, the word conservative is used to describe their 
organization, this is the not the case with the AFA or One Million Moms.  
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in individual mission oriented evangelicalism. Thus, even though the AFA is dependent on 
collective involvement and action, they cater to this mindset focused on individual 
salvation by using keywords and phrases that assuage any skepticism of intent that their 
individualist readers and potential members might have. 
The AFA professes to use activism to preserve: "Marriage and the Family," "Decency 
and Morality," "Sanctity of Human Life," "Stewardship" and "Media Integrity" (AFA.net). 
This focus on evangelical moral doctrine rather than overtly conservative ideology is 
important for my theory since I am interested in evangelical mobilization, not just Christian 
Right mobilization. Further, they state that they intend to:  
1. Restrain evil by exposing the works of darkness 
2. Promote virtue by upholding in culture that which is right, true and good 
according to Scripture 
3. Convince individuals of sin and challenge them to seek Christ’s grace and 
forgiveness 
4. Motivate people to take a stand on cultural and moral issues at the local, state 
and national levels 
5. Encourage Christians to bear witness to the love of Jesus Christ as they live 
their lives before the world (AFA.net) 
 
Again, line three draws the attention back to the individual and personal conversion. This 
continued focus on the individual is further evidence of the AFA’s evangelical persuasion 
and of their keen knowledge of their base. Most of these goals are painted in a positive 
light and with the attempt to instill hope and direction in an otherwise, potentially frustrated 
and marginalized, population.  
AFA activism, therefore, is done with the intent of trying to preserve (and promote) 
what they perceive to be the status quo of marriage and family, decency and morality, the 
sanctity of human life, stewardship and media integrity. They cannot preserve something 
they believe does not already exist in some capacity. Hence, they feel they are preserving 
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the status quo from cultural and societal changes. The website explains why they engage 
in activism.  
We believe in holding accountable companies that sponsor programs attacking 
traditional family values. We also believe in commending those companies that 
act responsibly regarding the programs they support. 
 
It is AFA’s goal to be a champion of Christian activism. If you are alarmed by the 
increasing ungodliness and depravity assaulting our nation, tired of cursing the 
darkness, and ready to light a bonfire, please join us. Do it for your children and 
grandchildren. (AFA.net)  
 
The AFA uses culturally specific language here. First, they call attention to their preferred 
form of activism: political consumerism. They then frame their call to action by first 
promoting the positive image of Christianity and then drawing upon assumed feelings of 
social strain amongst their target population.43 Key phrases like "alarmed by increasing 
ungodliness" or "depravity assaulting our nation" paint the picture of an embattled 
evangelical population with nowhere to turn. They draw a broad picture of the problems 
facing our country here. They then say, "tired of cursing the darkness" and "ready to light 
a bonfire." This imagery is powerful, especially for their target population. They play upon 
assumed feelings of frustration and angst that their constituency is feeling stuck as if their 
only form of release for their frustration is to curse the darkness. They then answer the 
problem with a solution of "lighting the bonfire" by joining their organization. Finally, they 
end with perhaps the most powerful call to action, act for your children and your 
grandchildren! Evangelicals, the ones I interviewed at least, express concern for the future, 
specifically for their children and grandchildren. If indeed they feel a growing sense of 
                                                 
43 Also note that they never feel the need to define what “traditional family values” are, as it assumed that 
their target population is aware of their meaning and the perceived threat against these "values." 
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social strain, utilizing fear of the future to motivate evangelicals into action is a brilliant 
move by the AFA social entrepreneurs.  
 The AFA also tries to alleviate any worries for the portion of their Christian base who 
feel that boycotting is unbiblical. Their Vice-President, Mr. Vitagliano, writes a piece 
called “objections answered” to assuage some of these concerns. He starts out by saying 
the following: 
Since it began in 1977, AFA has been known for its boycotts. However, some 
Christians believe such a tactic is, well, not very Christian.  
 
First, let me put forth a simple definition of what I mean by the word boycott. In 
its simplest form, a boycott involves the intentional withholding of money from a 
business of which you disapprove. It is usually used as an instrument of protest, 
persuasion, or even economic coercion (Vitagliano).  
 
This definition is helpful for my research in that the AFA defines boycotts in the same way 
that I define boycotts. They are a form of expression and protest and potential means for 
change. Mr. Vitagliano proceeds to explain why the AFA participates in boycotts. He, 
again, invokes the individualistic mindset of personal evangelism so prevalent in his 
culture.  
Christians are called to warn unbelievers that “the wrath of God comes upon the 
sons of disobedience” (Eph. 5:6). Is there something wrong with indicating to 
sinners what exactly constitutes their disobedience?  
 
There are many ways for the church to carry out this assignment. AFA believes 
boycotts are one of those ways. For example, when AFA initiated a boycott of 
Movie Gallery more than a decade ago, it was triggered by the company’s practice 
of renting and selling hardcore pornographic videos.  
 
In any case, AFA merely asks companies to remain neutral on controversial 
cultural issues. We aren’t asking them to side with us on abortion, for example, but 
we are asking companies not to fund Planned Parenthood. We aren’t asking 
businesses to uphold the biblical model of natural marriage, but we are asking 
companies not to give money to gay activist groups that call Christians bigots.  
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Hence, the AFA sees their actions as "evangelical" in some way. They are helping point 
out sin in people's lives, and therefore promoting the gospel by boycotting. They establish 
that they are not trying to force corporations to support Christian values but rather to remain 
neutral. Further, they add that they do not want companies giving money to the "out-
group," the gay activist groups, who are involved with calling Christian bigots. Hence, they 
are protecting evangelicals from what they see as further social marginalization. 
 Mr. Vitagliano also defines what the AFA considers a successful boycott.  
The fact is AFA does not primarily call for a boycott in order to hurt a company’s 
pocketbook. This is why AFA goes out of its way to target huge corporations, not 
the mom and pop grocery store on the corner. Disney. Pepsi. Ford. Home Depot. 
Such behemoths are often impervious to financial damage from boycotts – and 
AFA knows it. 
 
This differentiation is essential. I spoke with the head of the activism division of the AFA, 
and he was rather confused that I had found a decent number of AFA boycotts online. In 
fact, he could only list a few of which he was aware. He warned me that many news reports 
call a lot of AFA activism boycotting, when in fact there was no boycott. The AFA 
frequently petitions its members to speak out or contact businesses with objectionable 
value stances; however, it rarely calls on its members to intentionally boycott, and when it 
does, it is only for those businesses that are big enough to remain relatively financially 
unaffected by the boycott. Hence, there are only a few boycotts that the AFA has sponsored. 
This AFA executive went on to inform me that when the AFA does sponsor a boycott, they 
try to do so organically. In other words, they simply call on their members to boycott and 
let their members disseminate or spread the message to others. They do not advertise the 
boycott or promote the boycott outside of their member base. Thus, any involvement by 
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non-members in an AFA boycott is grassroots and stimulated by person-to-person 
contact.44 Mr. Vitagliano proceeds to explain what a successful boycott is for the AFA.  
We have had some tremendous successes with the use of boycotts, as the current 
effort against Target demonstrates. Some of our boycotts were actually settled 
behind the scenes and thus could not be publicly touted as victories. And some of 
AFA’s boycotts met with far less success on the financial level.  
 
Then why call the boycott? AFA uses the pocketbook to accomplish two things: (1) 
Get the attention of the offending company in order to start a dialogue with the 
decision makers; and (2) get the attention of the public in order to begin a dialogue 
with our neighbors in the community over the main issue of contention.  
 
The final paragraph explains that the AFA wants to start a dialogue to draw attention to 
some problem by placing it under public scrutiny. Thus, the boycotts are motivated not 
only by a desire to cause change but also to draw attention to an issue that evangelicals are 
expressing concern about. 
 Since the central focus of this dissertation is not the way that evangelical organizations 
collect members, but rather how and why evangelicals mobilize, specifically through 
political consumerism, I am going to transition to the actual analysis. The information 
above provides a clear context for the boycotts under analysis.  
Boycotts 
 Every year, the AFA publishes a Christmas Naughty or Nice list. The list rates 
American retailers as either nice, marginal or naughty based on how “Christmas-Friendly” 
their advertisements are (AFA.com). This promotes the AFA as a good source for private 
and individual level boycotting. Further, their members are encouraged and mobilized to 
directly contact and appeal for corporate change when the need arises. The number of 
small-scale protests and/or appeals that the AFA and their tangential organizations are 
                                                 
44 The bias here, of course, is that members of the AFA are already notably more engaged than their non-
member counterparts. Further, their friends and direct community are also probably more engaged.  
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involved in is numerous; however, appealing for change is not the focus of this study 
although it may be interesting to analyze at a future date.45 For the purposes of this 
dissertation and this analysis, I only analyze the actual boycotts that garnered national 
attention and generated notable collective involvement. 
While I would like to provide a case study analysis of all the major corporate boycotts, 
there is little to no information on the AFA’s website about any of those boycotts. Further, 
the head of the activist department had nowhere to point me to on the website and no 
helpful past documents or previous statements to provide. To accurately test my 
hypotheses, it is imperative I have language written by the elites who framed and mobilized 
the boycott. Therefore, I am confined to a case study of one, given that there is only one 
current AFA boycott. The AFA introduced the Target boycott in 2016 because of Target’s 
bathroom policy (AFA.net). I use The Associated Press and The Washington Post, 
Breitbart, and the AFA’s official website as the primary sources for my data and 
information.  
The Target boycott is one of the most successful boycotts the AFA has ever sponsored 
in terms of individuals involved. As of April 18th, 2018, the online boycott pledge has 
1,527,832 signatures. The boycott was initially launched on April 20th, 2016. By May 2nd, 
2016, the boycott had already received the bulk of its signatures with 1,137,000 (Riehl 
2016). That means that within days a significant portion of AFA members and many non-
members (membership is not required to pledge) had already signed the petition. Perhaps 
even more telling are the stock and profit losses that Target has experienced since the 
                                                 
45 Most of these small-scale activities are not usually boycotts, even if they are actions taken in response to 
corporate stances on issues. One Million Moms, specifically, writes letters, calls and personally contacts 
companies who are engaged or promoting values to which they are opposed.  
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boycott launched.46 The Washington Post reported that Target’s popularity dropped 4% 
after their bathroom policy was first announced (Andrews 2016). The AFA reported that 
Target’s stock fell 43% and their stock prices hit a two-year low after the start of the boycott 
(Vitagliano 2017). This indicates that the individuals who first signed the pledge are indeed 
holding up their end of the bargain.  
Target Boycott 
On April 19th, 2016, Target released a statement that they would allow transgendered 
people to use the bathroom of their choice. In their own words, “In our stores, we 
demonstrate our commitment to an inclusive experience in many ways. Most relevant for 
the conversations currently underway, we welcome transgender team members and guests 
to use the restroom or fitting room facility that corresponds with their gender identity.” 
(corporate.target.com). This statement satisfies the “catalyst” requirement of Hypothesis 
One in that it drew attention to an issue that evangelicals feel strongly about.  
Following this, the AFA called their members into action—asking members and non-
members alike to sign a pledge. By signing this pledge, individuals promised to take their 
business elsewhere because of Target’s bathroom policy. The pledge says, "Until Target 
makes the safety of women and children a priority, I will shop elsewhere." Then the AFA 
specifically asked their members to share the Target pledge with others, their friends and 
family and church members and to "politely" voice their concerns on social media. The 
AFA "call to action page" also includes a list of links to stories about harassments that have 
happened in Target bathrooms and changing rooms. This, of course, is supposed to 
instigate evangelical concern and consternation. The page has a picture of a young girl 
                                                 
46 There is no way to say with any certainty that the AFA boycott caused Target’s economic struggles but 
there is a clear correlation.   
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looking scared and alone with the words, “Men don’t belong in women’s restrooms and 
changing areas. #BoycottTarget” inscribed on the picture. The AFA website says the 
following:  
This [Target bathroom policy] means a man can simply say he "feels like a woman 
today" and enter the women's restroom...even if young girls or women are already 
in there. Target's policy is exactly how sexual predators get access to their victims. 
And with Target publicly boasting that men can enter women's bathrooms, where 
do you think predators are going to go? 
 
Clearly, Target's dangerous new policy poses a danger to wives and daughters. Over 
1 million people agree with us and pledged to boycott Target stores until protecting 
women and children is a priority. 
 
One solution is a common-sense approach and a reasonable solution to the issue of 
transgendered customers: a unisex bathroom. Target should keep separate facilities 
for men and women, but for the trans community and for those who simply like 
using the bathroom alone, a single occupancy unisex option should be provided 
(https://www.afa.net/activism/action-alerts/2016/04/sign-the-boycott-target-
pledge/) 
 
There is obvious framing here, as well as a clear invoking of an out-group, namely sexual 
predators, who want to prey on women and young children. The unidentified but implied 
outgroup is the LGBTQ community. This boycott is based upon the in-group/out-group 
premise. As the literature on gays and evangelicals posits, the homosexual community acts 
as the perfect villainous “they” in these boycotts (Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006). 
Hence, the homosexual community provides the threatening out-group for evangelicals to 
respond to and coalesce against; this in-group/out-group dynamic, based on Smith’s (1998) 
subcultural identity theory, strengthens and develops evangelical collective identity. The 
existence of an out-group provides support for my third hypothesis that stipulates there 
must be a collective identity to stimulate collective mobilization. 
The language invoked here focuses less on values and marginalization and more on 
issues of safety. The AFA assumes that their members share their traditional Biblical values 
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and already have a problem with the premise behind “open” bathrooms. Thus, it invokes a 
direct sense of threat. The AFA uses words like "dangerous" and "danger" to invoke a sense 
of fear. Elites organized and framed the issue. They first drew attention to the problem and 
the out-group, presented a solution, and convinced their members that participation is 
essential to the cause. This is evidence of the requirements needed to fulfill Hypothesis 
Two. 
 The fourth hypothesis is the final hypothesis that needs to be satisfied. Do members 
feel social marginalization? This is perhaps the most difficult hypotheses to assess given 
that I am trying to extrapolate individual feelings from collective action; however, there 
are a few key indicators that provide support for social marginalization. The first indicator, 
of course, is that these individuals chose to be a part of the AFA and given the language 
used by the AFA to inspire membership, these individuals were feeling enough strain to 
join. However, this is not enough to satisfy hypothesis four.  
The Target transgender bathroom policy is a product of the times. In other words, the 
social zeitgeist that I spoke at length about in my theory in veering towards norms and 
policies with which evangelicals are not as comfortable. This change creates an 
environment or a feeling of social marginalization, if not of the individual themselves, then 
of the values they hold in high regard. The social marginalization of their values then plays 
an important role in stimulating them to action. They are not OK with something that goes 
against their Biblical moral standards. Protecting and promoting Biblical values is why 
they joined the AFA in the first place; therefore, any policy or event that threatens or 
marginalizes those values must be spoken out against. Consequently, the very existence of 
this out-group and the policies and values they represent engenders the social strain and 
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feeling of threat that Smith's subcultural theory posits. The issue frame then paints an even 
more threatening picture and one that likely stirs up more strain. The framing likely intends 
to make evangelicals respond with the following sentiment: “The homosexual agenda is 
not only threatening our values but now also our personal safely!”  
Beyond this, the fact that the Target boycott is one of the largest in the AFA's history 
is telling. Many of the previous boycotts and appeals were in response to the same 
"homosexual agenda." However, in 2016, the social zeitgeist had become increasingly 
liberal socially and therefore, much more socially marginalizing. Thus, it is no surprise that 
the Target boycott received the most support.47 This does not mean, however, that the 
framing of the issue, as well as the other variables,  did not also play an important role in 
the sizable turnout. It is worth considering why this is that the largest response to a boycott 
and what about today's social zeitgeist likely played a part.48 
However, I cannot definitively show support for the social marginalization hypothesis 
in the way that I can for the other three hypotheses. I can only analyze the context, 
language, and reason for the boycott, along with the mission statement of the AFA, to get 
a sense of the emotions behind the boycott. Most every boycott that the AFA has launched 
has been in response to some new "homosexual agenda"; therefore, the Target boycott is 
no different except that it is in response to a different aspect of the "homosexual agenda." 
Further, I can assume, that with the presence of the homosexual "out-group," based on 
Smith's theory, evangelicals are feeling threatened by the perceived out-group and feel the 
                                                 
47 The more prevalent use of social media in 2016 versus other periods of time is also a likely causal factor 
in the success of the Target boycott; however, I do not believe that this changes or negates the effect and 
existence of increasing feelings of social marginalization. If anything, it likely acted as an amplifier. 
48 What does this say of the theory of increasing social marginalization? I cannot test that theory with this 
dissertation, but it is a theory I hope to explore more in the future. 
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need respond. Thus, I believe social marginalization was a necessary condition for 
evangelical collective mobilization.  
Political Consumerism: Buycotts 
The Chick-fil-A buycott is a unique and so far, “one-of-a-kind” occurrence. A close 
analysis of the moving parts of this event helps us better understand evangelical 
mobilization moving forward. Buycotts are uniquely different from boycotts in that they 
are predicated on supporting and rewarding a business rather than punishing a business. 
Hence, buycotts require more active involvement since those involved must intentionally 
go to the business and buy to express their support. Boycotting is the absence of activity 
(or transference) while buycotting is activity.  
Since there is only one example of an evangelical buycott in recent history, I spend 
extensive time delving into the specific details surrounding the event. This event is not only 
unique because of its singularity but also because it was not organized and promoted by an 
organization with an already established following; instead, it was promoted by a few 
evangelical elites via social media, allowing for all evangelicals, whether socially or 
politically engaged or not, to mobilize.  
Setting and Context 
As of 2012, many major companies had begun to take a public stand on sexual politics. 
Major brands like Google, Starbucks, Nike, General Mills, Apple, Goldman Sachs, Boeing, 
amongst many others, took a public stance on the issue of gay marriage (Phillip 2012). The 
first line of Phillip’s article says, "Gay marriage advocates have a new and powerful ally 
in corporate America." She goes on to note that 48 companies signed a brief arguing that 
the Defense of Marriage Act negatively affected their business. In 2011, 25 executives of 
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major corporations including Goldman Sachs, Viacom and Alcoa lobbied New York 
legislators to approve same-sex marriage. Another 2012 news article proclaimed that “the 
last five years have seen a significant increase in the number of companies deciding to 
embrace the reward rather than the risk of voicing support of LGBT rights” (McPherson 
and Clise 2012). Many companies, such as Apple, JC Penney, Macy's, Kraft Foods, and 
Oreo, started embracing LGBTQ rights by using gay couples and imagery in their 
advertising. This uptick in corporate support and promotion of LGBTQ norms coincides 
with the societal embrace of LGBTQ norms. Gallup polls show that, in 2012, 63% of 
Americans thought gay marriage should be legal while 54% thought it was morally 
acceptable. Though these are not overwhelming numbers, they are high when compared to 
what they were ten or even five years prior.  
 “Traditional marriage” has, for the most part, always been the socially-accepted status 
quo and the norm in American society. Therefore, it is novel and noteworthy for a company 
to run a commercial showing a boy with two dads, or to include a same-sex couple emoji 
on an iPhone. The companies that are making these changes are moving away from the 
status quo and starting to embrace and promote new norms. Still, even with this burgeoning 
change in society and in corporate America, it is important to note that most commercials 
and advertisements still conform to heterosexual norms while the commercial or 
advertisement that does not is the aberration. The increase and promotion of these new 
norms are distinctive given their scarcity.  
These new norms are part of what stirs up a feeling of social marginalization. This 
feeling of marginalization/alienation is made up of a mixture of feelings—including, but 
not limited to: feelings of concern, fear for the future, feeling disrespected and feeling 
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frustrated and agitated. These are all the feelings that the evangelical community begins to 
feel in response to the changes they see in society. Seeing outward evidence of what they 
call "sin" only bolsters and increases their already negative perspective on society. Their 
worldview dictates that man is innately sinful and evil and that everything slowly decays 
and dies. Given this worldview, they already feel that society is naturally going to go in the 
wrong direction; however, this does not make the practical ways they see this happening 
less painful to them. This is the picture. Evangelicals are coming off long and hard-fought 
social and political battles during the 1970s through the 1990s. They formed the Moral 
Majority, the Christian Coalition, supported Pat Buchanan, fought against Roe vs. Wade, 
and fought to keep prayer in schools. In the end, they lost most of these battles politically. 
Entering the twenty-first century, from the perspective of the evangelical community, 
things in society are not looking too promising. Church attendance has fallen to new lows, 
religious "nones" continue to grow, Protestant churches are closing their doors in droves 
and abortion is still legal (Lipka 2013; 2015). A few years into the twenty-first century, the 
LGBTQ movement begins gaining traction socially and politically. As society begins to 
embrace the LGBTQ cause, corporations respond and do the same. Soon, the LGBTQ 
movement is a fully developed social movement calling for societal acceptance and 
governmental validation via the Supreme Court. Some are starting to consider evangelicals 
to be bigoted and hateful for continuing to hold to the pastime belief that homosexuality is, 
in some way, wrong or sinful. I cannot say definitively that evangelicals are feeling socially 
marginalized because of this context, but the chances are high that they are. 
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Chick-fil-A 
 As of 2012, many corporations had started to establish their support of same-sex 
marriage publicly. No company had come out speaking against same-sex marriage. It is 
much easier to advertise one's brand for something rather than against something. 
However, as the Chick-fil-A example will show, saying you are for something implies that 
you might be against something. The implication, in some cases, is enough.  
 On June 16, 2012, Dan Cathy, the president of Chick-fil-A, said on “The Ken Coleman 
Show” that: 
"I think we are inviting God's judgment on our nation when we shake our fist at 
him and say, ‘We know better than you as to what constitutes marriage.' I pray 
God's mercy on our generation that has such a prideful, arrogant attitude to think 
that we have the audacity to define what marriage is about" (McGregor 2012).  
 
There was little acknowledgment or coverage of this interview at first. Then in the July 7th 
issue of the Biblical Recorder, Dan Cathy responded to the claim that some are critical of 
his company's support of the traditional family by saying, "Well, guilty as charged." Then 
he explained to a reporter for The Christian Post: 
“We are very much supportive of the family—the biblical definition of the family 
unit. We own a family business, a family led business, and we are married to our 
first wives. We give God thanks for that … We want to do anything we possibly 
can to strengthen families. We are very much committed to that.” (Collier 2012).  
 
On July 2nd, Equality Matters released a study showing Chick-fil-A’s financial 
contributions based on a 2010 tax return. In it, they found secondary donations to “anti-
gay” organizations. Not long after this, the Baptist Press published the Biblical Recorder 
interview with a few minor grammatical changes (Hannon 2013). The next day, Advocate 
published an article entitled, “It’s Official: Chick-fil-A COO Dan Cathy Comes Out as 
Anti-Gay” (Garcia 2012). A slew of articles began to pop up all over the internet with 
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similar titles. Soon, the June 16th interview on “The Ken Coleman Show” is publicized and 
thrust into the conversation, as are the findings about the Chick-fil-A donations. These new 
reports sparked a social media firestorm. Hannon (2013) points out that prior to the July 
16th article, the interview was entirely uncommented upon in social media (2013)  
 The reporter who wrote the initial story and conducted the interview for the Biblical 
Recorder said that the interview with Mr. Cathy was “very positive” and unlike how the 
rest of the media was portraying it (Hendricks 2012).  
After BP re-posted the story, related articles soon surfaced in the Huffington Post, 
Associated Press, USA Today, Los Angeles Times, Fox News, and other news 
agencies – many of which ran articles with “anti-gay” in the headline. 
  
Many of those reports “turned [the original story] into a negative,” said Blume, 
adding the term “anti-gay” never came up in the June interview while Cathy was 
speaking in the Raleigh area. 
  
“He was not saying ‘guilty as charged anti-gay,’” Blume added. “[Cathy] never 
even brought up that subject. Everything he stated was on the positive side … He 
never stated anything negative” (Hendricks 2012).  
 
For some, this is a clear example of media framing, framing that spurred many into action 
and triggered a firestorm of reactions and condemnations by celebrities and politicians on 
social media and eventually spurred politicians to speak out against Chick-fil-A and to 
declare the organization unwelcome in their cities. The framing that the media and LGBTQ 
community engaged in is a clear example of social constructionism. This framing, 
however, ended up working against them as the critiques and anger towards Chick-fil-A 
just solidified this LGBTQ community's out-group status for evangelicals and increased 
the feeling of threat for evangelicals. 
Quite a few major politicians took public stances against Chick-fil-A after news of Dan 
Cathy’s comments hit the web. The mayor of Boston, Thomas Memino, told Chick-fil-A 
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that there was "no place for your company" in his city and stated that he would not allow 
Chick-fil-A to open franchises in his city. Not long after, Chicago city officials declared 
that Chick-fil-A’s values were not representative of Chicago’s values, after which, 
Alderman Moreno stated his intentions to block any new Chick-fil-A stores from opening 
in Chicago. A DC councilman tweeted that he does not support “hate chicken” (Bingham 
2012).  CNN reported that a city councilman in Philadelphia, James F. Kenney, said to 
Chick-fil-A "Take a hike and take your intolerance with you." San Francisco Mayor Edwin 
M. Lee tweeted: "Closest #ChickFilA to San Francisco is 40 miles away & I strongly 
recommend that they not try to come any closer." (Gilgoff 2012). Twitter also broke out in 
a firestorm because of the comments made by Dan Cathy. Ed Helms, the actor most known 
for his role in The Office, tweeted, “Chick-fil-A doesn’t like gay people? So lame. Hate to 
think what they do to gay chickens! Lost a loyal fan.” Eventually, Chick-fil-A posted a 
Facebook statement saying that they strive to treat all people with respect, honor, and 
dignity and intend to stay out of the political and social debate. 
Not much later, Carly McGehee, a lesbian political activist in Dallas, introduced the 
idea of protesting Chick-fil-A by holding a “kiss-in” at Chick-fil-A on a specific day 
(Walsh 2012). She called this day “National Same-Sex Kiss Day @ Chick-fil-A." She is 
quoted saying, “I hope the visibility of the kiss-in helps LGBT youth who feel isolated and 
are victims of bullying” (Walsh 2012; Laird 2012).  
Without any elite framing, mobilization or organization, the frenzy of reactions would 
likely die down, and people move on with their lives. Evangelicals may feel connected to 
Chick-fil-A more than before and begin eating there more often, but little else changes. 
Their feelings of marginalization and alienation slowly die down but remain raw and easily 
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stoked.  
 However, evangelical elites did respond. Leith Anderson, the president of the National 
Association of Evangelicals, said, “Individuals have the right to decide whether or not to 
‘eat mor chikin.’ But no government leader should restrict a business or organization from 
expanding to their district based on the personal or political views of the owners” (Gilgoff 
2012b). Evangelicals expressed exasperation with the politicians and leaders who began to 
politically shun the franchise because of Dan Cathy’s comments. Anderson said, “Such 
evident discrimination and attempts to marginalize those with religious convictions have 
no place in American democracy” (Gilgoff 2012b).  
Mike Huckabee, a well-known Baptist pastor, and politician, posted on Facebook and 
Twitter a call for an organized counter-protest. He says: 
I ask you to join me in speaking out on Wednesday, August 1 "Chick-Fil-A 
Appreciation Day." No one is being asked to make signs, speeches, or openly 
demonstrate. The goal is simple: Let's affirm a business that operates on Christian 
principles and whose executives are willing to take a stand for the Godly values we 
espouse by simply showing up and eating at Chick-Fil-A on Wednesday, August 1. 
Too often, those on the left make corporate statements to show support for same-sex 
marriage, abortion, or profanity, but if Christians affirm traditional values, we're 
considered homophobic, fundamentalists, hate-mongers, and intolerant. This effort 
is not being launched by the Chick-fil-A company, and no one from the company or 
family is involved in proposing or promoting it. 
 
This Facebook post satisfies Hypothesis Two and to an extent Hypothesis Three. Huckabee 
first provides evangelicals with an organized and individualistic collective way to respond 
to the criticisms of Chick-fil-A. He then uses culturally specific language to target and stir 
up the evangelical population. He says, “willing to take a stand for the Godly values we 
espouse." First, he frames the situation appropriately for evangelicals by stressing the 
importance of "Godly values." He then uses the word "we" invoking a sense of the 
"collective" we, as if he represents and is part of a bigger collective unit of people whom 
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all agree on what these "Godly values" are. 
The media painted the picture that eating at Chick-fil-A is a statement to the world of 
being a devout evangelical (Hannon 2013). “Once Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day was 
established, it became the "in" thing for conservative politicians and pundits. It became, 
briefly, a litmus test for if someone was really conservative and if they really supported 
Biblical values or just gave them lip service. In this way, participation became a badge of 
membership” (Hannon 2013, 46). There is a clear out-group and sense of a collective 
“we”—even if evangelicals are still maintaining their individuality by showing up 
individually for their own personal reasons. Hypothesis Three is therefore satisfied.  
Huckabee went on to give a specific time and date for evangelical mobilization and 
catered to their individuality by emphasizing that it is not a political act as much as it is 
just a simple act of support and solidarity that can be carried out individually. He invoked 
this same sentiment earlier in his post when he says, "no one is being asked to make signs, 
speeches or openly demonstrate." He used these phrases intentionally. Evangelicals who 
are not involved in much else than their church and personal outreach are likely not thrilled 
(like the pastors I interviewed) about engaging publicly in protests. However, showing up 
to support Godly values by eating food, along with other evangelicals who are also 
supporting the same values, provides an excellent opportunity for evangelicals to mobilize. 
 The final portion of his post invokes those feelings of frustration, and social 
marginalization that he assumes are already simmering in the evangelical population. He 
said, "Too often, those on the left make corporate statements to show support for same-sex 
marriage, abortion, or profanity, but if Christians affirm traditional values, we're considered 
homophobic, fundamentalists, hate-mongers, and intolerant." He paints a picture of the 
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stereotypes evangelicals fall under and the frustrations they must have with those stereotypes. 
Further, he lists all the negative attributes (same-sex marriage, abortion, profanity) of the out-
group that are stimulating the feelings of social marginalization. 
With this Facebook post, Huckabee attempted to stimulate and stir up already present 
feelings of frustrations within the evangelical population. He paints a picture of a 
marginalized, pitiful and unrepresented group that needs to come out and re-establish their 
marginalized position. Without this feeling of social marginalization to stir up, he would 
possess far less ammunition to stimulate the evangelical public into action.  
I remind you of how the pastors I interviewed responded. They seemed so eager to 
explain and justify their positions, their identity and what they stand. In the same way, 
evangelicals, when given a chance participate in collective claim making (Tilly 2006) by 
eating a chicken sandwich, seemed eager to do so. One New York Times article described 
the Chick-fil-A controversy in this way, “For many, it comes down to this: Eating at Chick-
fil-A supports heterosexual marriage and religious freedom. Refusing to eat there supports 
same-sex marriage and equality" (Severson and Brown 2012). An article in The Atlantic 
said that Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day was a sort of anti-boycott in response to calls for 
an actual boycott (Martin 2012). Hence, I can safely say that, given the evidence presented, 
Hypothesis Four, social marginalization, is satisfied.  
This is also an obvious form of counter-mobilization in that evangelicals are countering 
first moves made by the LGBTQ community. However, the primary reason I conceptualize 
it as a counter-mobilization is because evangelicals are supporting and holding up what 
they consider to the be status quo of marriage values.   
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Evangelical Response 
 After Huckabee, an elite, framed the embattled, marginalized storyline to the 
evangelical community, how did the evangelical community respond? An article from The 
Huffington Post reported the following quote from Steve Robinson, a Chick-fil-A 
executive of marketing, “While we don’t release exact sales numbers, we can confirm 
reports that it was a record-setting day” (Fox News 2012). Fox News called the turnout on 
Chick-fil-A appreciation day unprecedented, with some reports saying that restaurants 
were running out of chicken because of the overwhelming business. Huckabee told Fox 
News that the turnout for Chick-fil-A had “gone beyond anything I could have imagined” 
(Bingham 2012). CNN reported that the lines in multiple locations across the country were 
tremendous and that Facebook was flooded with images of people holding up their Chick-
fil-A bags in support of the movement. One Forbes writer who also attended the Chick-fil-
A Appreciation Day wrote of his experience:  
I live in LA so, I was not expecting much in way of support but, I was not just 
surprised, I was blown away. The Chick-fil-A in Northridge, California, had a line 
that twisted throughout the parking lot. It was almost 100 degrees but, that didn't 
seem to deter anyone. They were peaceful, and the demographic was wide-ranging. 
Blacks, whites, teenagers, kids, Latinos and all other categories you could imagine. 
At this location, there were no anti-Chick-fil-A protesters. (Broes 2012) 
 
News reports say that lines snaked around the buildings at some stores, with people waiting 
hours to get their chicken. There was a tremendous turnout and record sales. There is no 
way to know the religious or political identity of those that did turn out; however, 
Huckabee's call to action was a direct plea to Christians, most notably evangelicals. He 
said, "Let's affirm a business that operates on Christian principles and whose executives are 
willing to take a stand for the Godly values we espouse…”.  
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Who are the people who mobilized in this case? Are they really evangelicals? While it 
is unclear how many of those who participated in Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day were 
evangelical, the news painted the movement as an evangelical movement, and the call for 
action was directed at evangelicals. There is no way to defend against the ecological fallacy 
statistically; however, common sense dictates that this turnout was highly evangelical and 
based upon the defense of typical conservative evangelical values.  
The result is clear, evangelicals (and many others) collectively mobilized in support of 
Chick-fil-A. All four necessary conditions were met, and therefore, collective mobilization 
occurred. They would not have mobilized without the instigation and planning of Mike 
Huckabee, who was aided in disseminating the message through conservative media outlets 
and social media platforms. They would not have mobilized to the same extent without 
feeling marginalized and alienated. They would not have mobilized without the “collective 
identity” and desire to express that identity and their values through consumerism. In 
conclusion, then, all four hypotheses were satisfied and thus suggest a potential sufficient 
condition for evangelical collective mobilization. 
News Reports and Interviews  
In this section, I provide a few quotes from different individuals who were involved in 
the buycott. This gives a more in-depth understanding of the individual motivations for 
collective action, although I cannot say based on this evidence that it is representative of 
the population of participants. Individuals within the evangelical community, as well as 
individuals not associated with the evangelical community, mobilized for various reasons. 
Some mobilized simply because they wanted to support “free speech” while others counter-
mobilized for religious reasons. CNN reports one person saying, “It’s really hard to find 
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people or leaders that stand for something good and stay firm” (Staff 2012). Another man 
was reported saying “I think it is ironic that the so-called forces of tolerance and inclusion 
are calling for the exclusion of Chick-fil-A from cities simply because of the beliefs of 
their chairman... People that disagree with me have a right to their opinion, and I have a 
right to mine," he said. Another posted on Facebook the following statement: “Good job 
supporters for coming out in force. This company is going to make more money today than 
any other day of the year. That's what happens when you put Jesus first." Another person 
is quoted saying, “A lot of us I think, we believe that our country has made a lot of poor 
choices and it's nice just to support someone who supports the same things that we do” 
(CNN.com) 
CNN published a comments article displaying a swath of comments made by different 
readers weighing in on the Chick-fil-A debate (see “Overheard on CNN.com: Readers 
Defend Chick-fil-A’s Stance on Marriage”). One commenter says,  
Mr. C. is not trying to force you to do anything. He is merely stating his moral 
standards in public, standards which you refuse to accept. That is not hate. That is 
not discrimination. That is intolerance, but it's intolerance of evil behavior, and 
that's laudable. If you are offended by that, then that's your fault. Admit it and stop 
spewing hate. 
 
Others were more concerned about the issue of free speech. One commenter said, 
“Someone asked him his opinion. What, is he locked into only chicken-related discussion 
because he runs a chicken place?”. A homosexual man is quoted as saying, "I'm gay. I don't 
care. If I ceased buying products from companies that did things I didn't like, then I'd be 
Amish…".   
 Many different organizations joined to support of Chick-fil-a, including Project 21, a 
Black conservative activist organization. Fox News reported one of its members, 
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Demetrios Minor, explaining why their organization supports Chick-fil-A. He says, “I 
think liberals are missing a vital point in their blind hatred of Chick-fil-A. Being against 
gay marriage is not being anti-gay” (Roberts 2012).   
There were at least two primary types of supporters, those who supported the specific 
religious cause and those that supported free speech (Hannon 2013). Hannon (2013) also 
found that amongst the evangelical population there was a debate on what real Christianity 
is. Some argued that Christianity is about love and tolerance and that Dan Cathy was not 
representing true Christianity while others disagreed. 
Who Mobilized? The Individual or the Church? 
Individuals mobilized in response to elite prompting, but did churches and 
congregations also respond corporately? "Religious leaders make connections between 
faith and political goals by impressing members with a sense that they should participate 
in politics as part of the criteria of living 'like a Christian'" (Greenberg 2000, 381). Pastors 
can use the community of the church to impress upon their members the importance of 
supporting their Christian values by supporting Chick-fil-A. However, there is little 
evidence available, that I can find, to show that this is how pastors or churches responded 
in this instance.   
While churches act as a network of association with opinion leaders generating and 
stimulating discourse, as my interviews show, not all churches engage in corporate 
behavior. In fact, based on my findings, very few churches engage in this behavior. This 
leads me to believe that only a small number of evangelical pastors are responsible for 
making most of the noise coming from the evangelical population. Perhaps most 
evangelical churches keep their heads down and do not get involved? This does not mean 
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that many of the evangelicals attending church were not activated to participate in the 
Chick-fil-A buycott, but it does mean that many of those participating were not likely 
participating because of a church-wide movement instigated by the pastor.49 
However, some evangelical pastors and evangelical leaders feel the need to get 
involved in political and social issues even if others, seemingly the majority, do not. Larry 
Taunton, a prominent author and Christian activist, also the founder of Fixed Point 
Foundation, a Christian think tank in Alabama, wrote an article about his experiences 
regarding the Chick-fil-A controversy. Taunton used the article, published on a Fox News 
Opinion page, to criticize pastors who do not get involved, claiming that they are simply 
wimps. He says, "This event [Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day] marked the first time I could 
remember Christians fighting back rather than meekly submitting to the media and special 
interest bullies" (2017). He argued against the stance a fellow evangelical, John Piper, took 
on the Chick-fil-A controversy. Piper discouraged evangelicals from participating in the 
buycott and said that he would not be participating in the Chick-fil-A buycott. His 
reasoning is as follows: 
Convictions, especially political ones, will divide people. That is inevitable but not 
desirable.  The separation of believers and unbelievers, when it happens, must be a 
last resort or an unavoidable result.  Actions to the contrary, those that clearly 
promote an ‘us versus them’ mentality, are most often unhelpful.  There is a time 
for Christians to engage in boycotting, such as when a business deals in obviously 
immoral areas or is clearly unethical in its methods.  But for a mass of Christians 
to descend upon Chick-fil-A restaurants across the country tomorrow to support the 
leadership’s view on this issue is, I believe, a bold mistake. 
 
Taunton, miffed by this stance, writes in response, “…brother, if you can’t be relied on to 
show up and order a combo meal in support of a company under attack for its commitment 
                                                 
49 I cannot definitively say that there was no corporate church involvement/mobilization; however, I could 
not find any news reports or information to show that there were church wide mobilizations. There likely 
were a few; however, there were apparently not enough to garner media attention.  
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to Christian principles, when exactly can we count on you?”. Taunton proceeds to lay out 
what he believes a Christian’s duty is. He says it is not to be likable. Rather, Christians 
should "push back against culture" and, in turn, be perceived as "divisive," "unloving," 
"bigoted" and "intolerant" for standing for what is right and moral. He draws his argument 
to a conclusion when he says, "I fully believe that if they [evangelical Christians] were to 
find their voices, their courage, and were to dispense of the candy-assed Christianity, that 
we would see a Great Awakening in America. Indeed, we would see American become 
truly great rather than superficially so. But it will, as I say, require courage because the 
forces opposing us seem determined to burn this country to the ground" (2017). 
There is a clear spiritual disagreement within the evangelical community about their 
place in society and politics. I believe that the Chick-fil-A controversy draws attention to 
this disagreement. Further, I presume that the Chick-fil-A case was one of the few 
occasions that the hitherto latent evangelicals were willing to participate. Their 
involvement was not part of a church-wide protest. It did not require a political stance or 
require becoming deeply involved in a debate, nor did it require a well-oiled organization 
with millions of members. Instead, all that was required was simply buying a chicken 
sandwich. In doing so, however, they could make a statement about their individual values 
and establish themselves as part of a certain community (Hannon 2013).  
The pastors that I interviewed almost all seemed to fall into the “stay out of the politics” 
camp. They did not mind forms of traditional political participation like voting. In fact, 
they encouraged and supported traditional participation; but they would rarely ever 
organize a church-wide protest or boycott or tell their congregants to vote for someone. 
The focus on the individual was ever-present in their mindset. Every individual in the 
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congregation was entitled to their own opinion, conscience and political position. The 
church was not interested in forcing its members to support a corporate position that the 
member may not support. Each pastor seemed fine with the idea of individual members 
engaging in whatever form of political mobilization they wanted, whether it be expressing 
on Twitter on avoiding a certain company because of their position on some moral issue, 
but corporate activity was avoided. Thus, it is fundamental to this chapter that the readers 
understand the uniqueness of this Chick-fil-A buycott.  
The “Kiss-In” and Homosexual Response 
Two days after Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day, the LGBTQ community launched their 
own protest, this time against Chick-fil-A. They held a “Kiss-In” in which gay members 
of the community came to Chick-fil-A to kiss in public at the restaurant. The turnout was 
surprisingly muted. News reports claim that there was a much smaller than expected 
turnout for the “kiss-in” protest (NBCDFW 2012; Williams, Vives, and Xia 2012). Local 
TV stations reported little to no turnout in some places.  
This muted turnout in support of the homosexual community seems a little surprising. 
At the time, LGBTQ rights were central in the cultural zeitgeist. In 2012, 3.5% of the 
United States population identified as LGBTQ (Gates 2017). This is not a very large 
number of people in the U.S., although if all 8.3 million turned out to kiss at Chick-fil-A, 
there could have been a notable turnout. The LGBTQ population is smaller than the 
evangelical population, which could be one explanation for lower turnout. However, they 
had been very active socially and politically during 2012, and social and political activism 
is not against the LGBTQ movement or worldview.  
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The LGBTQ population has been a marginalized population for centuries (Plummer 
1996). “The significance of homosexuality in our society context within which the 
homosexual can find has been minimized and obscured by the force acceptance as 
homosexual and collective support of social taboo” (1996). However, clearly, an important 
variable was missing in this instance of attempted LGBTQ mobilization. A hypothesis was 
left unsatisfied. 
Carly McGehee, a lesbian political activist, based in Dallas, Texas, posted a Facebook 
post calling the LGBTQ community to action after Cathy's remarks. She said later in an 
interview, “We live in a time where hate isn't acceptable anymore" (Murray 2012). Her 
Facebook post received 15,000 likes. How elite and respected is Carly McGehee? It is hard 
to say, and research shows little about what kind of activist she is. She does not represent 
Gay, Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) a powerful and prominent gay rights 
organization. Her "Kiss-In" did receive a sizeable amount of media coverage, and she was 
interviewed by GLAAD about the boycott prior to the planned day of action. However, the 
satisfaction of Hypothesis Two, elite framing, and mobilization, is hard to establish. The 
framing was weak and the elite status questionable. 
There is a clear sense of "collective identity" in this community, and the presence of 
the evangelical "out-group" confirms this, which means Hypothesis Three is satisfied. Dan 
Cathy's statements act as a clear catalyst event, satisfying Hypothesis One. A clear sense 
of social marginalization brought on by Dan Cathy's comments is harder to support, 
however, even if it appears supported at face value. The LGBTQ community has been 
marginalized on many occasions; however, in this circumstance, the swath of media voices, 
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political voices, and social reactions supporting the LGBTQ community after the Dan 
Cathy statements likely vindicated some of these feelings. 
Further, Chick-fil-A made no public statement regarding its stance on homosexuality. 
Dan Cathy spoke of his marriage values, but he did not say that he opposes gay marriage 
or that members of the LGBTQ community are not welcome in his restaurant. Perhaps the 
discovery of Chick-fil-A donations to “anti-gay” organizations is a stronger motivator; but 
even that does not change the fact that many politicians and talking heads rallied in support 
of the gay community, assuaging much of their social marginalization. For the feelings of 
marginalization to matter, members must feel like society is not on their side and that they 
are on the margins of society. The slew of reactions for the LGBTQ cause goes against this 
marginalized premise then, making collective action harder to stimulate. There is no need 
to make an “identity claim” or express a marginalized perspective when---as I showed in 
the description of the backlash against Chick-fil-a---most of society is rallying in favor of 
that perspective and identity. Hence, I cannot safely say that Hypothesis Four is satisfied. 
This means that Hypothesis Five is not satisfied and is the likely explanation for such a low 
turnout on the designated “kiss-in” day.   
Conclusion 
 These case studies show that the combination of four necessary conditions potentially 
creates the ideal sufficient condition for evangelical mobilization. Further, the unsuccessful 
LGBTQ “Kiss-in” suggests the importance of a prominent elite voice, a powerful frame 
and vibrant feelings of social marginalization.  
 There is much work to be done moving forward. This is not an exhaustive study, and there 
are other cases to study. The two cases I have tested provide support for my theory that 
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perceived social marginalization, kindled by opinion leaders, may be a necessary condition 
for mobilization. Further, they provide a clearer picture of evangelical motivations and 
stimulation. They respond to language promoting Biblical values and family values; 
further, they may feel threatened by the homosexual “out-group” and therefore respond to 
language invoking this threat.  
 The findings presented in this dissertation are unique within political science and 
religion and politics. Groups that feel marginalized and alienated are supposed to mobilize 
using alternative methods of political and social involvement. However, I am finding that, 
for evangelicals, they are for the most part content using mainstream forms of participation 
such as voting and writing their congressman. A small subset certainly engages in deeper 
ways as opinion leaders, media figures, and campaign donors. Further, many seem to be 
entirely individualistic in their worldview. Therefore, it takes a unique set of conditions to 
mobilize evangelicals. In other words, evangelicals do mobilize because of feeling 
marginalized but only under a specific set of circumstances. This chapter shows that 
collective mobilization is hard to come by for evangelicals and may only occur when the 
stars align.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
TWITTER: THE NEW, NEW TACTIC 
 
“The gospel doesn’t need gimmicks it stands on its own truth. Marketing ploys in the 
church as if Jesus is a product is an insult to the cross & the redemptive power of God. 
Implementing secular things or preaching a ‘desirable’ gospel other than the bible  to 
win souls is a no.”  
 Nefertari—@Rumbizlee, posted on Twitter April 1, 2018, at 1:42 pm  
 
“The church cannot be both prophet and lobbyist. We must decide to whom are we 
allegiant? In whom do we place our trust? If it is man, then we should lobby as if our 
lives depended on it. But if our hope is in God, then we should speak truth. To power. 
Regardless of consequence.” 
 Mark Charles---@wirelesshogan, posted on Twitter February 2, 2018, at 10:13 pm   
 
“Federal lawsuit in Colorado against a Christian baker why not against a Muslim baker? 
Double standards?” 
 Harry Hattigh---@HarryHattigh, posted April 5, 2018, at 8:50 am   
 
“I don't spend a single moment fearing Muslims. White Republican Evangelicals, on 
the other hand... now, they terrify me daily. #LoveAMuslim” 
 John Pavlovitz---@johnpavlovitz, posted April 3, 2018, at 4:00 pm   
 
“YES. They frighten me too. Crazy. They actually believe in doing whatever they deem 
necessary to bring on the apocalypse and therefore the second coming. Dangerous 
Fools.” 
NerdQueen---@Scarletthirty2, post on April 4, 2018, at 4:19 pm in response to 
Pavolovitz's tweet. 
 
The prominent author and blogger, Lauren Leto, said this of Twitter: “Twitter provides us 
with a wonderful platform to discuss/confront societal problems. We trend Justin Bieber 
instead” (Farfan 2017). She brings attention to the irony of Twitter. Twitter provides an 
open forum for public political discussion and news in a way that has never been seen 
before. Yet, most people tweet about nonsense or mundane topics. Research shows that 
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liberals tweet more about politics than conservatives and that their tweets are also more 
negative (Preotiuc-Pietro et al. 2017); therefore, there is variation in Twitter usage, and this 
variation allows us to garner some useful and interesting information about different groups 
in America. 
I use Twitter as a proxy for evangelical mobilization at the individual level. Twitter 
provides a public forum for evangelicals to express themselves and their values; the 
question is, do they? Rigorous analysis of the emotional makeup of the tweets requires a 
level of statistical sophistication that even some highly skilled computer programmers 
struggle to carry out. Therefore, I am unable to provide conclusive evidence about the 
levels of perceived marginalization, or the lack thereof, expressed in evangelical tweets. 
However, I do create a completely original dataset of evangelical Twitter users and a 
control dataset of randomly selected Twitter users that allows me to compare the use of 
political language by evangelicals and the general US population on Twitter. Further, I 
assess the basic negative and positive sentiment displayed in evangelical tweets versus the 
control dataset. I am also able to assess political Twitter use between the two groups 
regionally. This analysis provides a narrow but enlightening and original starting point for 
religion and politics scholars to understand how evangelicals are mobilizing online.    
Twitter  
 Twitter has changed our world. It has become a new forum for public statements, a 
new source of political and social activism, and a primary news source for many people 
(Cresci 2016). As of January 1, 2018, there were 330 million monthly active Twitter users 
producing about 500 million tweets a day (Aslom 2018). Seventy-nine percent of Twitter 
users are based outside of the United States (2018). Demographically, 37% of Twitter users 
 237  
are between the ages of 18-29, while 25% are between the ages of 30-49. Fifty-percent of 
Twitter users make $50,000 or more a year. Twenty-nine percent of Twitter users have a 
college degree or higher, while 25%  have some college. Only 20% have a high-school 
degree or less. Twitter is therefore more popular among the highly educated. Men and 
women use Twitter at about the same rate. Twenty-four percent of all internet-using 
Americans (68%) use Twitter (Greenwood, Perrin, and Duggan 2016; Smith and Anderson 
2018).  
Twitter has truly revolutionized the way the world works. However, as Lauren Leto 
aptly stated, much of the discussion on Twitter has little to do with political or social issues. 
In fact, Preotiuc-Pietro et al. (2017) find that most of the political discussion on Twitter 
comes from a small number of ideologically extreme members while most moderate 
members use the site for immaterial conversations, comments, arguments, celebrity 
following, and discussion. Demographically, Twitter does skew young, and users tend to 
make more money than the world average; therefore, I realize that an analysis of Twitter is 
not representative of everyone. However, because Twitter over-represents the educated and 
wealthy it provides a key source of analysis to look at some of the more vocal members of 
the population (Smith and Anderson 2018).  
Twitter acts as an ideal proxy for individual-level mobilization. Are evangelicals 
stimulated to express their “identity claims” (Tilly 2006) online after a politically or 
socially relevant event stirs up feelings of social marginalization? The results of my case 
studies in Chapter 5 show that without the necessary conditions of elite framing, collective 
identity, a catalyst event, and a feeling of social marginalization, evangelicals are unlikely 
to mobilize collectively.   
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However, in this chapter, I assume some evangelicals are mobilizing individually by 
expressing their thoughts and positions on social media forums. Thus, all the variables 
previously mentioned are not necessarily relevant. I believe each variable might at some 
point influence online expression, but the combination of all the variables for sufficiency 
is not required for individual expression on social media. I contend that the key influencing 
factor for political expression on Twitter, for evangelicals, is a feeling of social 
marginalization. In other words, if the counter-factual could be tested, we would find that 
members who are politically expressive on Twitter would not have expressed in this way 
were they not feeling social marginalization.  
Expression is a fundamental part of political mobilization (Theocharis 2015; Rojas and 
Puig-I-Abril 2009). Mobilization or counter-mobilization is simply an individual or a group 
of individuals expressing themselves publicly. Citizens desire that their voices, for 
whatever cause, be heard. Charles Tilly calls it "identity claims." Evangelicals simply want 
to express their identity and their position on an issue without becoming overly involved 
in the political or social process. Twitter allows for this kind of engagement. 
While there is some debate about whether social media activity can be considered 
political activity, scholars now agree that social media activism is indeed political activity 
(Oser, Hooghe, and Marien 2013; Feezell 2016; McCosker 2015; Theocharis 2015; 
Sormanen and Dutton 2015). Someone who chooses to go online and express their feelings 
and thoughts about a political/social issue in a public forum is uniquely different from 
someone who does not put the same time and effort into expressing those feelings or 
thoughts publicly. While it is impossible to know whether the person who does not use 
social media politically has the same feelings as the one who does, we can know that there 
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are some intangible variables pushing one person into online mobilization instead of 
another. 
The intangible mobilizing variable may be as simple as age. An elderly person may 
have strong feelings and thoughts about political and social issues, but they are not inclined 
or even capable of using social media to express those sentiments. Also, research shows 
that certain personality types, such as extroversion and openness to new experiences, lend 
themselves to increased social media usage, specifically for political reasons (Correa, 
Hinsley, and Zúñiga 2013). Other psychological factors such as anxiety and emotional 
instability also lend themselves to increased social media usage (Correa, Hinsley, and 
Zúñiga 2013). While I cannot analyze the variables that differentiate Twitter users from 
non-Twitter users, I can analyze the nuances differentiating Twitter users who express 
themselves politically from those users who do not.  
Some research has been done on the differences between conservative and liberal 
Twitter users. Preotiuc-Pietro et al. (2017) find that there are fewer very conservative 
Twitter users than very liberal Twitter users. Very conservative Twitter users use more 
religious language and demonstrate more positive emotion than very liberal Twitter users. 
Liberal Twitter users’ language reflects more anxiety. Preotiuc-Pietro et al.’s analysis 
shows that “…conservatives on Twitter [tend] to identify [with] like-minded individuals, 
as extreme conservatives are a minority on the platform. Liberals, by contrast, use the 
platform to discuss and popularize their causes” (734).  
Their research shows then that liberals are far more likely to use Twitter for political 
expression than conservatives, which means that any amount of political expression by 
evangelicals is that much more unique. Preotiuc-Pietro et al. (2017) also find that 
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ideologically extreme Twitter users tweet about political issues much more frequently than 
ideologically moderate users. Further, the overall sentiment of ideologically extreme 
Twitter users is more negative. Ergo, the use of political terms in tweets is almost always 
correlated with the ideological extreme groups. Given then that evangelicals usually hold 
ideologically extreme views, they should be politically active on Twitter. However, as 
Burge (2018) shows in his assessment of evangelical elites on Twitter; very few of them 
used the platform for political expression. I believe that these pastors are restrained by more 
pressures and expectations than average evangelicals, and therefore I expect to find a 
higher rate of evangelical political expression on Twitter by non-clergy evangelicals. 
Operationalization 
The research for this chapter is two-fold. First, are evangelicals mobilizing? The 
literature has established that social media political expression is a form of activism. 
Therefore, the first question to answer is are they actually mobilizing. After I uncover the 
answer to this question, I assess the negative or positive sentiment displayed in the tweets.  
Given that mobilization is “the deliberate activation of social networks as a method of 
diffusing awareness about a social or political problem or of exerting social and/or political 
pressure for its resolution” (Theocharis 2015, 5) and that expression is a key means of 
carrying this out, I choose to analyze Twitter. Due to data and coding limitations, I simply 
analyze the number of tweets that contain political words. Using an extensive list of 240 
political words or phrases such as "Trump," "Parkland," "Gun Control," "Gay," "Abortion" 
and many others, I am able to identify political tweets. To achieve a more nuanced 
assessment of political tweets, I divided the set of 240 words into social-political words 
and non-social political words. Social-political words consist of words that deal with social 
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issues, for example, gay, abortion, transgender, and death penalty. Non-social political 
words are any other political words such as the following: Trump, Hillary, Congress, taxes, 
immigration and more. 
While I cannot analyze the following expectations directly, based on my theory, I 
expect that evangelicals will display defensive language, especially surrounding values 
they feel are under attack. Since I believe that evangelicals are counter-mobilizing, I expect 
to find them defending the status quo; specifically, I expect to see them defending what 
they believe to be the status quo of values. For instance, if evangelicals believe that the 
status quo in America is “traditional” marriage, they will defend their version of this value 
if they feel it is under attack. Further, if they feel that they are under attack, they will also 
use language defending themselves or their identity.  
Ryan Burge (2018) found that, out of 88 evangelical pastors’ Twitter accounts, only 
three of them were politically active. This finding coincides with my theoretical assumption 
(and findings from my interviews) that most pastors are disinclined to make public political 
or social statements or take public positions on political or social issues. I do not believe 
that pastors will be highly active on Twitter given their sensitive leadership position; 
however, I do believe that, based on social movement theory, evangelicals who are not 
clergy will use Twitter to vent their frustrations with society and/or express their views. 
Twitter provides a low-cost means of activism and expression, and I believe that 
evangelicals are willing to capitalize on this low-cost form of activism. If evangelicals are 
indeed feeling socially marginalized, then I would expect to find evangelicals on Twitter 
using a good degree of political rhetoric, specifically defensive political rhetoric. I expect 
them to verbally "fight back." 
 242  
Theoretically, I also contend that there must be a significant event that mobilizes 
evangelicals into collective action. They collectively mobilize with the instigation and 
framing of elites, but I believe many individually mobilize sooner than they engage in 
collective action (if they ever do). In short, I do not believe that a catalyst event is a 
necessary condition for individual mobilization on Twitter; however, I do believe that an 
event will likely spur more reaction than no event. The goal of this chapter then is to test 
whether evangelicals first, mobilize. Second, do they mobilize as much, more or less than 
a random sampling of all Twitter users? Finally, do they tweet more about social-political 
issues or non-social political issues and is there a difference in the sentiments between the 
two? 
Evangelical Users Dataset 
I compile a dataset of evangelical Twitter users as well as randomly-selected Twitter 
users that are active on Twitter today. In order to do this, I first selected six evangelical 
elites—evangelical "superusers"—from Ryan Burge's 88 evangelical elites. By doing this, 
I increase the likelihood of evangelicalism by using their followers as my pool of Twitter 
users to create the evangelical dataset. I did not select one of the three overtly political 
elites that Burge identified as I did not want to bias my selection and I also wanted to assess 
the use of political rhetoric by purely doctrinal evangelicals. The three evangelical figures 
I chose were Matt Chandler who has 421,000 followers, John Piper who has 981,000 
followers and Beth Moore who has 865,000 followers. I created for myself double 
protection by sifting through followers of an already established evangelical elite. Thus, 
not only do these account profiles use key evangelical words and phrases, but they are also 
following key elite evangelical figures. 
 243  
 In order to identify evangelical users, I created a dataset of overtly evangelical words, 
such as "Christ," "Jesus," "born-again" and "redeemed," and identify users with these 
words in their profile descriptions. I hydrate 351,000 users from the over 2.2 million 
evangelical superuser followers. Of these 351,000 hydrated users, only 17,417 were overtly 
evangelical—i.e., they used overtly evangelical words in their profile descriptions. This 
means that of the 351,000 followers of the six evangelical superusers, just under 5% were 
overtly evangelical based on their profile. Following this, I was able to gather up to 3,000 
tweets per user; however, since most users have not tweeted 3,000 times, the average 
number of tweets per user is 450 resulting in a total of 7.8 million tweets. These tweets 
span a range of time between one week to two years, depending on how frequently or 
infrequently the user tweeted. For a baseline dataset, I gathered one million tweets from 
2,500 randomly selected Twitter users. I am able to analyze approximately 400 tweets per 
user for the control dataset.  
Again, the percentage of followers who are distinctly evangelical was about 5% of the 
total followers of each evangelical figure. I cannot definitively say that these Twitter users 
fit into the doctrinal standards for evangelical, but the likelihood is high that they do. The 
fact that they follow prominent evangelical figures, coupled with their public 
proclamations of faith, leads me to believe that these individuals are highly active and 
involved in their faith and therefore more likely evangelical than mainline protestant. I also 
cannot say that the users without key religious words in their profiles are not evangelical. 
This is the price I must pay, however, to compose a clearly identified evangelical dataset 
possible using the information provided on Twitter. 
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With this dataset, I can examine variation within the evangelical population itself. The 
first question I want to answer is, how many evangelical users are actually politically active 
on Twitter? Since I have established that political rhetoric on Twitter, a form of expression, 
is considered a form of mobilization, I can assess how many evangelicals are mobilizing 
on Twitter by looking at the frequency of political language in their tweets. The next 
question I want to answer is how many of these evangelicals are showing signs of perceived 
marginalization? Further, I expect the tweets discussing social issues will show more 
indications of marginalization than those tweets that are purely political.  
I analyze evangelical mobilization against two baselines: the rate of elite evangelical 
mobilization shown in Burge's (2018) analysis of evangelical elites on Twitter and all 
Twitter users. For the Burge baseline, out of 88 users, he found that only three elite 
evangelicals were actively engaged in political rhetoric on Twitter. He found that just 1.8% 
of the tweets analyzed (85,543 tweets in total) displayed political language. Thus, the 
threshold of political mobilization is very low for evangelical elites. I believe that most 
pastors and evangelical elites hold themselves to a different standard and are therefore more 
careful about what they tweet about and how engaged they are politically. The findings 
from my interviews with pastors confirm this belief. I argued in Chapter 4 that it is likely 
that evangelicals who are not pastors are much more willing to engage in politics and 
express their feelings of social marginalization than pastors. Further, if evangelical 
churchgoers are anything like their pastors, they are feeling socially marginalized and 
stereotyped, but with less of a filter than the pastors. Thus, I expect to see more 
mobilization in my dataset than that of Burge, since mine is compiled of all kinds of 
evangelical users, not just elites.  
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The baseline using all Twitter users is a bit more complex. While theoretically I could 
say that evangelicals, if they are feeling socially marginalized, should show more political 
mobilization than the other users, I do not necessarily believe this is the case. Neither do I 
believe that evangelical tweets are going to be more negative than those of all Twitter users. 
As Preotiuc-Pietro et. al. (2017) find, liberal users are much more negative than 
conservative users. However, I do expect to find that evangelical users will display higher 
levels of marginalization when discussing social issues than political issues when 
compared to all Twitter users. This finding can speak specifically to my conceptualization 
of social marginalization.   
I also analyze regional variation. Are evangelicals in the South more likely to mobilize 
than those in the Northeast, Midwest or West? These findings allow me to understand a bit 
more about the environments in which evangelicals may feel marginalization, or if that 
even matters. In other words, I would expect northern evangelicals to feel more 
marginalized by society than southern evangelicals; but perhaps living in the South, where 
evangelicals probably feel more accepted, leads to increased boldness and assertion of 
one’s values on Twitter. This regional variation can shed some light on these differences. 
This brings me to my testable implications for the evangelical dataset, a compilation of 
17,417 evangelical Twitter users. 
H1: Evangelicals are individually mobilizing on Twitter at a higher average rate 
than the elite-level evangelical figures from Burge’s (2018) dataset. 
 
I conceptualize individual mobilization as any tweet that includes political rhetoric, 
whether it be social, or economic or other. Even the use of one political word shows 
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engagement. However, the more political words that show up, the more highly political it 
is.  
H2: Evangelicals display higher levels of negative sentiment when discussing 
social political issues than non-social political issues.  
 
Social topics are those that deal with issues of morality or values. Social rhetoric 
includes words like abortion, same-sex marriage, homosexuality, gay, lesbian, transgender, 
poor, sex, sexuality, political correctness (PC), religious freedom, tolerance, bigotry, 
racism, sexism, discrimination, Colorado bakers, and more.  
H3: Evangelicals are more likely to display higher levels of negative sentiment 
when discussing social political issues than non-social political issues compared 
to all Twitter users.  
 
Discussion 
 First, I randomly select 84,000 tweets from the evangelical dataset and the control data 
to analyze. Using a set of political words, I find that 12.8% of tweets in the control group 
contained political words, while only 5% of evangelical tweets contained political words. 
This means that, according to this data, evangelicals are significantly less likely to tweet 
about political issues than the general population. However, they are significantly more 
likely to tweet about political issues than the evangelical elites in  Burge’s analysis of 
political tweets. He found that 1.8% of the tweets contained political words, while non-
elite evangelical Twitter users’ tweets contained political words 5% of the time in my 
sample. This supports my hypothesis that evangelical users are more likely to tweet 
politically than evangelical elites and also confirms my belief that evangelical users will 
be less likely to tweet politically than the control dataset users. These findings are not 
entirely surprising. Many religion and politics scholars have found that evangelicals are 
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otherworldly focused (Jelen 1993a; Olson 2000); therefore, it makes intuitive sense that 
they would spend less time tweeting about political issues.  
 In order to assess the different emotions attached to kinds of political topics, I split the 
“political words” search list into two distinct lists, a non-social political words (NSPW) 
dataset, and a social political words dataset (SPW). When tweeting politically, evangelicals 
and the control group were equally as likely to tweet about non-social political issues as 
they were to tweet about social political issues. In other words, neither dataset showed a 
clear proclivity to discuss NSPW or SPW more than the other. Thus, a random user from 
the control dataset, if they are tweeting politically, is just as likely to be tweeting about a 
NSPW and they are to be tweeting about an SPW and I found the same to be true for 
evangelical users.  
 I also ran a simple sentiment analysis on all tweets for the evangelical and control 
dataset. I found that, overall, evangelical tweets are significantly more positive in nature 
than the control tweets, even though both datasets skew slightly positive on -1 to 1 
sentiment analysis scale. I found that, for both datasets, between NSPW tweets and SPW 
tweets, the SPW tweets displayed a slightly more positive sentiment than the NSPW tweets. 
In other words, for both datasets, the tweets that contained social political words were more 
positive in nature than tweets discussing non-social political issues. This is surprising given 
the generally divisive and emotional nature of social issues.  
I also found that between the two datasets, it was tweets in the control dataset used the 
word “Trump” more often—in fact, four times more frequently than the evangelical 
dataset. The word “Trump” showed up 4,561 times in the control dataset and only 953 
times in the evangelical dataset. Given the high evangelical support of Donald Trump in 
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the 2016 presidential election, this is unexpected. Below are the top ten words from each 
dataset’s political tweets.  
These word frequencies are distinct from each other. The top ten words in the control 
dataset of political tweets are highly political while the top ten words in the sample of 
evangelical political tweets are less overtly political and seemingly more spiritual, with 
words like “God” and “love” appearing. For both datasets, the word “Trump” is the most 
frequently used, while unlikely words such as “children” or “think” also show up in the 
sets of words.  
 
Figure 6.1 Word Frequency of Top 10 Words in Control Dataset’s Political Tweets 
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Figure 6.2 Word Frequency of Top 10 Words in Evangelical Political Tweets 
Conclusion 
 The original data in this chapter offers a few new and informative nuggets of 
information regarding the political mobilization of evangelical Twitter users in comparison 
to a control group of likely nonevangelical Twitter users. The first is that evangelical 
Twitter users are much less likely to discuss politics on Twitter than general Twitter users. 
They are, however, substantially more likely to tweet something political than the 
evangelical elites from Burge’s (2018) analysis of 88 evangelical elites, confirming my 
expectation that evangelical parishioners are on average more likely to engage in online 
media expression than evangelical clergy.  
However, counter to my expectation, evangelicals displayed more positive sentiment 
in all of their tweets, including political ones, when compared to the tweets in the control 
group. Further, the negative sentiment was higher for both datasets when discussing non-
social political issues compared to social-political issues. While this is counter to my 
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hypothesis, it is not that surprising to find that evangelicals overall display more positive 
sentiment given what Preotiuc-Pietro et al. (2017) found regarding liberal versus 
conservative Twitter use. However, it is unique to find that tweets with SPWs, issues that 
are generally more emotional, displayed less negative sentiment than NSPWs for both 
datasets.  
In conclusion, I find that evangelicals are not as interested in using non-institutional 
forms of expression such as Twitter I had previously assumed. Instead, they seem more 
interested in discussing spiritual issues while non-evangelicals were far more engaged in 
political discussions. This data gathered chapter warrants much more future research and 
more in-depth analysis to better understand the nuanced differences between evangelicals 
and non-evangelicals, and between evangelicals of different races within evangelicals. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation is a first step to understanding what it takes to instigate expressive, 
extra-institutional forms of mobilization among a historically dominant group—white 
evangelical Protestants. I provide evidence of perceived social marginalization in the 
evangelical community through interviews with evangelical pastors. This social 
marginalization is key to understanding the movements and actions of the evangelical 
community. It is not the only relevant variable, but it is an important one and one that, up 
to this point, largely has been overlooked. Additionally, the perceptions of social 
marginalization displayed by the pastors I interviewed is unique in that is stems from their 
Biblical worldview and values. Thus, they are less concerned about how society views 
them personally but rather their values. Gaining a better understanding of the complex 
factors at work in generating this perception of marginalization—incorporating the role of 
race, partisan politics, and elite-level priming and framing—is an important next step. 
White evangelicals are situated in a unique position in society. Their unfettered support 
for President Trump has led to onlooker confusion about their ostensibly highly devout 
religious beliefs. Are evangelicals that are white simply feeling racial and status anxiety 
that leads them to a new fervency for white identity? My research was not intended to 
answer this question as much as it was intended to look at the mechanisms needed to 
stimulate evangelicals who are feeling marginalized, whether for theological/values or 
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racial/status reasons or something else, into unconventional expressive forms of 
mobilization.  
My findings suggest that it is difficult to stimulate evangelicals to engage in 
unconventional expressive mobilization. However, when they are stirred to action, they 
may do so vigorously. Social constructionist theory dictates that collective identity, 
emotion, elite framing, and culture are all necessary conditions for collective action. I 
argued that these are all true, but the marginalization need only be social (rather than 
political) and that there must be a catalyst event that stirs evangelicals into action. I found 
support for these assertions, meaning that perceived social marginalization seems to be 
enough to spur mobilization of a subset of evangelicals.  
The pastors from my interviews showed varying levels of perceived social 
marginalization but were not stimulated into any sorts of auxiliary forms of expression 
because of it. This could be because of the missing variables from the social constructionist 
theory; however, something tells me even these variables would not cause these pastors to 
change their behavior. I take them at their word. A few of them explained that if things 
were to “get bad enough” they would take a corporate and public stand. This means that 
the task for us, as researchers, is to figure out what that threshold is. This dissertation begins 
to uncover this question, although there is much work left to do.  
Future Research 
All of this leads me to the question: what further research is there to do on this subject? 
How else can we uncover what the threshold for collective action is for evangelicals? There 
are many different avenues for research moving forward. Perceived social marginalization 
among evangelicals and concurrent engagement in alternative forms of mobilization are 
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just the tip of the iceberg. First, I think a full-scale survey of a representative random 
sample of evangelicals asking about their engagement in protest marches, boycotting, and 
social media would offer a much clearer picture about how mobilized evangelicals are both 
individually and collectively. Further, the survey should also include questions about 
evangelical emotions; how are they feeling about society right now? How does society 
make them feel? Do they feel like outcasts? Moreover, how are these perspectives 
interwoven with their historical position of cultural and political dominance? The fact that 
many evangelicals claim to feel more discriminated against than Muslims is quite revealing 
regarding the importance of perception in understanding their psyche (Green 2017). 
My Twitter analysis only uncovers a small number of questions regarding evangelicals 
and their individual forms of expression on Twitter. Only a small portion of evangelicals 
engaged in political and social issues on Twitter; however, these users displayed evidence 
of perceived social marginalization. This shows that at least the ones who are engaged in 
politics are showing signs of social strain. However, a time-sensitive assessment of these 
online activities would do wonders for our understanding of evangelical emotions and 
mobilization. How were they feeling before 2016? Are they pre-disposed to mobilize more 
under a president they view as unfriendly as opposed to one they view as sympathetic to 
their cause? In other words, were they expressing these signs of social marginalization 
more before the Trump election since the social marginalization they perceive may have 
been amplified by political marginalization? Alternatively, are they more likely to express 
themselves in a more politically favorable environment, meaning they may retreat if the 
next president is someone they do not support? Some of these trends on Twitter would lend 
themselves to time-series analysis. Of course, Twitter is not representative of all 
 254  
evangelicals, but it can provide some valuable insight into how some of the more engaged 
citizens are feeling and responding to things. 
More rigorous research needs to be done on other forms of alternative evangelical 
mobilization. For instance, though the American Family Association does sponsor 
boycotts, they only sponsor a select few and are only interested in boycotting those few 
organizations whose fiscal bottom line will not be affected by the boycott. However, they 
are much more engaged in individually motivated collective activism. By that I mean, they 
encourage evangelicals to call, write letters, and make personal contact with the leaders at 
different companies and corporations who are promoting values or agendas that do not 
align with their Biblical perspectives. These forms of activism have proven highly 
effective, which means that AFA members are responding to the AFA's calls to action with 
actual mobilization. These forms of mobilization are not as highly visible and therefore 
draw less media attention. They do provide evidence for my theory, though, and act as a 
proxy for the issues and concerns within the evangelical population. 
To point out the obvious, the AFA is not the only evangelical organization in the United 
States and boycotting is not the only form of form of alternative expression available to 
them. In fact, there are many alternative forms of expression. Perhaps another one that 
needs to be better explored is that of local evangelical demonstrations and organization. 
For instance, the Nehemiah Network, recently founded in South Carolina, is an inter-
denominational network of 365 South Carolina pastors who have joined together to act as 
a catalyst for a fellowship of church leaders that will "1) Obey the tenets of 2 Chronicles 
7:14 together. 2) Work in communities together to engage in culture and meet spiritual and 
temporal needs. 3) Earn influence with elected officials together in defense of Judeo-
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Christian values" (palmettofamily.org). This is a unique and powerful coalition. These 
pastors have come together on the steps of the South Carolina statehouse to make their 
presence known and influence state politics. They are the first coalition of this kind to have 
a member in each Senate and House district in South Carolina. This means that members 
in each district work to hold their legislator accountable. What other organizations have 
been started of which we may be unaware? What does the existence of these organizations 
mean for evangelical mobilization both socially and politically? 
Race and evangelicalism is another area of research in religion and politics that still 
needs further attention. Most research thus far focuses exclusively on the white Christian 
Right and neglects any study of Black evangelicals. How many African American 
evangelicals are there and what is going on in their ranks? Are they also feeling social 
marginalization for the same reason that white evangelicals are? The results of my 
interviews show that there are African American evangelicals who share some of the same 
religious and social concerns as white evangelicals. This finding exposes an overlooked 
and understudied area of evangelicalism that is still in need of further research and 
unpacking.  
Evangelical inaction is also an area of research that needs more fine-tuning. This 
dissertation shows that a good proportion of evangelicals are rather silent when it comes to 
public forms of expression. The pastors I interviewed rejected the notion of church-wide 
activities or expression and were individually uninvolved, save for one Southern Baptist 
minister. Given this finding and the fact that the proportion of evangelical Twitter users 
engaging in political rhetoric was minimal, as was the number of evangelical boycotts, we 
must assume that most evangelicals are not highly involved in alternative forms of 
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mobilization. Of course, this is likely true of the population more broadly. However, there 
is a subset that is involved and that makes much noise. Who are these evangelicals? Who 
is the "they" that the evangelical pastors I interviewed wanted to distance themselves from? 
What portion of the evangelical population represents John Piper's belief and 
understanding of the Christian's role in society and what portion share Larry Taunton's 
belief? The answers to these questions matter to American politics and democracy given 
the size and potential influence of the evangelical population. 
Another area of research in need of more attention that I discovered while writing this 
dissertation is the politicization of corporations. Is this a new phenomenon or have 
corporation always wielded their power politically? The North Carolina HB2 corporate 
boycott was successful and incredibly powerful. I have not done extensive research at this 
point on corporations and their impact on social and political norms, but I would be 
interested to see what research does exist and begin to dabble in this area myself. 
Corporations wield an immense amount of power, both politically and socially; therefore, 
political scientists cannot miss their contribution and influence on the political and social 
world. I believe so much time, effort and research has been put into studying interest 
groups, lobbyists, political parties, and big business and their influence on politicians, we 
miss the agenda-setting power of big business. This is an area that has yet to be fully 
explored and one that I am interested in exploring. 
Conclusion 
There is still much research to be done and much about the evangelical population to 
understand. However, the influence of their perceived social marginalization is not 
something to take lightly and shrug off. I believe it played a pivotal role in the Trump 
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election—almost certainly magnified by partisan, racial, and perhaps economic 
overtones—and is likely to serve an important function in future elections, as well as in 
future conversations about social and political issues. I started this dissertation with a quote, 
and I will end with a quote that encapsulates the perceptions of social marginalization 
grounded in group identity that elites are trying to stir up to mobilize the evangelical base. 
I end with these words written by Larry Taunton to his evangelical base: “I urge you 
instead to be offended by the way our God’s name is blasphemed in our country every day; 
by the 54 million children murdered in the holocaust of abortion since 1973; by the sordid 
sexual agenda that is eroding the fabric of Western civilization; by the fact that Christians 
are dying for their faith, largely at the hands of Muslims, at a rate of 100,000 per year; and 
most of all, by the reality that these things are being ignored, trivialized, or celebrated. 
These are things that offend me deeply, and I hope they offend you, too. Righteous anger 
has a place within the Christian life. Tap into it. In the words of Ephesians 4:26 “Be angry 
and do not sin” (Larry Taunton 2017).  
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APPENDIX A 
CLERGY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Tell me a little bit about yourself and your ministry. 
2. Do you consider yourself to be evangelical? Do you believe this term can also be 
applied to your congregation?  
3. How do you feel society views you or people like you?  
4. What are your thoughts on society and politics today, from your perspective as either 
a Bible-believing Christian or as a pastor?  
5. What do you think about the direction society is headed in both socially and 
politically and how does it make you feel?  
6. What issues do you believe are the most important in society today? What issues do 
you think are most important to evangelicals today? 
7. Do you, as an individual and as a congregation, feel that you have or can have, an 
impact on the political process?  
8. Has Donald Trump’s election or his presidency so far had any effect on your answers 
to my previous questions? 
o If so, how so?  
o If not, why not? 
9. How, if at all, do you and your congregation express yourselves politically and 
socially?  
 285  
10. Have you changed your political tactics at all in the past few years? 
11. Do you see boycotting as an appropriate outlet for establishing political positions 
and/or expressing your feelings about today’s society? 
12. Do you see Twitter as an appropriate outlet for establishing political positions and/or 
expressing your feelings about today’s society? 
13. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
